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1 International Relations Theory
Getting Started with 
International Relations Theory
STEPHEN MCGLINCHEY, ROSIE WALTERS & DANA GOLD
Before we go forward you should know that this book is available in e-book, 
PDF, web and paperback versions. While we know that many will use the 
digital versions of the book, we encourage you to buy a paperback copy as 
well if you are able. A growing body of research offers strong evidence that it 
is more effective to study from paper sources than from digital. Regardless of 
how you engage with the book, we hope it is an enjoyable read. 
You can order the paperback version of this book in all good bookstores – 
from Amazon right down to your local bookstore – and digital versions are 
always freely available on the E-International Relations Students Portal: 
http://www.e-ir.info/students/
The Students Portal also includes a range of online resources that 
complement and expand upon the material in this book: http://www.e-ir.info/
online-resources/
Hello
This book is designed as a foundational entry point to International Relations 
(IR) theory. As a beginner’s guide, it has been structured to condense the 
most important information into the smallest space and present that 
information in the most accessible manner in order to introduce this area of 
study in a fresh way. It is recommended that you first consult this book’s 
companion text International Relations (McGlinchey 2017) so that you have a 
fuller understanding of the discipline of International Relations before you 
delve into IR theory, which is one of its more difficult elements.
Theories of IR allow us to understand and try to make sense of the world 
around us through various lenses, each of which represents a different 
theoretical perspective. They are ways to simplify a complicated world. In a 
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familiar analogy, theories are like maps. Each map is made for a certain 
purpose and what is included in the map is based on what is necessary to 
direct the map’s user. All other details are left out to avoid confusion and 
present a clear picture. Since a picture paints a thousand words, go to 
Google and type in ‘Singapore MRT’ and then click on images. There you will 
see a map of Singapore’s Mass Rapid Transit network. Enlarge it and stare at 
it for a moment. What you see there are lines, stations and some basic 
access information. You will not see public toilets, roads, banks, shops (and 
the like) charted as these are not essential to travelling on the system. 
Theories do a similar thing. Each different theory of IR puts different things on 
its map, based on what its theorists believe to be important. Variables to plot 
on an IR map would be such things as states, organisations, people, 
economics, history, ideas, class, gender and so on. Theorists then use their 
chosen variables to construct a simplified view of the world that can be used 
to analyse events – and in some cases to have a degree of predictive ability. 
In a practical sense, IR theories can be best seen as an analytical toolkit as 
they provide multiple methods for students to use to answer questions.
Some students love studying IR theories because they open up interesting 
questions about the world we live in, our understanding of human nature and 
even what it is possible to know. Some students, however, are eager to get 
straight to the real-life (often described as ‘empirical’) case studies of world 
events that made them want to study IR in the first place. For these students, 
studying IR theory might even seem like a distraction. Yet it is crucial to point 
out that embarking on the study of International Relations without an 
understanding of theory is like setting off on a journey without a map. You 
might arrive at your destination, or somewhere else very interesting, but you 
will have no idea where you are or how you got there. And you will have no 
response to someone who insists that their route would have been much 
better or more direct. Theories give us clarity and direction; they help us to 
both defend our own arguments and better understand the arguments of 
others.
This book presents a wide range of IR theories, split into two sections. The 
first section covers the established theories that are most commonly taught in 
undergraduate IR programmes. The second section expands to present 
emerging approaches and offer wider perspectives on IR theory. By giving 
equal space to the two sections we encourage readers to appreciate the 
diversity of IR theory. Each chapter of the book has a simple set of aims in 
mind. First, to compress and simplify the basics of each theory. Although 
theories are complex, our aim with this book is to provide an accessible 
foundation for further study rather than try to survey an entire field of 
scholarship. To return to the map analogy from above, our aim with each 
chapter is to give you a starting point on your journey – you will have to read 
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deeper and wider to fully appreciate each theory’s complexity. Like a good 
map, the chapters signpost you to where you can find this literature. Second, 
and to help you continue your journey in IR theory, each chapter also 
presents a case study of a real-world event or issue. This allows you to see 
each theory in action as a tool of analysis and understand the insights that IR 
theory can bring. The final chapter of each of the two sections (chapters 10 
and 20) breaks this format and instead offers an innovative perspective on IR 
theory as a whole – allowing you to take a fresh view of things and reflect 
back on the discipline as you reach the mid and end points of the book.
Unlike most other textbooks, there are no boxes, charts, pictures or exercises 
included. The philosophy underpinning this book is that these things can be a 
distraction. This book, like others in the E-IR Foundations series, is designed 
to capture attention with an engaging narrative.
Before we get started, one very important note. You may notice that some of 
the theories you are introduced to here are referred to by names that also 
occur in other disciplines. They may be related to those theories, or not 
related at all. This can sometimes be confusing – for example, realism in IR is 
not the same as realism in art. Similarly, you may hear the word ‘liberal’ being 
used to describe someone’s personal views, but in IR liberalism means 
something quite distinct. To avoid any confusion, this note will serve as a 
caveat that in this book we refer to the theories concerned only as they have 
been developed within the discipline of International Relations. Where minor 
exceptions to this rule are necessary, this will be stated clearly to avoid 
reader confusion.
A brief introduction to IR theory
As international relations has grown in complexity, the family of theories that 
IR offers has grown in number, which presents a challenge for newcomers to 
IR theory. However, this introduction should give you the confidence to get 
started. To kick off, this section will briefly introduce IR theory via a three-part 
spectrum of traditional theories, middle ground theories and critical theories. 
As you read further into the book, you should expect this simple three-part 
picture to dissolve somewhat – though it is a useful device to come back to 
should you get confused.
Theories are constantly emerging and competing with one another. This can 
be disorientating. As soon as you think you have found your feet with one 
theoretical approach, others appear. This section will therefore serve as both 
a primer and a warning that complexity is to be expected ahead! Even though 
this book presents IR theory in a particularly simple and basic way, complexity 
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remains. IR theory requires your full attention and you should buckle down 
and expect turbulence on your journey. 
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) set the stage 
for understanding how and why certain theories are legitimised and widely 
accepted. He also identified the process that takes place when theories are 
no longer relevant and new theories emerge. For example, human beings 
were once convinced that the earth was flat. With the advancement of 
science and technology, there was a significant discovery and humans 
discarded this belief. When such a discovery takes place, a ‘paradigm shift’ 
results and the former way of thinking is replaced by a new one. Although 
changes in IR theory are not as dramatic as the example above, there have 
been significant evolutions in the discipline. This is important to keep in mind 
when we consider how theories of IR play a role in explaining the world and 
how, based upon different time periods and our personal contexts, one 
approach may speak to us more than another. 
All of the theories previewed in this section (and many more besides) are 
covered in their own chapters in the book.
Traditionally there have been two central theories of IR: liberalism and 
realism. Although they have come under great challenge from other theories, 
they remain central to the discipline. At its height, liberalism was referred to 
as a ‘utopian’ theory and to some degree is still recognised as such today. Its 
proponents view human beings as innately good and believe peace and 
harmony between nations is not only achievable, but desirable. In the late 
eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant developed the idea that states that shared 
liberal values should have no reason for going to war against one another. In 
Kant’s eyes, the more liberal states there were in the world, the more 
peaceful it would become, since liberal states are ruled by their citizens and 
citizens are rarely disposed to go to war. This is in contrast to the rule of kings 
and other non-elected rulers who frequently have selfish desires out of step 
with citizens. His ideas have resonated and continue to be developed by 
modern liberals, most notably in the democratic peace theory, which posits 
that democracies do not go to war with each other.
Further, liberals have faith in the idea that the permanent cessation of war is 
an attainable goal. Putting liberal ideas into practice, US President Woodrow 
Wilson addressed his ‘Fourteen Points’ to the US Congress in January 1918 
during the final year of the First World War. The last of his ‘points’ – ideas for 
a rebuilt world beyond the war – was the setting up of a general association 
of nations: this became the League of Nations. Dating back to 1920, the 
League of Nations was created largely for the purpose of overseeing affairs 
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between states and implementing, as well as maintaining, international 
peace. However, when the League collapsed due to the outbreak of the 
Second World War in 1939, its failure was difficult for liberals to comprehend, 
as events seemed to contradict their theories. Therefore, despite the efforts of 
figures such as Kant and Wilson, liberalism failed to retain a strong hold and 
a new theory emerged to explain the continuing presence of war. That theory 
became known as realism.
Realism gained momentum during the Second World War, when it appeared 
to offer a convincing account for how and why the most widespread and 
deadly war in known history followed a period of supposed peace and 
optimism. Although it originated in named form in the twentieth century, many 
realists look back much further. Indeed, realists have looked as far back as 
the ancient world, where they detected similar patterns of human behaviour 
as those evident in our modern world. As its name suggests, advocates of 
realism purport that it reflects the ‘reality’ of the world and more effectively 
accounts for change in international politics. Thomas Hobbes is often 
mentioned in discussions of realism due to his description of the brutality of 
life during the English Civil War of 1642–1651. Hobbes described human 
beings as living in an orderless ‘state of nature’ that he perceived as a war of 
all against all. To remedy this, he proposed a ‘social contract’ between the 
ruler and the people of a state to maintain relative order. Today, we take such 
ideas for granted as it is usually clear who rules our states. Each leader, or 
‘sovereign’ (a monarch or a parliament, for example), sets the rules and 
establishes a system of punishments for those who break them. We accept 
this in our respective states so that our lives can function with a sense of 
security and order. It may not be ideal, but it is better than a state of nature. 
As no such contract exists internationally and there is no sovereign in charge 
of the world, disorder and fear rules international relations. For realists, we 
live in a system of ‘international anarchy’. That is why war seems more 
common than peace to realists; indeed, they see it as inevitable.
It is important to understand that, despite what the layout of the chapters in 
this book may suggest, there is no single variant of each theory. Scholars 
rarely fully agree with each other, even those who share the same theoretical 
approach. Each scholar has a particular interpretation of the world, which 
includes ideas of peace, war and the role of the state in relation to individuals. 
Nevertheless, these perspectives can still be grouped into theory families (or 
traditions) and this is how we have organised the material in this book. In your 
studies you will need to unpack the various differences but, for now, 
understanding the core assumptions of each approach is the best way to get 
your bearings. For example, if we think of the simple contrast of optimism and 
pessimism we can see a familial relationship in all branches of realism and 
liberalism. Liberals share an optimistic view of IR, believing that world order 
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can be improved, with peace and progress gradually replacing war. They may 
not agree on the details, but this optimistic view generally unites them. 
Conversely, realists tend to dismiss optimism as a form of misplaced idealism 
and instead they arrive at a more pessimistic view. This is due to their focus 
on the centrality of the state and its need for security and survival in an 
anarchical system where it can only truly rely on itself. As a result, realists 
reach an array of accounts that describe IR as a system where war and 
conflict is common and periods of peace are merely times when states are 
preparing for future conflict.
The thinking of the English school is often viewed as a middle ground 
between liberal and realist theories. Its theory involves the idea of a society of 
states existing at the international level. Hedley Bull, one of the core figures of 
the English school, agreed with traditional theories that the international 
system was anarchic. However, he insisted this does not mean the absence 
of norms (expected behaviours), thus claiming a societal aspect to 
international politics. In this sense, states form an ‘Anarchical Society’ (Bull 
1977) where a type of order does exist, based on shared norms and 
behaviours. 
Constructivism is another theory commonly viewed as a middle ground, but 
this time between mainstream theories and the critical theories that we will 
explore later. It also has some familial links with the English school. Unlike 
scholars from other perspectives, constructivists highlight the importance of 
values and of shared interests between individuals who interact on the global 
stage. Alexander Wendt, a prominent constructivist, described the relationship 
between agents (individuals) and structures (such as the state) as one in 
which structures not only constrain agents but also construct their identities 
and interests. His phrase ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992) 
sums this up well. Another way to explain this, and to explain the core of 
constructivism, is that the essence of international relations exists in the 
interactions between people. After all, states do not interact; it is agents of 
those states, such as politicians and diplomats, who interact. Since those 
interacting on the world stage have accepted international anarchy as its 
defining principle, it has become part of our reality. However, if anarchy is 
what we make of it, then different states can perceive anarchy differently and 
the qualities of anarchy can even change over time. International anarchy 
could even be replaced by a different system if an influential group of other 
individuals (and by proxy the states they represent) accepted the idea. To 
understand constructivism is to understand that ideas, or ‘norms’ as they are 
often called, have power. As such, constructivists seek to study the process 
by which norms are challenged and potentially replaced with new norms.
7 International Relations Theory
Critical approaches refer to a wide spectrum of theories that have been 
established in response to mainstream approaches in the field, mainly 
liberalism and realism. In a nutshell, critical theorists share one particular trait 
– they oppose commonly held assumptions in the field of IR that have been 
central since its establishment. They call for new approaches that are better 
suited to understand, as well as question, the world we find ourselves in. 
Critical theories are valuable because they identify positions that have 
typically been ignored or overlooked within IR. They also give a voice to 
groups of people who have frequently been marginalised, particularly women 
and those from the Global South. Much of this book’s expansion pack deals 
with theories set within this larger category.
Marxism is a good place to start with critical theories. This approach is based 
upon the ideas of Karl Marx, who lived in the nineteenth century at the height 
of the industrial revolution. The term ‘Marxist’ refers to people who have 
adopted Marx’s views and believe that industrialised society is divided into 
two classes – the business class of ‘owners’ (the bourgeoisie) and the 
working class (the proletariat). The proletariat are at the mercy of the 
bourgeoisie who control their wages and therefore their standard of living. 
Marx hoped for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat and an 
eventual end to the class society. Critical theorists who take a Marxist angle 
often argue that the organisation of international politics around the state has 
led to ordinary people around the globe becoming divided and alienated, 
instead of recognising what they all have in common – potentially – as a 
global proletariat. For this to change, the legitimacy of the state must be 
questioned and ultimately dissolved. In that sense, emancipation from the 
state in some form is often part of the wider critical agenda.
Postcolonialism differs from Marxism by focusing on the inequality between 
nations or regions, as opposed to classes. The effects of colonialism are still 
felt in many regions of the world today as local populations continue to deal 
with the challenges created and left behind by ex-colonial powers such as the 
United Kingdom and France. Postcolonialism’s origins can be traced to the 
Cold War period when much activity in international relations centred around 
decolonisation and the wish to undo the legacies of European imperialism. 
This approach acknowledges that the study of IR has historically centred on 
Western perspectives and experiences, excluding the voices of people from 
other regions of the world. Crucially, postcolonial scholars have argued that 
analyses based on Western theoretical perspectives, or that do not take into 
account the perspectives of those in former colonies, may lead international 
institutions and world leaders to take actions that unfairly favour the West. 
They have created a deeper understanding of the way in which the operations 
of the global economy, the decision-making processes of international 
institutions and the actions of the great powers might actually constitute new 
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forms of colonialism. Edward Said’s (1978) Orientalism described how 
societies in the Middle East and Asia were regularly misrepresented in 
Western literary and scholarly writing in a way that positioned them as inferior 
to the West. Postcolonial scholars are, therefore, important contributors to the 
field as they widen the focus of enquiry beyond IR’s traditionally ‘Western’ 
mindset.
Another theory that exposes the inequality inherent in international relations is 
feminism. Feminism entered the field in the 1980s as part of the emerging 
critical movement. It focused on explaining why so few women seemed to be 
in positions of power and examining the implications of this on how global 
politics was structured. You only need look at a visual of any meeting of world 
leaders to see how it appears to be a man’s world. Recognising this 
introduces a ‘gendered’ reading of IR, where we place an issue such as 
gender as the prime object on our map. If it is a man’s world, what does that 
mean? How have certain characteristics traditionally viewed as masculine – 
such as aggression, emotional detachment and strength – come to be seen 
as essential qualities of a world leader? Which qualities and characteristics 
does this exclude (it might be empathy and cooperation) and what kind of 
actions does this result in? By recognising that gender – the roles that society 
constructs for men and women – permeates everything, feminism challenges 
those roles in a way that benefits everyone. It is not simply a question of 
counting male and female bodies. Rather, feminists ask how gendered power 
structures make it difficult for women or men who display supposedly 
feminine traits to reach the highest levels of power. Given that those positions 
involve making life and death decisions, it matters to all of us whether the 
person who gets there is known for their aggression or their compassion. With 
all this talk of socially constructed gender roles, you might be beginning to 
see some overlaps – with constructivism, for example. We are doing our best 
to present each approach separately so that you have a clearer starting point, 
but it is wise to caution you that IR theory is a dense and complex web and 
not always clearly defined. Keep this in mind as you read on and as your 
studies develop.
Perhaps the most controversial of the critical theories is poststructuralism. 
This is an approach that questions the very beliefs we have all come to know 
and feel as ‘real’. Poststructuralism questions the dominant narratives that 
have been widely accepted by mainstream theories. For instance, liberals and 
realists both accept the idea of the state and for the most part take it for 
granted. Such assumptions are foundational ‘truths’ on which those traditional 
theories rest – becoming ‘structures’ that they build their account of reality 
around. So, although these two theoretical perspectives may differ in some 
respects with regard to their overall worldviews, they share a general 
understanding of the world. Neither theory seeks to challenge the existence 
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of the state; they simply count it as part of their reality. Poststructuralism 
seeks to question these commonly held assumptions of reality, not just the 
state but also more widely the nature of power. Michel Foucault’s contribution 
to poststructuralism was his identification of the knowledge–power nexus. 
What this means is that people in a position of power, including politicians, 
journalists, even scholars, have the ability to shape our common understan-
dings of a given issue. In turn, these understandings of the issue can become 
so ingrained that they appear to be common sense and it becomes difficult to 
think outside of them, leaving room for only certain kinds of action. Power is 
knowledge and knowledge is power. By analysing the way in which a certain 
understanding of an issue becomes dominant, poststructuralists aim to 
expose the hidden assumptions it is based upon. They also aim to open up 
other possible ways of being, thinking and doing in international politics.
As this brief introduction to IR theory has shown, each theory of IR possesses 
a legitimate, yet different, view of the world. Indeed, beyond the theories 
explored above are many other theories and perspectives that you will find in 
the expansion pack section of this book. It is also important to note that the 
theories covered in this book are not exhaustive and there are more that 
could be examined. However, the book’s editors believe that we have 
provided a good starting point for achieving an overall understanding of the 
field and where the most common, and most novel, approaches and 
perspectives are situated. It is not necessary – and probably not wise so early 
in your studies – to adopt one theory as your own. It is more important to 
understand the various theories as tools of analysis, or analytical lenses, that 
you can apply in your studies. Simply, they offer a means by which to attempt 
to understand a complex world.
Thinking like a scholar
Since studying IR theory requires real focus, you should start to consider how 
to make the space and time to concentrate as you read this book. You will 
need to put your devices on silent, close your internet browsers and find a 
quiet space to work. Take ten-minute mini-breaks every hour or so to do other 
things and make sure to eat a decent meal midway through your study 
session to give you a longer break. Finally, try to get a good night’s sleep 
before and after you study. Your brain does not absorb or retain information 
very well when you are sleep deprived or hungry. There will be times in the 
year when panic sets in as deadlines approach, but if you have already 
developed a good reading strategy you will find you are in good shape for the 
task at hand. So, before we delve further into IR theory, we will try to give you 
some tips to help you think like a scholar. 
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Reading for scholarly purposes is not the same as reading for pleasure. You 
need to adopt a reading strategy. Everyone has their own way of doing this, 
but the basic tip is this: take notes as you read. If you find that you don’t have 
many notes or your mind goes a little blank, then you might be reading too 
quickly or not paying enough attention. This is most likely if you are reading 
digitally on a computer or tablet, as it is very easy for eyes to wander or for 
you to drift onto a social media site. If this happens, don’t worry: just go back 
and start again. Often, reading something a second time is when it clicks.
Best practice is to make rough notes as you read through each chapter. 
When you get to the end of a chapter, compile your rough notes into a list of 
‘key points’ that you would like to remember. This will be useful when you 
come to revise or recap an issue because you won’t necessarily have to read 
the entire chapter again. Your notes should trigger your memory and remind 
you of the key information. Some textbooks do this for you and provide a list 
of key points at the end of each chapter. This book, being a foundational book 
for beginners, does not do so: we want readers to develop the important skills 
of reading and note-taking for themselves and not take short cuts.
Although there is no substitute for reading, if you find a certain theory is not 
clicking, go to the online resources section of the E-IR Student Portal (linked 
below) and you will find carefully selected audio and visual resources on each 
theory to give yourself a different perspective: http://www.e-ir.info/online-
resources-international-relations-theory/
By making notes on everything you encounter you will form a strategy that will 
allow you to retain the most important information and compress it into a 
smaller set of notes integral to revision for examinations or preparation for 
discussions and assignments. It’s best to use digital means (laptop/tablet) so 
you can create backups and not risk losing valuable handwritten paper notes. 
If you do use paper notes, take pictures of them on your phone so you have a 
backup just in case.
You should also note down the citation information for each set of notes at the 
top of the page so that you can identify the source you took the notes from if 
you need to reference it later in any written work. As theories are most often 
developed in written form it is important to understand how to properly 
reference the work of theorists as you encounter them. Referencing sources 
is very important in academia. It is the way scholars and students attribute the 
work of others, whether they use their exact words or not. For that reason it is 
usual to see numerous references in the expert literature you will progress to 
after completing this book. It is an important element of scholarly writing, and 
one that you should master for your own studies. In this book we have tried to 
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summarise issues from an expert perspective so as to give you an 
uninterrupted narrative. When we need to point you to more specialist 
literature, for example to invite you to read a little deeper, we do so by 
inserting in-text citations that look like this: (Hutchings 2001). These point you 
to a corresponding entry in the references section towards the back of the 
book where you can find the full reference and follow it up if you want to. 
Typically, these are books, journal articles or websites. In-text citations 
always include the author’s surname and the year of publication. As the 
reference list is organised alphabetically by surname, you can quickly locate 
the full reference. Sometimes you will also find page numbers inside the 
brackets. For example, (Hutchings 2001, 11–13). Page numbers are added 
when referring to specific arguments, or a quotation, from a source. This 
referencing system is known as the ‘Author-Date’ or ‘Harvard’ system. It is the 
most common, but not the only, referencing system used in IR.
When the time comes for you to make your own arguments and write your 
own assignments, think of using sources as if you were a lawyer preparing a 
court case. Your task there would be to convince a jury that your argument is 
defensible, beyond reasonable doubt. You would have to present clear, well-
organised evidence based on facts and expertise. If you presented evidence 
that was just someone’s uninformed opinion, the jury would not find it 
convincing and you would lose the case. Similarly, in academic writing you 
have to make sure that the sources you use are reputable. You can usually 
find this out by looking up the author and the publisher. If the author is not an 
expert (academic, practitioner, etc.) and/or the publisher is unknown/obscure, 
then the source is likely unreliable. It may have interesting information, but it 
is not reputable by scholarly standards. 
It should be safe to assume that you know what a book is (since you are 
reading one!) and that you understand what the internet is. However, one 
type of source that you will find cited in this book and may not have 
encountered before is the journal article. Journal articles are typically only 
accessible from your university library as they are expensive and require a 
subscription. They are papers prepared by academics, for academics. As 
such, they represent the latest thinking and may contain cutting-edge 
insights. But, they are often complex and dense due to their audience being 
fellow experts, which makes them hard for a beginner to read. In addition, 
journal articles are peer reviewed. This means they have gone through a 
process of assessment by other experts before being published. During that 
process many changes and improvements may be made – and articles often 
fail to make it through peer review and are rejected. So, journal articles are 
something of a gold standard in scholarly writing. 
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Most journal articles are now available on the internet, which leads to 
confusion as students can find it difficult to distinguish a journal article from 
an online magazine or newspaper article. Works of journalism or opinion are 
not peer reviewed and conform to different professional standards. If you 
follow the tip above and ‘search’ the publisher and author, you should be able 
to discern which is which. Another helpful tip is length. A journal article will 
typically be 10–20 pages long (7,000–11,000 words); articles of journalism or 
commentary will usually be shorter.
A final note on the subject of sources: the internet is something of a Wild 
West. There is great information there, but also a lot of rubbish. It can often 
be hard to tell them apart. But, again, if you follow the golden rule of looking 
up the author and looking up the publisher (using the internet), you can 
usually find your way. However, even some of the world’s biggest websites 
can be unreliable. Wikipedia, for example, is a great resource, but it often has 
incorrect information because it is authored, and usually edited, by ordinary 
people who are typically enthusiasts rather than experts. In addition, its pages 
are always changing (because of user edits), making it hard to rely on as a 
source. So the rule of thumb with the internet is to try to corroborate anything 
you find on at least two good websites/from at least two reputable authors. 
Then you can use the internet with confidence and enjoy its benefits while 
avoiding its pitfalls. When preparing assignments, however, you should only 
use the internet to supplement the more robust information you will find in 
academic journals and books. 
Another important part of learning to think like a scholar is to understand the 
language that scholars use. Each discipline has its own unique language. 
This comprises a range of specific terms that have been developed by 
scholars to describe certain things. As a result, a lot of the time you spend 
learning a discipline is spent learning its jargon so that you can access and 
understand the literature. Instead of packing this book with jargon we have 
tried as far as possible to explain things in ordinary language while easing 
you into the more peculiar terminology found within IR theory. This approach 
should keep you engaged while giving you the confidence to read the more 
advanced literature that you will soon encounter. 
Understanding key terms even applies to something as basic as how to 
express the term ‘International Relations’. The academic convention is to 
capitalise it (International Relations, abbreviated as ‘IR’) when referring to the 
academic discipline – that is, the subject taught in university campuses all 
over the world. IR does not describe events; rather, it is a scholarly discipline 
that seeks to understand events – with IR theory being a major tool in that 
endeavour. On the other hand, ‘international relations’ – not capitalised – is 
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generally used by both scholars and non-scholars to describe relations 
between states, organisations and individuals at the global level. This term is 
interchangeable with terms such as ‘global politics’, ‘world politics’ or 
‘international politics’. They all mean pretty much the same thing. We have 
maintained this capitalisation convention in the book.
We should also mention that as this book is published in the UK it is 
presented in British English. This means words like ‘globalisation’ and 
‘organisation’ are spelt with an ‘s’ rather than a ‘z’.
Bottom line
All theories are imperfect. If one was accurate at accounting for behaviour 
and actions in IR, there would be no need for any others. The sheer volume 
of different IR theories should be a warning to you that International Relations 
still is a young discipline that is undergoing significant formative development. 
Within that development is a sometimes fierce set of arguments over the 
nature of the state, the individual, international organisations, identity and 
even reality itself. The important point to remember is that theories are tools 
of analysis. Often they are pertinent and insightful when applied correctly to 
understand an event. But just as often they are imperfect and you will find 
yourself reaching for a more applicable theoretical tool. This book will equip 
you with a foundational starting point for developing your own IR theory 
toolkit, so that no matter what your task, you are armed with all that you need 
to get started in your analysis and well oriented to access – and understand – 
the key texts and more advanced textbooks within the field. Good luck!
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1
Realism
SANDRINA ANTUNES & ISABEL CAMISÃO
In the discipline of International Relations (IR), realism is a school of thought 
that emphasises the competitive and conflictual side of international relations. 
Realism’s roots are often said to be found in some of humankind’s earliest 
historical writings, particularly Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War, 
which raged between 431 and 404 BCE. Thucydides, writing over two 
thousand years ago, was not a ‘realist’ because IR theory did not exist in 
named form until the twentieth century. However, when looking back from a 
contemporary vantage point, theorists detected many similarities in the 
thought patterns and behaviours of the ancient world and the modern world. 
They then drew on his writings, and that of others, to lend weight to the idea 
that there was a timeless theory spanning all recorded human history. That 
theory was named ‘realism’.
The basics of realism
The first assumption of realism is that the nation-state (usually abbreviated to 
‘state’) is the principle actor in international relations. Other bodies exist, such 
as individuals and organisations, but their power is limited. Second, the state 
is a unitary actor. National interests, especially in times of war, lead the state 
to speak and act with one voice. Third, decision-makers are rational actors in 
the sense that rational decision-making leads to the pursuit of the national 
interest. Here, taking actions that would make your state weak or vulnerable 
would not be rational. Realism suggests that all leaders, no matter what their 
political persuasion, recognise this as they attempt to manage their state’s 
affairs in order to survive in a competitive environment. Finally, states live in a 
context of anarchy – that is, in the absence of anyone being in charge 
internationally. The often-used analogy of there being ‘no one to call’ in an 
international emergency helps to underline this point. Within our own states 
we typically have police forces, militaries, courts and so on. In an emergency, 
there is an expectation that these institutions will ‘do something’ in response. 
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Internationally, there is no clear expectation of anyone or anything ‘doing 
something’ as there is no established hierarchy. Therefore, states can ultim-
ately only rely on themselves.
As realism frequently draws on examples from the past, there is a great deal 
of emphasis on the idea that humans are essentially held hostage to 
repetitive patterns of behaviour determined by their nature. Central to that 
assumption is the view that human beings are egoistic and desire power. 
Realists believe that our selfishness, our appetite for power and our inability 
to trust others leads to predictable outcomes. Perhaps this is why war has 
been so common throughout recorded history. Since individuals are 
organised into states, human nature impacts on state behaviour. In that 
respect, Niccolò Machiavelli focused on how the basic human characteristics 
influence the security of the state. And in his time, leaders were usually male, 
which also influences the realist account of politics. In The Prince (1532), 
Machiavelli stressed that a leader’s primary concern is to promote national 
security. In order to successfully perform this task, the leader needs to be 
alert and cope effectively with internal as well as external threats to his rule; 
he needs to be a lion and a fox. Power (the Lion) and deception (the Fox) are 
crucial tools for the conduct of foreign policy. In Machiavelli’s view, rulers 
obey the ‘ethics of responsibility’ rather than the conventional religious 
morality that guides the average citizen – that is, they should be good when 
they can, but they must also be willing to use violence when necessary to 
guarantee the survival of the state.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Hans Morgenthau (1948) sought to 
develop a comprehensive international theory as he believed that politics, like 
society in general, is governed by laws that have roots in human nature. His 
concern was to clarify the relationship between interests and morality in 
international politics, and his work drew heavily on the insights of historical 
figures such as Thucydides and Machiavelli. In contrast to more optimistically 
minded idealists who expected international tensions to be resolved through 
open negotiations marked by goodwill, Morgenthau set out an approach that 
emphasised power over morality. Indeed, morality was portrayed as some-
thing that should be avoided in policymaking. In Morgenthau’s account, every 
political action is directed towards keeping, increasing or demonstrating 
power. The thinking is that policies based on morality or idealism can lead to 
weakness – and possibly the destruction or domination of a state by a 
competitor. In this sense pursuing the national interest is ‘amoral’ – meaning 
that it is not subject to calculations of morality.
In Theory of International Politics (1979), Kenneth Waltz modernised IR 
theory by moving realism away from its unprovable (albeit persuasive) 
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assumptions about human nature. His theoretical contribution was termed 
‘neorealism’ or ‘structural realism’ because he emphasised the notion of 
‘structure’ in his explanation. Rather than a state’s decisions and actions 
being based on human nature, they are arrived at via a simple formula. First, 
all states are constrained by existing in an international anarchic system (this 
is the structure). Second, any course of action they pursue is based on their 
relative power when measured against other states. So, Waltz offered a 
version of realism that recommended that theorists examine the charac-
teristics of the international system for answers rather than delve into flaws in 
human nature. In doing so, he sparked a new era in IR theory that attempted 
to use social scientific methods rather than political theory (or philosophical) 
methods. The difference is that Waltz’s variables (international anarchy, how 
much power a state has, etc.) can be empirically/physically measured. Ideas 
like human nature are assumptions based on certain philosophical views that 
cannot be measured in the same way.
Realists believe that their theory most closely describes the image of world 
politics held by practitioners of statecraft. For this reason, realism, perhaps 
more than any other IR theory, is often utilised in the world of policymaking – 
echoing Machiavelli’s desire to write a manual to guide leaders. However, 
realism’s critics argue that realists can help perpetuate the violent and 
confrontational world that they describe. By assuming the uncooperative and 
egoistic nature of humankind and the absence of hierarchy in the state 
system, realists encourage leaders to act in ways based on suspicion, power 
and force. Realism can thus be seen as a self-fulfilling prophecy. More 
directly, realism is often criticised as excessively pessimistic, since it sees the 
confrontational nature of the international system as inevitable. However, 
according to realists, leaders are faced with endless constraints and few 
opportunities for cooperation. Thus, they can do little to escape the reality of 
power politics. For a realist, facing the reality of one’s predicament is not 
pessimism – it is prudence. The realist account of international relations 
stresses that the possibility of peaceful change, or in fact any type of change, 
is limited. For a leader to rely on such an idealistic outcome would be folly.
Perhaps because it is designed to explain repetition and a timeless pattern of 
behaviour, realism was not able to predict or explain a major recent 
transformation of the international system: the end of the Cold War between 
the United States of America (US) and the Soviet Union in 1991. When the 
Cold War ended, international politics underwent rapid change that pointed to 
a new era of limited competition between states and abundant opportunities 
for cooperation. This transformation prompted the emergence of an optimistic 
vision of world politics that discarded realism as ‘old thinking’. Realists are 
also accused of focusing too much on the state as a solid unit, ultimately 
overlooking other actors and forces within the state and also ignoring 
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international issues not directly connected to the survival of the state. For 
example, the Cold War ended because ordinary citizens in Soviet-controlled 
nations in Eastern Europe decided to rebel against existing power structures. 
This rebellion swept from one country to another within the Soviet Union’s 
vast empire, resulting in its gradual collapse between 1989 and 1991. 
Realism’s toolbox did not and does not account for such events: the actions 
of ordinary citizens (or international organisations, for that matter) have no 
major part in its calculations. This is due to the state-centred nature of the 
thinking that realism is built upon. It views states as solid pool balls bouncing 
around a table – never stopping to look inside each pool ball to see what it 
comprises and why it moves the way it does. Realists recognise the 
importance of these criticisms, but tend to see events such as the collapse of 
the Soviet Union as exceptions to the normal pattern of things.
Many critics of realism focus on one of its central strategies in the 
management of world affairs – an idea called ‘the balance of power’. This 
describes a situation in which states are continuously making choices to 
increase their own capabilities while undermining the capabilities of others. 
This generates a ‘balance’ of sorts as (theoretically) no state is permitted to 
get too powerful within the international system. If a state attempts to push its 
luck and grow too much, like Nazi Germany in the 1930s, it will trigger a war 
because other states will form an alliance to try to defeat it – that is, restore a 
balance. This balance of power system is one of the reasons why inter-
national relations is anarchic. No single state has been able to become a 
global power and unite the world under its direct rule. Hence, realism talks 
frequently about the importance of flexible alliances as a way of ensuring 
survival. These alliances are determined less by political or cultural 
similarities among states and more by the need to find fair-weather friends, or 
‘enemies of my enemy’. This may help to explain why the US and the Soviet 
Union were allied during the Second World War (1939–1945): they both saw 
a similar threat from a rising Germany and sought to balance it. Yet within a 
couple of years of the war ending, the nations had become bitter enemies and 
the balance of power started to shift again as new alliances were formed 
during what became known as the Cold War (1947–1991). While realists 
describe the balance of power as a prudent strategy to manage an insecure 
world, critics see it as a way of legitimising war and aggression.
Despite these criticisms, realism remains central within the field of IR theory, 
with most other theories concerned (at least in part) with critiquing it. For that 
reason, it would be inappropriate to write a textbook on IR theory without 
covering realism in the first chapter. In addition, realism continues to offer 
many important insights about the world of policymaking due to its history of 
offering tools of statecraft to policymakers.
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Realism and the Islamic State Group
The Islamic State group (also known as IS, Daesh, ISIS or ISIL) is a militant 
group that follows a fundamentalist doctrine of Sunni Islam. In June 2014, the 
group published a document where it claimed to have traced the lineage of its 
leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, back to the prophet Muhammad. The group 
then appointed al-Baghdadi its ‘caliph’. As caliph, al-Baghdadi demanded the 
allegiance of devout Muslims worldwide and the group and its supporters set 
about conducting a range of extreme and barbaric acts. Many of these were 
targeted at cities in Western nations such as Melbourne, Manchester and 
Paris – which has led to the issue becoming a global one. Ultimately, the 
intent is to create an Islamic State (or Caliphate) in geopolitical, cultural and 
political terms and to deter (via the use of terrorism and extreme actions) 
Western or regional powers from interfering with this process. Of course, this 
means that existing states’ territory is under threat. Although the Islamic State 
group considers itself a state, due to its actions it has been defined as a 
terrorist organisation by virtually all of the world’s states and international 
organisations. Islamic religious leaders have also condemned the group’s 
ideology and actions. 
Despite it not being an officially recognised state, by taking and holding 
territory in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State group clearly possessed aspects 
of statehood. The major part of efforts to fight the Islamic State group has 
comprised airstrikes against its positions, combined with other military 
strategies such as using allied local forces to retake territory (most notably in 
Iraq). This suggests that war is considered the most effective method of 
counterbalancing the increasing power of terrorism in the Middle East and 
neutralising the threat that the Islamic State group poses not only to Western 
states but also to states in the region. So, while transnational terrorism, such 
as that practised by the Islamic State group, is a relatively new threat in 
international relations, states have relied on old strategies consistent with 
realism to deal with it.
States ultimately count on self-help for guaranteeing their own security. Within 
this context, realists have two main strategies for managing insecurity: the 
balance of power and deterrence. The balance of power relies on strategic, 
flexible alliances, while deterrence relies on the threat (or the use) of 
significant force. Both are in evidence in this case. First, the loose coalition of 
states that attacked the Islamic State group – states such as the US, Russia 
and France – relied on various fair-weather alliances with regional powers 
such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran. At the same time, they downplayed 
the role of international organisations because agreeing action in places such 
as the United Nations is difficult due to state rivalry. Second, deterring an 
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enemy with overwhelming, superior force (or the threat of it) was perceived as 
the quickest method to regain control over the territories under Islamic State’s 
rule. The obvious disproportionality of Islamic State’s military forces when 
compared with the military forces of the US, France or Russia seems to 
confirm the rationality of the decision – which again harks back to realism’s 
emphasis on the importance of concepts like deterrence, but also on viewing 
states as rational actors. However, the rational actor approach presupposes 
that the enemy – even if a terrorist group – is also a rational actor who would 
choose a course of action in which the benefits outweigh the risks. 
Via this point, we can see that while the actions of a terrorist group might 
appear irrational, they can be interpreted otherwise. From a realist 
perspective, the Islamic State group, by spreading terror, is using the limited 
means at its disposal to counterbalance Western influence in Iraq and Syria. 
The substantial collateral damage of a full military offensive is evidently not a 
concern for the group’s commanders for two main reasons, both of which may 
serve to enhance their power. First, it would contribute to fuelling anti-
Western sentiment throughout the Middle East as local populations become 
the target of foreign aggression. Second, the feeling of injustice prompted by 
these attacks creates an opportunity for the spontaneous recruitment of 
fighters who would be willing to die to validate the group’s aims – this is 
equally true for those within the immediate region and those internationally 
who fall prey to Islamic State propaganda on the internet.
It is for reasons such as those unpacked in this case, in regions that are as 
complex as the Middle East, that realists recommend extreme caution 
regarding when and where a state uses its military power. It is easy when 
viewing realism to see it as a warmongering theory. For example, on reading 
the first half of the paragraph above you might feel that realism would support 
an attack on the Islamic State group. But when you read the second half of 
the paragraph you will find that the same theory recommends extreme 
caution.
The key point in understanding realism is that it is a theory that argues that 
unsavoury actions like war are necessary tools of statecraft in an imperfect 
world and leaders must use them when it is in the national interest. This is 
wholly rational in a world where the survival of the state is pre-eminent. After 
all, if one’s state ceases to exist due to attack or internal collapse, then all 
other political objectives cease to have much practical relevance. That being 
said, a leader must be extremely cautious when deciding where and when to 
use military power. It is worth noting that the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
undertaken as part of the Global War on Terror, was opposed by most leading 
realists as a misuse of power that would not serve US national interests. This 
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was due to the possibility that the disproportionate use of US military force 
would cause blowback and resentment in the region. Indeed, in this case, 
realism yielded strong results as a tool of analysis, as the rise of the Islamic 
State group in the years after the Iraq invasion demonstrated.
Conclusion 
Realism is a theory that claims to explain the reality of international politics. It 
emphasises the constraints on politics that result from humankind’s egoistic 
nature and the absence of a central authority above the state. For realists, the 
highest goal is the survival of the state, which explains why states’ actions are 
judged according to the ethics of responsibility rather than by moral princip-
les. The dominance of realism has generated a significant strand of literature 
criticising its main tenets. However, despite the value of the criticisms, which 
will be explored in the rest of this book, realism continues to provide valuable 
insights and remains an important analytical tool for every student of Internat-
ional Relations.
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2
Liberalism
JEFFREY W. MEISER
Liberalism is a defining feature of modern democracy, illustrated by the 
prevalence of the term ‘liberal democracy’ as a way to describe countries with 
free and fair elections, rule of law and protected civil liberties. However, 
liberalism – when discussed within the realm of IR theory – has evolved into a 
distinct entity of its own. Liberalism contains a variety of concepts and argu-
ments about how institutions, behaviours and economic connections contain 
and mitigate the violent power of states. When compared to realism, it adds 
more factors into our field of view – especially a consideration of citizens and 
international organisations. Most notably, liberalism has been the traditional 
foil of realism in IR theory as it offers a more optimistic world view, grounded 
in a different reading of history to that found in realist scholarship.
The basics of liberalism
Liberalism is based on the moral argument that ensuring the right of an 
individual person to life, liberty and property is the highest goal of govern-
ment. Consequently, liberals emphasise the wellbeing of the individual as the 
fundamental building block of a just political system. A political system 
characterised by unchecked power, such as a monarchy or a dictatorship, 
cannot protect the life and liberty of its citizens. Therefore, the main concern 
of liberalism is to construct institutions that protect individual freedom by 
limiting and checking political power. While these are issues of domestic 
politics, the realm of IR is also important to liberals because a state’s 
activities abroad can have a strong influence on liberty at home. Liberals are 
particularly troubled by militaristic foreign policies. The primary concern is that 
war requires states to build up military power. This power can be used for 
fighting foreign states, but it can also be used to oppress its own citizens. For 
this reason, political systems rooted in liberalism often limit military power by 
such means as ensuring civilian control over the military.
23 International Relations Theory
Wars of territorial expansion, or imperialism – when states seek to build 
empires by taking territory overseas – are especially disturbing for liberals. 
Not only do expansionist wars strengthen the state at the expense of the 
people, these wars also require long-term commitments to the military 
occupation and political control of foreign territory and peoples. Occupation 
and control require large bureaucracies that have an interest in maintaining 
or expanding the occupation of foreign territory. For liberals, therefore, the 
core problem is how to develop a political system that can allow states to 
protect themselves from foreign threats without subverting the individual 
liberty of its citizenry. The primary institutional check on power in liberal 
states is free and fair elections via which the people can remove their rulers 
from power, providing a fundamental check on the behaviour of the 
government. A second important limitation on political power is the division of 
political power among different branches and levels of government – such as 
a parliament/congress, an executive and a legal system. This allows for 
checks and balances in the use of power.
Democratic peace theory is perhaps the strongest contribution liberalism 
makes to IR theory. It asserts that democratic states are highly unlikely to go 
to war with one another. There is a two-part explanation for this phenomenon. 
First, democratic states are characterised by internal restraints on power, as 
described above. Second, democracies tend to see each other as legitimate 
and unthreatening and therefore have a higher capacity for cooperation with 
each other than they do with non-democracies. Statistical analysis and 
historical case studies provide strong support for democratic peace theory, 
but several issues continue to be debated. First, democracy is a relatively 
recent development in human history. This means there are few cases of 
democracies having the opportunity to fight one another. Second, we cannot 
be sure whether it is truly a ‘democratic’ peace or whether some other factors 
correlated with democracy are the source of peace – such as power, 
alliances, culture, economics and so on. A third point is that while 
democracies are unlikely to go to war with one another, some scholarship 
suggests that they are likely to be aggressive toward non-democracies – 
such as when the United States went to war with Iraq in 2003. Despite the 
debate, the possibility of a democratic peace gradually replacing a world of 
constant war – as described by realists – is an enduring and important facet 
of liberalism.
We currently live in an international system structured by the liberal world 
order built after the Second World War (1939–1945). The international 
institutions, organisations and norms (expected behaviours) of this world 
order are built on the same foundations as domestic liberal institutions and 
norms; the desire to restrain the violent power of states. Yet, power is more 
diluted and dispersed internationally than it is within states. For example, 
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under international law, wars of aggression are prohibited. There is no 
international police force to enforce this law, but an aggressor knows that 
when breaking this law it risks considerable international backlash. For 
example, states – either individually or as part of a collective body like the 
United Nations – can impose economic sanctions or intervene militarily 
against the offending state. Furthermore, an aggressive state also risks 
missing out on the benefits of peace, such as the gains from international 
trade, foreign aid and diplomatic recognition.
The fullest account of the liberal world order is found in the work of Daniel 
Deudney and G. John Ikenberry (1999), who describe three interlocking 
factors: 
First, international law and agreements are accompanied by international 
organisations to create an international system that goes significantly beyond 
one of just states. The archetypal example of such an organisation is the 
United Nations, which pools resources for common goals (such as 
ameliorating climate change), provides for near constant diplomacy between 
enemies and friends alike and gives all member states a voice in the 
international community. 
Second, the spread of free trade and capitalism through the efforts of 
powerful liberal states and international organisations like the World Trade 
Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank creates an 
open, market-based, international economic system. This situation is mutually 
beneficial as a high level of trade between states decreases conflict and 
makes war less likely, since war would disrupt or cancel the benefits (profits) 
of trade. States with extensive trade ties are therefore strongly incentivised to 
maintain peaceful relations. By this calculation, war is not profitable, but 
detrimental to the state. 
The third element of the liberal international order is international norms. 
Liberal norms favour international cooperation, human rights, democracy and 
rule of law. When a state takes actions contrary to these norms, they are 
subject to various types of costs. However, international norms are often 
contested because of the wide variation in values around the globe. 
Nevertheless, there are costs for violating liberal norms. The costs can be 
direct and immediate. For example, the European Union placed an arms sale 
embargo on China following its violent suppression of pro-democracy 
protesters in 1989. The embargo continues to this day. The costs can also be 
less direct, but equally as significant. For example, favourable views of the 
United States decreased significantly around the world following the 2003 
invasion of Iraq because the invasion was undertaken unilaterally (outside 
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established United Nations rules) in a move that was widely deemed 
illegitimate.
Most liberal scholarship today focuses on how international organisations 
foster cooperation by helping states overcome the incentive to escape from 
international agreements. This type of scholarship is commonly referred to as 
‘neoliberal institutionalism’ – often shortened to just ‘neoliberalism’. This often 
causes confusion as neoliberalism is also a term used outside IR theory to 
describe a widespread economic ideology of deregulation, privatisation, low 
taxes, austerity (public spending cuts) and free trade. The essence of 
neoliberalism, when applied within IR, is that states can benefit significantly 
from cooperation if they trust one another to live up to their agreements. In 
situations where a state can gain from cheating and escape punishment, 
defection is likely. However, when a third party (such as an impartial 
international organisation) is able to monitor the behaviour of signatories to 
an agreement and provide information to both sides, the incentive to defect 
decreases and both sides can commit to cooperate. In these cases, all 
signatories to the agreement can benefit from absolute gains. Absolute gains 
refer to a general increase in welfare for all parties concerned – everyone 
benefits to some degree, though not necessarily equally. Liberal theorists 
argue that states care more about absolute gains than relative gains. Relative 
gains, which relate closely to realist accounts, describe a situation where a 
state measures its increase in welfare relative to other states and may shy 
away from any agreements that make a competitor stronger. By focusing on 
the more optimistic viewpoint of absolute gains and providing evidence of its 
existence via international organisations, liberals see a world where states 
will likely cooperate in any agreement where any increase in prosperity is 
probable.
Liberal theory and American imperialism
One of the more interesting illustrations of liberalism comes from the foreign 
policy of the United States during the early twentieth century. During this 
period, the United States was liberal, but according to the dominant historical 
narrative, also imperialistic (see Meiser 2015). So, there appears to be a 
contradiction. If we take a closer look we see that the United States was more 
restrained than commonly believed, particularly relative to other great powers 
of that era. One simple measure is the level of colonial territory it accrued 
compared to other great powers. By 1913, the United States claimed 310,000 
square kilometres of colonial territory, compared to 2,360,000 for Belgium, 
2,940,000 for Germany and 32,860,000 for the United Kingdom (Bairoch 
1993, 83). In fact, the bulk of American colonial holdings was due to the 
annexation of the Philippines and Puerto Rico, which it inherited after 
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defeating Spain in the Spanish-American War of 1898. The United States 
exhibited such restraint because, as suggested by liberal theory, its political 
structure limited expansionism. Examining US–Mexico relations during the 
early twentieth century helps illustrate the causes of this American restraint.
In the spring of 1914, the United States invaded the Mexican city of Veracruz 
because of a dispute over the detention of several American sailors in 
Mexico. However, US–Mexican relations were already troubled because of 
President Woodrow Wilson’s liberal belief that it was the duty of the United 
States to bring democracy to Mexico, which was a dictatorship. The initial 
objectives of the American war plan were to occupy Veracruz and 
neighbouring Tampico and then blockade the east coast of Mexico until 
American honour was vindicated – or a regime change occurred in Mexico. 
After American forces landed in Veracruz, senior military leaders and Wilson’s 
top diplomatic advisor in Mexico advocated an escalation of the political 
objectives to include occupation of Mexico City – there were also vocal 
proponents who advocated the full occupation of Mexico. Wilson did not 
actually follow any of the advice he received. Instead, he reduced his war 
aims, halted his forces at Veracruz and withdrew US forces within a few 
months. Wilson exercised restraint because of American public opposition, his 
own personal values, unified Mexican hostility and the military losses incurred 
in the fighting. International opinion also appears to have influenced Wilson’s 
thinking as anti-Americanism began to sweep through Latin America. As 
Arthur Link points out, ‘Altogether, it was an unhappy time for a President and 
a people who claimed the moral leadership of the world’ (Link 1956, 405).
By 1919, a pro-interventionist coalition developed in the United States built on 
frustration with President Wilson’s prior restraint and new fears over the 
Mexican Constitution of 1917, which gave the Mexican people ownership of 
all subsoil resources. This potentially endangered foreign ownership of mines 
and oilfields in Mexico. Interventionists wanted to turn Mexico into an 
American protectorate – or at least seize the Mexican oil fields. This coalition 
moved the country toward intervention while Wilson was distracted by peace 
negotiations in Europe and then bedridden by a stroke. The path to 
intervention was blocked only after Wilson recovered sufficiently to regain 
command of the policy agenda and sever the ties between the 
interventionists. Wilson had two main reasons for avoiding the more 
belligerent policy path. First, he saw the Houses of Congress (with the 
support of some members of the executive branch) attempting to determine 
the foreign policy of the United States, which Wilson viewed as uncon-
stitutional. In the American system, the president has the authority to conduct 
foreign policy. His assertion of authority over foreign policy with Mexico was 
therefore a clear attempt to check the power of Congress in policymaking. 
Second, Wilson was determined to maintain a policy consistent with the norm 
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of anti-imperialism, but also the norm of self-determination – the process by 
which a country determines its own statehood and chooses its own form of 
government. Both of these norms remain bedrocks of liberal theory today. 
US relations with Mexico in this case show how institutional and normative 
domestic structures restrained the use of violent power. These institutional 
restraints can break down if the political culture of a society does not include 
a strong dose of liberal norms. For example, anti-statism (a belief that the 
power of the government should be limited) and anti-imperialism (a belief that 
conquest of foreign peoples is wrong) are liberal norms. A society infused by 
liberal norms has an added level of restraint above and beyond the purely 
institutional limitations on state power. A liberal citizenry will naturally oppose 
government actions that threaten individual liberty and choose represen-
tatives that will act on liberal preferences. The institutional separation of 
powers in the United States allowed Wilson to block the interventionist efforts 
of Congress and others. The liberal norm of anti-imperialism restrained Amer-
ican expansion through the mechanisms of public opinion and the personal 
values of the president of the United States. Institutions and norms worked 
symbiotically. International opinion put additional pressure on American 
political leaders due to increasing trade opportunities with Latin American 
countries throughout the early 1900s. Precisely as liberal theory details, the 
absolute gains and opportunities offered by trade, together with preferences 
for self-determination and non-interference, acted as a restraint on US 
expansionism toward Mexico in this most imperial of periods in world history.
Conclusion
A core argument of liberalism is that concentrations of unaccountable violent 
power are the fundamental threat to individual liberty and must be restrained. 
The primary means of restraining power are institutions and norms at both 
domestic and international level. At the international level institutions and 
organisations limit the power of states by fostering cooperation and providing 
a means for imposing costs on states that violate international agreements. 
Economic institutions are particularly effective at fostering cooperation 
because of the substantial benefits that can be derived from economic 
interdependence. Finally, liberal norms add a further limitation on the use of 
power by shaping our understanding of what types of behaviour are 
appropriate. Today, it is clear that liberalism is not a ‘utopian’ theory 
describing a dream world of peace and happiness as it was once accused of 
being. It provides a consistent rejoinder to realism, firmly rooted in evidence 
and a deep theoretical tradition.
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The English School
YANNIS A. STIVACHTIS
The English school provides the basis for the study of international and world 
history in terms of the social structures of international orders. Unlike many 
theories that claim a certain sector of the subject of International Relations, 
the English school provides a holistic approach to the subject, attempting to 
see the world as a whole. English school theory is built around establishing 
distinctions between three key concepts: international system, international 
society and world society. By doing so it opens up a new space in IR theory 
and offers a middle ground between the opposing theories of realism and 
liberalism.
The basics of the English school
The English school is built around three key concepts: international system, 
international society and world society. Hedley Bull (1977, 9–10) defined the 
international system as being formed ‘when two or more states have sufficient 
contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions 
to cause them to behave as parts of a whole.’ According to this definition, the 
international system is mainly about power politics among states whose 
actions are conditioned by the structure of international anarchy. An 
international society exists when a group of like-minded states ‘conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one 
another, and share in the working of common institutions’ (Bull 1977, 13). In 
other words, international society is about the creation and maintenance of 
shared norms, rules and institutions. Finally, world society is more 
fundamental than international society because ‘the ultimate units of the great 
society of all mankind are not states … but individual human beings’ (Bull 
1977, 21). Thus, world society transcends the state system and takes individ-
uals, non-state actors and ultimately the global population as the focus of 
global societal identities and arrangements. It is important to note here that in 
the English school the term ‘institution’ is different to the term ‘organisation’. 
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According to English school thought, ‘institutions’ refer to long-term practices 
among states (such as diplomacy, law and war) rather than to international 
bureaucratic structures (organisations) that may be established to facilitate 
state interaction. To refer to international organisations, the English school 
uses the term ‘pseudo-institutions’ or ‘secondary institutions’ to show that the 
effectiveness of international organisations depends on the function of an 
international society’s primary institutions.
The distinction between an international system and an international society 
helps us distinguish the pattern and character of relations among and 
between certain states and groups of states. For example, historically there 
was an essential difference between the type of relations among the 
European states and the type of their relations with the Ottoman Empire. 
Relations among the European states reflected the existence of a European 
international society, while relations between the European states and the 
Ottoman Empire reflected the existence of an international system. Likewise, 
the interaction among the European Union’s member states reflects the 
existence of an international society, while the interaction of the European 
Union itself with Turkey (a non-member) describes interaction within a 
broader international system. Despite its usefulness, the distinction between 
an international system and an international society invited considerable 
criticism because even in an international system one could observe the 
existence of some rules and the operation of some institutions. This debate 
has resulted in the acceptance of the premise that an international system 
constitutes a weak or ‘thin’ form of an international society.
Throughout the bulk of history, there was not any single international system 
or society. Instead, there were several regional international societies, each 
with its own distinctive rules and institutions. All were built upon elaborate 
civilisations, including distinctive religions, different systems of governance, 
different types of law and different conceptions of the world. This, in turn, 
implied that relations between political entities that were members of different 
regional international societies could not be conducted on the same moral 
and legal basis as relations within the same society, because the rules of 
each individual regional society were culturally particular and exclusive. There 
was no single agreed body of rules and institutions operating across the 
boundaries of any two or more regional international societies to speak for a 
broad international society. Moreover, contacts between regional international 
societies were much more limited than contacts within them. Thus, the 
emergence of a truly universal international society would not be possible 
unless one of the regional international societies could expand itself to the 
degree that it could merge all the others into a single universal society 
organised around a common body of rules and values.
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During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, international society came 
to be regarded as a privileged association of European and ‘civilised’ states, 
which had visible expression in certain institutions such as international law, 
diplomacy and the balance of power. There was a sense that European 
powers were bound by a code of conduct in their dealings with one another 
and that this code did not apply in their dealings with other societies. 
Nineteenth-century international lawyers perpetuated the cultural duality 
between Europeans and non-Europeans and between ‘civilised’ and ‘non-
civilised’ peoples. The distinction between ‘civilised’ and ‘barbarous’ humanity 
meant that states belonging to either category were accorded different stages 
of legal recognition. As the European international society spread over the 
world, many non-European states sought to join international society. Thus, 
the European states needed to define the conditions under which non-
European political entities would be admitted. The result was the 
establishment of a standard of ‘civilisation’, which reflected the norms of the 
liberal European civilisation. 
The standard of civilisation included such elements as the guarantee of basic 
human rights and the maintenance of a domestic legal system guaranteeing 
justice for all. Thus, by definition, countries unwilling or unable to guarantee 
such rights could not be considered ‘civilised’. Consequently, non-European 
candidate states were judged not only by how they conducted their foreign 
relations but also by how they governed themselves. The process also led to 
the creation of hierarchical relations between two new categories of states: 
the ‘civilisers’ and the ‘civilisees’. Or to put it another way, the ‘teachers’ and 
the ‘pupils’.
A new international society emerged following the end of the First World War 
(1914–1918), watermarked by the establishment of the League of Nations in 
1920. The latter’s design for a new global international society incorporated 
almost all the rules and practices that had developed in the European 
international society, including its international law and diplomacy, as well as 
its basic assumptions about sovereignty and the judicial equality of states 
recognised as independent members of the society. The impetus for the 
League came not from Europe, but from an American president, Woodrow 
Wilson – signifying a change in the nature of the international order. The 
outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 interrupted the functioning of the 
League and consequently led to the destruction of that particular international 
society. The establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 constituted the 
expression of yet another new international society. In fact, many principles 
and structures found in the League were replicated by the United Nations. 
Meanwhile, the standard of ‘civilisation’ was insulting to representatives of 
non-European civilisations since the privileged legal status which European 
states claimed for themselves meant not only the division of the world 
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between ‘civilised’ and ‘non-civilised’ states but also the maintenance of a 
hierarchical relationship among states. Consequently, non-European states 
and colonised communities began campaigning against the ‘standard of 
civilisation’, which was eventually abolished when the decolonisation process 
commenced – heralding the end of the age of empire and imperialism. The 
emergence of the bipolar world of the Cold War (1947–1991), when two 
superpowers divided the world into their respective orbits, led to the division 
of the relatively ‘thin’ new global international society into two sub-global 
‘thicker’ international societies: one associated with the United States and 
one with the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War in 1991 meant two things: 
first, the division of the global international society ceased to exist; and 
second, a set of regional international societies with different degrees of 
‘thickness’ gradually emerged within the confines of the ‘thinner’ global 
international society.
A key debate within the English school revolves around pluralism and 
solidarism. Pluralism refers to international societies with a relatively low 
degree of shared norms, rules and institutions. Solidarism refers to types of 
international society with a relatively high degree of shared norms, rules and 
institutions. The pluralist/solidarist debate is basically about how international 
society relates to world society or, in other words, to people. The main 
question has been how to reduce the tension between the needs and 
imperatives of states and the needs and imperatives of humankind. These are 
regularly in conflict both in real world situations and in the theory. Most 
English school scholars operate within this debate, taking the tension 
between the imperatives of order and justice as the core problem to be 
addressed. 
Important to the pluralist/solidarist debate are questions about whether 
international law should include natural law or positive law. Natural law is a 
philosophy that advocates that certain rights or values are inherent by virtue 
of human nature and can be universally understood through human reason. 
In other words, natural law refers to a body of unchanging moral principles 
regarded as a basis for all human conduct. Positive law, on the other hand, 
refers to human-made laws of a given community, society or state. This 
debate manifests most acutely between states’ claims to sovereignty (via 
pluralism) on the one hand and the idea that universal rights are vested in 
people (via solidarism) on the other. A quick example to demonstrate this 
would be to use the case of Syria. A pluralist reading would state that despite 
terrible atrocities since 2011 as the state has collapsed in a brutal civil war, 
Syria is a sovereign country and responsible for its own territory and people. 
A solidarist position would stress the overriding obligation to protect human 
life and intervene in Syria’s civil war. Both positions would suggest a very 
different type of international society. Pluralism and solidarism, while 
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seemingly opposites, are the framing principles for a debate about the limits 
and possibilities of international society. This debate is mostly about how best 
to reconcile the desires and needs of both people and states. In this sense, 
the English school is an essential tool within IR theory that tries to find a 
working balance between how power, interests and standards of justice and 
responsibility operate in international society.
The English school and the European Union
Following the end of the Second World War in 1945, six European states 
formed a regional international system in the sense that they had ‘sufficient 
contact between them, and had sufficient impact on one another’s decisions 
to cause them to behave as parts of a whole’ (Bull 1977, 9–10). Applying 
Bull’s definition of international society, relatively soon an international society 
was formed in the sense that ‘they conceive themselves to be bound by a 
common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the 
working of common institutions’ (Bull 1977, 13). In other words, these 
European states that today are associated with the European Union (EU) 
created a set of rules and institutions to govern and manage their affairs. As 
time progressed, the integration process gained strength, breadth and depth, 
resulting in the creation of supranational institutions (legal powers existing 
beyond the state), law and policies. This, in turn, led, among other things, to 
the creation of an EU world society that underpins the EU international 
society. At the same time, EU law and policies seek to regulate the relations 
between the Union and, on the one hand, its member states and, on the 
other, its people. In this way, the tension between the needs and imperatives 
of states and the needs and imperatives of people, as well as the tension 
between the imperatives of order and justice, which constitute the core of the 
pluralist/solidarist debate, are addressed.
The process of the EU enlargement as it went from six members in 1951 to 
28 in 2013 is not very different from the process of the historical expansion of 
European international society. As in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, EU member states had to define the conditions under which they 
would admit candidate states. As a result, European states that aspire to EU 
membership need to meet specific political and economic criteria. Like the 
historical standard of ‘civilisation’, the EU’s membership conditions are an 
expression of the assumptions used to distinguish those that belong to the 
expanding Union from those that do not. Those that fulfil the political and 
economic conditions set by the EU states will be brought inside while those 
that do not conform will be left outside. Like the non-European states before, 
EU candidate states had to learn to adjust themselves to new realities, 
sometimes at significant cost to their own societies. 
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The EU’s membership criteria include both economic and political conditions. 
Because the EU started as an economic organisation, the definition of the 
economic conditions that prospective members must meet was in place from 
the beginning. On the other hand, the formulation of political conditions has 
undergone considerable evolution. At its Copenhagen Summit in June 1993, 
EU norms and values were clarified under the following criteria: 
1. Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and 
respect for the protection of minorities. 
2. Membership requires the existence of a functioning market economy as 
well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union. 
3. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations 
of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union.
The EU’s potential for impacting on candidate states varies between two 
broad stages: first, pre-negotiations (when the Copenhagen criteria must be 
satisfied before negotiations commence); and second, actual negotiations 
(when political conditions are monitored regularly). During the first phase, 
negotiations may be blocked by a country’s failure to satisfy the political 
conditions, while during the second phase, negotiations may be interrupted or 
terminated if a negotiating country reverses its fulfilment of the political 
conditions or violates any of them. Here the case of Turkey comes to mind, 
considering its authoritarian power shifts and troubled human rights record – 
which may explain why its path to membership has gone unfulfilled since it 
first applied to join in 1987. 
The process of EU enlargement, steadily growing to cover the bulk of the 
European continent, demonstrates how a ‘thick’ regional international society 
expands outwards, gradually transforming the much broader international 
system in which it is embedded into an international society. But, as noted 
earlier, the international system itself represents a ‘thin’ form of an inter-
national society. 
However, the expansion process does not end with the entry of candidate 
states into the European Union. In fact, elements of order present in the EU 
and which are associated with international society and world society are 
exported beyond the Union’s boundaries in three additional ways. First, states 
located around the EU’s borders are encouraged to adopt norms and 
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practices compatible with those of the European Union. Second, to access 
development assistance or aid, states must fulfil certain political and 
economic conditions that reflect EU norms and values. Third, asking trading 
partners to adhere to certain norms, rules and practices have become EU 
conditions that have shaped the Union’s trade policy and its relations with 
external states.
If the study of the EU enlargement is important to understand how regional 
international societies expand outwards, thereby slowly transforming the 
much broader international system in which they are embedded into an 
international society, the investigation of what happens to them if they 
contract is equally important. For example, what would happen to the EU 
regional international society as a result of ‘Brexit’ (the United Kingdom 
leaving the European Union) and the possibility that other states may also 
leave? There are two possibilities. First, if core members of a regional 
international society depart, then this society may be gradually transformed 
into a ‘thinner’ international society, which is equivalent to an international 
system. Second, the regional international society may continue to exist, but 
the states that leave this society would move into the broader international 
system in which the regional international society is embedded. 
For example, despite Brexit, the EU regional international society will 
continue to exist but the United Kingdom would move into the broader 
international system in which the EU regional international society is 
embedded. But if other EU member states follow the same path, then the EU 
regional international society will be gradually transformed into a ‘thinner’ 
international society, which is equivalent to an international system. Unless 
the EU member states come together to commonly confront its challenges (of 
which Brexit is only one), we may gradually see a decrease in the EU’s 
‘thickness’, which implies a movement from the world society end of the 
spectrum to the international system end of the spectrum.
Conclusion
Two important debates have taken place within the English school. First, 
whether the distinction between an international system and an international 
society is valid and, if yes, then where does the boundary line between the 
two forms of international order lie. The second turns on pluralist versus 
solidarist understandings and the relationship between international society 
and world society. The first debate has resulted in the acceptance of the 
premise that an international system constitutes a weak/thin form of an 
international society. Although the pluralist/solidarist debate is still ongoing, 
one should recognise that certain changes in international society (e.g. a shift 
35 International Relations Theory
from a world of perpetual war pre-1945 to a world of relative peace post-
1945) are accompanied by some other important developments in world 
society. For example, there has been a growing demand for human rights as 
people increasingly understand that they are embedded in a single global 
economy and a single global environment. At the same time, technology and 
social media enable widely shared experiences. These developments have 
led to an increased interplay between international society and world society 
that has the potential of stabilising international society by embedding ideas 
not just in the minds of political and economic elites but also in the minds of 
ordinary citizens.
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Constructivism
SARINA THEYS
Constructivism’s arrival in IR is often associated with the end of the Cold War, 
an event that the traditional theories such as realism and liberalism failed to 
account for. This failure can be linked to some of their core tenets, such as 
the conviction that states are self-interested actors who compete for power 
and the unequal power distribution among states which defines the balance of 
power between them. By having a dominant focus on the state, traditional 
theories have not opened much space to observe the agency of individuals. 
After all, it was the actions of ordinary people that ensured the end of the 
Cold War, not those of states or international organisations. Constructivism 
accounts for this issue by arguing that the social world is of our making (Onuf 
1989). Actors (usually powerful ones, like leaders and influential citizens) 
continually shape – and sometimes reshape – the very nature of international 
relations through their actions and interactions.
The basics of constructivism
Constructivism sees the world, and what we can know about the world, as 
socially constructed. This view refers to the nature of reality and the nature of 
knowledge that are also called ontology and epistemology in research 
language. Alexander Wendt (1995) offers an excellent example that illustrates 
the social construction of reality when he explains that 500 British nuclear 
weapons are less threatening to the United States than five North Korean 
nuclear weapons. These identifications are not caused by the nuclear 
weapons (the material structure) but rather by the meaning given to the 
material structure (the ideational structure). It is important to understand that 
the social relationship between the United States and Britain and the United 
States and North Korea is perceived in a similar way by these states, as this 
shared understanding (or intersubjectivity) forms the basis of their 
interactions. The example also shows that nuclear weapons by themselves 
do not have any meaning unless we understand the social context. It further 
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demonstrates that constructivists go beyond the material reality by including 
the effect of ideas and beliefs on world politics. This also entails that reality is 
always under construction, which opens the prospect for change. In other 
words, meanings are not fixed but can change over time depending on the 
ideas and beliefs that actors hold.
Constructivists argue that agency and structure are mutually constituted, 
which implies that structures influence agency and that agency influences 
structures. Agency can be understood as the ability of someone to act, 
whereas structure refers to the international system that consists of material 
and ideational elements. Returning to Wendt’s example discussed above, this 
means that the social relation of enmity between the United States and North 
Korea represents the intersubjective structure (that is, the shared ideas and 
beliefs among both states), whereas the United States and North Korea are 
the actors who have the capacity (that is, agency) to change or reinforce the 
existing structure or social relationship of enmity. This change or reinforcem-
ent ultimately depends on the beliefs and ideas held by both states. If these 
beliefs and ideas change, the social relationship can change to one of 
friendship. This stance differs considerably from that of realists, who argue 
that the anarchic structure of the international system determines the 
behaviour of states. Constructivists, on the other hand, argue that ‘anarchy is 
what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992). This means that anarchy can be 
interpreted in different ways depending on the meaning that actors assign to 
it.
Another central issue to constructivism is identities and interests. Construc-
tivists argue that states can have multiple identities that are socially 
constructed through interaction with other actors. Identities are repres-
entations of an actor’s understanding of who they are, which in turn signals 
their interests. They are important to constructivists as they argue that 
identities constitute interests and actions. For example, the identity of a small 
state implies a set of interests that are different from those implied by the 
identity of a large state. The small state is arguably more focused on its 
survival, whereas the large state is concerned with dominating global political, 
economic and military affairs. It should be noted, though, that the actions of a 
state should be aligned with its identity. A state can thus not act contrary to its 
identity because this will call into question the validity of the identity, including 
its preferences. This issue might explain why Germany, despite being a great 
power with a leading global economy, did not become a military power in the 
second half of the twentieth century. Following the atrocities of Adolf Hitler’s 
Nazi regime during the Second World War, German political identity shifted 
from one of militarism to pacifism due to unique historical circumstances.
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Social norms are also central to constructivism. These are generally defined 
as ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ 
(Katzenstein 1996, 5). States that conform to a certain identity are expected 
to comply with the norms that are associated with that identity. This idea 
comes with an expectation that some kinds of behaviour and action are more 
acceptable than others. This process is also known as ‘the logic of app-
ropriateness’, where actors behave in certain ways because they believe that 
this behaviour is appropriate (March and Olsen 1998, 951–952). To better 
understand norms, we can identify three types: regulative norms, constitutive 
norms and prescriptive norms. Regulative norms order and constrain 
behaviour; constitutive norms create new actors, interests or categories of 
action; and prescriptive norms prescribe certain norms, meaning there are no 
bad norms from the perspective of those who promote them (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998). It is also important to note that norms go through a ‘lifecycle of 
norms’ before they can get accepted. A norm only becomes an expected 
behaviour when a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt it and internalise 
it in their own practices. For example, constructivists would argue that the 
bulk of states have come together to develop climate change mitigation 
policies because it is the right thing to do for the survival of humanity. This 
has, over decades of diplomacy and advocacy, become an appropriate 
behaviour that the bulk of citizens expect their leaders to adhere to. Liberals, 
on the other hand, might reject the notion of climate change politics in favour 
of continued economic growth and pursuing innovative scientific solutions, 
while realists might reject it due to the damage that climate policies may do to 
shorter-term national interests.
Although all constructivists share the above-mentioned views and concepts, 
there is considerable variety within constructivism. Conventional constru-
ctivists ask ‘what’-type questions – such as what causes an actor to act. They 
believe that it is possible to explain the world in causal terms and are 
interested in discovering the relationships between actors, social norms, 
interests and identities. Conventional constructivists assume, for instance, 
that actors act according to their identity and that it is possible to predict when 
this identity becomes visible or not. When an identity is seen to be under-
going changes, conventional constructivists investigate what factors caused 
which aspects of a state’s identity to change. Critical constructivists, on the 
other hand, ask ‘how’-type questions such as how do actors come to believe 
in a certain identity. Contrary to conventional constructivists, they are not 
interested in the effect that this identity has. Instead, critical constructivists 
want to reconstruct an identity – that is, find out what are its component parts 
– which they believe are created through written or spoken communication 
among and between peoples. Language plays a key role for critical cons-
tructivists because it constructs, and has the ability to change, social reality. 
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Most constructivists, however, position themselves between these two more 
extreme ends of the spectrum.
Constructivism and Bhutan’s national interests
Bhutan is a Buddhist kingdom located in the Himalayas. The material 
structural conditions are reflected in its population of approximately 745,000, 
a territory that amounts to 38,394 square kilometres, a weak economy and a 
very small military. On top of this, Bhutan shares a national border with the 
two major powers in Asia: China in the north and India in the south. Bhutan’s 
location is geographically sensitive as the country serves as a buffer state 
between these major powers, which perceive each other as rivals rather than 
friends. In addition to this, the Chinese leadership claimed, after it annexed 
Tibet in the 1950s, that Bhutan’s territory was also part of its mainland. To 
date there remains an ongoing border dispute between Bhutan and China 
and there have been reports that the Chinese army has made several 
incursions into Bhutan. Likewise, India has had a hand in Bhutan’s foreign 
policy. Article 2 of the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty (1949) notes that 
‘Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of India in regard to its external 
relations.’ Although this Article was revised in 2007, commentators have 
reported that India still holds a degree of influence over Bhutan.
From a realist perspective, one would argue that Bhutan is in an unfavourable 
position as it is hindered by its geographical location and cannot compete for 
power with its neighbours. The preservation of its national sovereignty would 
likely depend on the outcome of the greater competition between China and 
India. A constructivist view, on the other hand, would argue that these 
structural conditions do not necessarily constrain Bhutan’s ability to pursue its 
national interests since they are not the only conditions that influence state 
behaviour: the meaning given to these structural conditions also matters. For 
example, when Tibet was annexed by China, Bhutan felt threatened. As a 
result, it closed its border in the north and turned to India, its neighbour in the 
south. From that moment onward, Bhutan perceived China as a potential 
threat and India as a friend. To date, Bhutan and India perceive each other as 
friends whereas Bhutan has no official relations with China. These social 
relationships represent the ideational structure that originated from the 
meaning given to the material structure. It is important to note, however, that 
the social relationships are subject to change depending on the ideas, beliefs 
and actions of Bhutan, India and China. For example, an agreement on the 
border dispute between China and Bhutan could change how both countries 
perceive each other. This change might lead to the establishment of an official 
relationship, the nature of which is friendship rather than enmity. A 
constructivist is well placed to detect and understand these changes since 
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their object of enquiry focuses on the social relationships between states.
Bhutan has also developed a distinctive national identity that differentiates it 
from its larger neighbours. This identity projects Bhutan as ‘the last surviving 
independent Mahayana Buddhist Kingdom in the world’ (Bhutan Vision 2020, 
24–25). The usage of the word ‘independent’ refers directly to Bhutan’s 
national interest – the preservation of its national sovereignty. Bhutan’s 
national identity is socially constructed through a Bhutanisation process that 
started in the 1980s, when the fourth king of Bhutan introduced the ‘One 
Nation, One People’ policy. This policy demanded the observance of a code 
of conduct known as Driglam Namzhag. This code of conduct is built upon 
strict observance of vows – such as strong kinship loyalty, respect for one’s 
parents, elders and superiors, and mutual cooperation between rulers and 
ruled. It also reinforced the rules for wearing a national dress – the gho for 
men and the kira for women. In addition to this, Dzongkha was selected as 
the national language of Bhutan. The Driglam Namzhag can be thought of as 
a regulative norm because the aim of the policy is to direct and constrain 
behaviour. For example, although Bhutan’s national identity suggests that the 
Bhutanese comprise one homogeneous group, Bhutan is actually a multi-
ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual country. There are three main ethnic 
groups: the Ngalongs, the Sharchhops and the Lhotshampas, who are of 
Nepali descent. Of these, the Ngalongs and the Sharchhops are Buddhists, 
while the Lhotshampas are mostly Hindus who speak the Nepali language. 
The policy had severe consequences for the Lhotshampas as Nepali was no 
longer taught in schools and people who could not prove residence in Bhutan 
prior to 1958 were classified as non-nationals. Consequently, thousands of 
Lhotshampas were expelled from Bhutan in the 1990s. Thus, the code of 
conduct is used by the Bhutanese authorities to create cultural unity and to 
stimulate citizens to reflect upon their cultural distinctiveness, which is 
paramount in creating a national identity.
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, a norm needs to go through a lifecycle 
before it becomes established. In the case of Bhutan, we can witness the first 
phase, norm emergence, in the creation of the Driglam Namzhag by the 
Bhutanese authorities. The second phase, norm acceptance, required 
Bhutanese citizens to accept the Driglam Namzhag, including the national 
dress and Dzongkha as the national language. Once this acceptance 
occurred, norm internalisation occurs. The completion of this process entails 
that the behaviour of the Bhutanese citizens is circumscribed by these norms 
and practices. This circumscription also shows the constitutive nature of the 
Driglam Namzhag, which created new actors – that is, Bhutanese citizens 
who act and behave according to specific rules. We can see, for instance, 
that these norms and practices are regulated to date. For example, 
Bhutanese citizens are obliged to wear the national dress during national 
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events and when they attend school or work. This regulation is, as explained 
earlier, important as the behaviour of a state and its citizens should comply 
with the norms that are associated with Bhutan’s national identity. The 
regulation also signifies that these norms are perceived as something good 
by the Bhutanese authorities, which underlines the prescriptive nature of 
norms.
Members of the Bhutanese elite have also created a second identity, which 
projects Bhutan as a leader in advancing a holistic and sustainable 
development paradigm. This identity is based on Bhutan’s development 
philosophy, Gross National Happiness (GNH), which criticises the well-known 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) approach for being solely focused on the 
economy of a state. Instead, GNH promotes a balance between material 
wellbeing and the spiritual needs of the mind. It is implemented and 
embedded in Bhutan’s political and educational systems. Members of the 
Bhutanese elite have predominantly used the United Nations as a platform to 
promote the idea internationally. Subsequently, the United Nations adopted 
Resolution 65/309, which states that the pursuit of happiness is a 
fundamental goal and that the gross domestic product indicator was not 
designed to, and does not adequately reflect, the wellbeing of people. 
Projecting their country as the last surviving independent Mahayana Buddhist 
kingdom in the world and as a leader in advancing a holistic and sustainable 
development paradigm enables Bhutanese authorities to signal their country’s 
status as an independent sovereign state. It also allows Bhutan to increase its 
international visibility, which is advantageous when tensions run high with and 
among its neighbours.
Conclusion
Constructivism is often said to simply state the obvious – that actions, 
interactions and perceptions shape reality. Indeed, that idea is the source of 
the name of this theory family. Our thoughts and actions literally construct 
international relations. Yet, this seemingly simple idea, when applied 
theoretically, has significant implications for how we can understand the 
world. The discipline of International Relations benefits from constructivism as 
it addresses issues and concepts that are neglected by mainstream theories 
– especially realism. Doing so, constructivists offer alternative explanations 
and insights for events occurring in the social world. They show, for instance, 
that it is not only the distribution of material power, wealth and geographical 
conditions that can explain state behaviour but also ideas, identities and 
norms. Furthermore, their focus on ideational factors shows that reality is not 
fixed, but rather subject to change.
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Marxism
MAÏA PAL
Marxism is both a critical approach that wants to always question the 
mainstream policy-driven approaches to IR theory and a classical approach 
via the philosophical and sociological tradition of its namesake, the 
philosopher Karl Marx (1818–1883). In fact, Marxism is the only theoretical 
perspective in IR that is named after a person. Of the range of great thinkers 
available to us, Marx may not automatically qualify as being the most 
‘internationalist’. In fact, most of Marx’s (and his sometimes co-author 
Friedrich Engels’) work was not primarily concerned with the formation of 
states or even the interactions between them. What connected their interests 
to IR was the industrial revolution, as this event was ultimately what Marx was 
witnessing and trying to understand. He, with Engels, developed a revol-
utionary approach and outlined a set of concepts that transcended national 
differences while also providing practical advice on how to build a 
transnational movement of people. Workers from factories across the world – 
the proletariat – were to organise themselves into a politically revolutionary 
movement to counter the exploitative and unequal effects of capitalism, which 
were accelerated and expanded by the industrial revolution. This vision of a 
potential link between the bulk of humanity as a global proletariat is where, 
and how, Marxism enters IR from a different vantage point to other theories.
The basics of Marxism
Marxist concepts are all connected by the common goal to contribute to what 
they perceive as the greater good of humankind and its environment. To 
borrow the words of Adrienne Rich (2002, 65), theory is 
the seeing of patterns, showing the forest as well as the trees 
– theory can be a dew that rises from the earth and collects in 
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the rain cloud and returns to earth over and over. But if it 
doesn’t smell of the earth, it isn’t good for the earth. 
In other words, Marxists must remain informed and reflective of the basic and 
most common aspects of societies and their environment. This also means 
that if the industrial revolution (and capitalism in general) smells of burning 
coal, overcrowded factories and petrol fumes, the smells of the next 
revolution should be less deadly, less polluting and more protective of the 
earth. To understand Marxism, we need to grasp the basic elements of Marx’s 
innovations regarding the origins and functioning of capitalism. In addition, we 
must understand that those origins and functioning can simultaneously 
happen at the domestic and international level. Combining these tasks leads 
to arguably the most important contribution Marxism offers to IR: that the 
capitalist mode of production and the modern sovereign states system (that 
emerged roughly at the same time) are not natural or inevitable events. They 
are interdependent products of particular historical conditions and social 
relations. The work of Marxists is to map and retrace those conditions and 
social relations and to figure out how the capitalist mode of production and 
the sovereign states system emerged – as two sides of the same coin, as 
different coins or maybe as different currencies. Debates on the degree of 
interdependence between these two major historical phenomena may be 
ongoing, but Marxism’s achievement in IR has been to stop us from thinking 
about them separately. Marxism also advises that concepts are not just meant 
to help us understand the world – they should also help us change it.
To explain Marxism in IR, we need to start with Marx’s main theory for the 
development of capitalism: historical materialism. Most simply, historical 
materialism asserts that human beings – including their relations with each 
other and their environment – are determined by the material conditions in 
which they can survive and reproduce. Therefore, Marxism asserts that 
material conditions can be changed by the actions of human beings as well 
as by events – think of climate change for example, which depends on 
physical phenomena as well as human behaviour. In other words, these 
material conditions are historical, they change over space and time. But they 
are also always dependent on – and often hampered by – the processes and 
ideas that preceded them, as the past weighs on the present. A Marxist would 
stress that IR is not just about states’ foreign policy or the behaviour of 
politicians, but more about survival (or more broadly, life), reproduction, 
technologies and labour. If this is correct then the separation between the 
political and economic, or public and private, is problematic because those 
categories hide the ways in which states and foreign policies are determined 
by the social relations and structures of the global economy – such as 
multinational corporations or international financial institutions. Put differently, 
Marxism fundamentally questions what ‘the international’ is in IR. Whether it 
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is anarchy for realists or international society for the English school, Marxists 
argue that such concepts are problematic because they make us believe in 
illusions or myths about the world. For example, the concept of anarchy 
creates the mirage that states are autonomous agents whose rational 
behaviour can be predicted. However, this ignores the endurance of regional 
inequalities and the structural and historical links between states, violence 
and the key actors of the global political economy.
The first application of Marxist ideas to explain international processes was 
by communists and revolutionaries of the early twentieth century such as 
Rosa Luxemburg, Rudolf Hilferding and Vladimir Lenin. These authors 
developed what we now call the classical theories of imperialism to 
understand how capitalism expanded and adapted to a world of inter-imperial 
rivalry leading to the First World War and the slow disintegration of the 
European empires. 
In 1974, Immanuel Wallerstein developed ‘world systems theory’ to 
incorporate the changes of the late twentieth century and counter the way 
traditional approaches tended to understand imperialism as a state-led 
process. Wallerstein’s approach used different units of analysis and took a 
much longer-term view of the history of states and their interactions. He 
distinguished three groups of states or regions: the core, the semi-periphery 
and the periphery. The aim was to understand how states have developed 
since the sixteenth century in relation to each other, thereby creating relations 
of dependency between different groups of states depending on the specific 
types of economies and industries they specialised in. Therefore, these 
relations of dependency and groups required that we understand the world 
through broader units than states. These units – or world systems – helped to 
address the dilemma of why states all became capitalist, albeit in very 
unequal and different ways. The core group of states (e.g. in Western Europe 
and North America) refers to democratic governments providing high wages 
and encouraging high levels of investment and welfare services. The semi-
periphery states (e.g. in Latin America) are authoritarian governments that 
provide low wages and poor welfare services for their citizens. Periphery 
states (e.g. sub-Saharan and Central Africa, South Asia) refer to non-
democratic governments where workers can mostly expect wages below 
subsistence levels and where there are no welfare services. 
The core is able to produce high-profit consumption goods for itself as well as 
for the semi-periphery and periphery markets because the periphery provides 
the cheap labour and raw materials to the core and semi-periphery necessary 
to make these high-profit consumption goods. In other words, although 
historically some states have changed their group (e.g. from periphery to 
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semi-periphery), capitalism always needs a peripheral region that provides 
the means for the core to sustain a high level of consumption and security. 
Thus, relations of dependency and inequality are essential to capitalism and 
cannot be significantly reduced.
Another influential update of the classical theories of imperialism is the neo-
Gramscian strand of Marxism. Antonio Gramsci’s (1891–1937) concept of 
hegemony is thought by some to be more useful today than the concept of 
imperialism. It emphasises two things. First, the domination of some groups 
of individuals (or groups of states) over other groups also depends on 
ideological factors. In other words, capitalism is experienced in different ways 
historically and across the globe because people understand it – and 
therefore agree to or resist it – in different ways. Second, the relations of 
dependency and types of groups (or units) used to understand those relations 
are more varied and fluid than world systems theory. Therefore, capitalism 
dominates our social relations because it is reproduced through coercive and 
consensual means. The concept was used to explain why educated and 
organised workers in Western Europe did not ‘unite’ to ‘lose their chains’, as 
Marx and Engels had predicted. A neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony 
focuses on the consensual ways in which transnational classes, organisations 
and international law reproduce capitalism and its inequalities. The 
transnational capitalist class – dominated by great powers – forms a ‘global 
civil society’ that universalises liberal ideals rather than imposing itself 
through more coercive processes of classical imperialism and colonisation, as 
was the case in earlier times. 
For example, Singapore, Hong-Kong, South Korea and Taiwan were known 
as the Four Asian Tigers because of their rapid industrialisation and high 
growth rates from the 1960s to the 1990s. In these countries, a strong ruling 
elite consented to a specific type of financial economy – often called a 
‘neoliberal’ model – which also took hold across the world to varying degrees 
as other states sought to emulate this ‘success’. However, vast inequalities 
and human rights violations are increasing across and within many societies 
despite the dominance of neoliberalism globally. This shows that although 
neoliberal hegemony is far from producing the success it originally projected, 
this perceived success remains one of the main drivers of capitalism because 
it convinces people to consent to capitalism without the threat of force.
A more recent trend of Marxism in IR – historical sociology – returns to some 
of the more classical problems of IR. Specifically, it looks at the development 
of the modern state system in relation to the transition(s) to capitalism and to 
the different moments of colonial and imperial expansion. It looks more 
closely at what happened inside Europe but also beyond Europe. More 
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specifically, it contests the birth of the sovereign states system following the 
treaties of Westphalia in 1648 and instead focuses on more socio-economic 
processes in the nineteenth century to define key shifts in modern internatio-
nal relations. This underlines how scholars are taking history beyond Europe 
in order to address the Eurocentric assumptions found in Marxism and in the 
wider discipline of IR itself. 
In sum, Marxism is characterised by interdependence. The Marxist term for 
this is dialectics, which underpins the way in which all the previous concepts 
explored in this chapter relate to each other. For Marxism, all concepts reflect 
social relations, but categories take on a life of their own and often hide those 
social relations. It is easy to overcomplicate or abuse this concept. However, 
it is a crucial starting point for understanding the world as a whole, rather than 
just its individual parts, since ‘dialectics is a way of thinking that brings into 
focus the full range of changes and interactions that occur in the world’ 
(Ollman 2003, 12).
Marxism, migrants and borders
A Marxist IR approach to migration shows the importance of historical 
materialism as an approach to IR. First, Marxists are critical of the fixed 
aspect of borders because they create relations of dependency and inequality 
between peoples by restricting and controlling their access to resources and 
labour. Some Marxists argue that we need a global concept of citizenship to 
counter how states exclude non-citizens from benefits and access to labour 
and resources. After all, from a Marxist point of view, peoples of all nations 
are united in their oppression by capitalism and the modern state system that 
separates them and sets them against each other, so people should be freed 
(or emancipated) from this status. Consequently, Marxists see borders as 
fixtures that unfairly determine relations of dependency and inequality – or in 
other words, who has the right to what. Second, we need to think of who 
decides who is a migrant and what that category entails. For example, being 
a migrant who is fleeing a country because of persecution is a necessary 
condition according to international law for applying for asylum and becoming 
a refugee in a host state. Most states have signed the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention and have agreed to this definition. Hence, the reality of being this 
particular type of migrant is dependent on a specific treaty and the will of 
states to consent to it. In other words, the category of persecuted migrant or 
refugee is relative – it is not real in the sense that the colour of your eyes is 
real and cannot be decided differently by someone else. 
People who flee from poverty related to conflict, climate change, or lack of 
jobs are often designated as economic migrants. Their status does not 
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depend on a definition as clear as that of a refugee, and it also does not lead 
to the same rights and opportunities. Many people move towards Europe 
because it offers more economic opportunities and a relatively safer political 
environment. However, decisions at the European and state level are 
increasingly resulting in the strengthening (or closing) of borders, because 
some feel that economic migration is not a sufficient reason to freely admit a 
person. In contrast, being an economic migrant who has a particular skill 
needed by the host country is considered legitimate. In other words, the 
‘reality’ of being a ‘good’ economic migrant – who is allowed to move across 
countries – depends on factors that are often independent of the person 
migrating.
Marxism provides us with an original angle that makes us reconsider 
migration and shows why closing borders is a sociologically and politically 
blind policy in relation to the system we all live in. In effect, capitalism started 
a simultaneous process of territorial bordering and of social change through 
wage-labour. Mainstream IR separates those processes historically and 
theoretically by taking the separation between the domestic and international 
as fixed and real. Marxism argues that this leads to obscuring the social 
relations and processes linking movements of people and the creation of 
borders. In other words, dissociating the domestic and international levels 
leads to thinking that being a migrant is the reserve of certain people rather 
than a condition we are all subjected to. Crucially, it justifies treating migrants 
as second-class people and therefore leads to further racial and social 
inequalities. 
Movement of peoples occurred long before capitalism, but capitalism shapes 
those movements in conjunction with the creation of borders and economic 
productivity. The process of enclosure at the beginning of capitalism led to 
people moving away from the land on which they hunted, gathered and grew 
food. The process involved landowners closing off or fencing common land 
so as to graze sheep and develop more intensive methods of agriculture. 
This gradually transformed social relations – the ways in which people could 
survive and reproduce. Without land to survive on, people had to start selling 
their ability to work – what Marxists call labour power – and often had to work 
far from their homes. Although people move for a variety of reasons, one that 
is particularly familiar is the necessity to move to sell our labour. This can 
involve transferring from the countryside to an urban centre within a state or 
from one state to another. In other words, it is the same imperative to work 
that makes this move happen, whether one crosses an international border or 
not. In a capitalist system, it is hard to survive without working and working 
implies moving or being prepared to move. In other words, we are all in 
theory migrants. Acknowledging this means that closing borders, which 
involves fixing peoples’ status as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ economic migrants, is based 
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on two illusions revealed by Marxism and should therefore be questioned and 
reconsidered. The first is the distinction between domestic and international. 
Capitalism is an expanding international system and allows domestic borders 
only in so far as it can transcend them economically. The second illusion is 
the distinction between categories of people as real and fixed. Capitalism 
allows the elite to transcend borders economically but also allows the 
potential to close them politically. Thus, it allows certain people (the most 
wealthy) to decide that others (the least wealthy) cannot try and change their 
situations.
Conclusion
The role of theories and knowledge more generally is to reveal what is real 
and what is an illusion. Historical materialism – the theory that drives Marxism 
– tries to apply this advice by grounding the understanding of international 
relations in the ways in which people have transformed the land, produced 
things on it and are ultimately dependent on its resources for shaping political 
institutions such as the state and international organisations. Marxism has 
made several inroads in the development of the discipline of IR by being 
intrinsically concerned with the ways in which people – and groups – interact 
and produce things across borders, as well as how they organise themselves 
through institutions to manage and contest the production and distribution of 
things across the world. More specifically, it argues that the construction of 
modern borders is determined by, or linked in various ways to, the devel-
opment of capitalism. Therefore, it makes us question the natural or inevitable 
character we tend to ascribe to our economic and political systems. In other 
words, if a system is not as real and fixed as we first thought, because it has 
a particular and relatively short history in the broader course of humanity, 
then it becomes much easier for us to imagine the various ways it is 
challenged and how it could be transformed to a system that, Marxists hope, 
will better redistribute the wealth of the world. Marx himself wrote that 
philosophy is often too concerned with interpreting the world, when the real 
point is to change it. Marxism as a theory of IR has certainly answered that 
call and, regardless of variations within the theory family, to be a Marxist 
always means to challenge one’s ideas about the world.
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Critical Theory
MARCOS FARIAS FERREIRA  
Critical theory incorporates a wide range of approaches all focused on the 
idea of freeing people from the modern state and economic system – a 
concept known to critical theorists as emancipation. The idea originates from 
the work of authors such as Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx who, in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, advanced different revolutionary ideas of 
how the world could be reordered and transformed. Both Kant and Marx held 
a strong attachment to the Enlightenment theme of universalism – the view 
that there are social and political principles that are apparent to all people, 
everywhere. In the modern era, both authors became foundational figures for 
theorists seeking to replace the modern state system by promoting more just 
global political arrangements such as a federation of free states living in 
perpetual peace (Kant) or communism as a global social and economic 
system to replace the unequal capitalist order (Marx). Critical theory sets out 
to critique repressive social practices and institutions in today’s world and 
advance emancipation by supporting ideas and practices that meet the 
universalist principles of justice. This kind of critique has a transformative 
dimension in the sense that it aims at changing national societies, inter-
national relations and the emerging global society, starting from alternative 
ideas and practices lingering in the background of the historical process.
The basics of critical theory
Although critical theory reworks and, in some ways, supersedes Kantian and 
Marxian themes, both authors remain at the base of the theory’s lineage. 
Through critical philosophy, Kant discussed the conditions in which we make 
claims about the world and asserted that the increasing interconnectedness 
of his time opened the door for more cosmopolitan (i.e. supranational) 
political communities. Marx’s critical mode of inquiry was grounded on the will 
to understand social developments in industrialised societies, including the 
contradictions inherent in capitalism that would lead to its collapse, the 
50Critical Theory
suppression of labour exploitation and the setting up of a more just system of 
global social relations. This way, the writings of Kant and Marx converge to 
demonstrate that what happens at the level of international relations is crucial 
to the achievement of human emancipation and global freedom. Conse-
quently, the tracing of tangible social and political possibilities or change 
(those stemming from within existing practices and institutions) became a 
defining feature of the strand of critical thought entering IR via authors 
reworking Marxian and Kantian themes during the twentieth century.
Of course, neither Marx nor Kant were IR theorists in the contemporary 
sense. Both were philosophers. We must therefore identify two more recent 
sources for how critical theory developed within the modern discipline of IR. 
The first is Antonio Gramsci and his influence over Robert Cox and the 
paradigm of production (economic patterns involved in the production of 
goods and the social and political relationships they entail). The second is the 
Frankfurt school – Jürgen Habermas in particular – and the influence of 
Habermas over Andrew Linklater and the paradigm of communication 
(patterns of rationality involved in human communication and the ethical 
principles they entail). There are two themes uniting these approaches that 
show the connective glue within the critical theorist family. First, they both use 
eman-cipation as a principle to critique, or assess, society and the global 
political order. Second, they both detect the potential for emancipation 
developing within the historical process, but consider that it may not be 
inevitable. The paradigms of redistribution and recognition relate to what 
Nancy Fraser (1995) has called the two main axes of contemporary political 
struggle. While redistribution struggles refer directly to the Marxist themes of 
class struggles and social emancipation, recognition struggles have to do with 
aspirations to freedom and justice connected to gender, sexuality, race and 
national recognition. Therefore, while Cox focuses on contemporary redistri-
bution struggles, Linklater turns to questions of identity and community as 
more significant than economic relations in today’s quest for emancipation.
Cox sets out to challenge realism’s assumptions, namely the study of 
interstate relations in isolation from other social forces. He stresses the need 
to see global politics as a collective construction evolving through the 
complex interplay of state, sub-state and trans-state forces in economic, 
cultural and ideological spheres. His purpose is to pay attention to the whole 
range of spheres where change is needed in contemporary global politics. For 
example, when realism focuses only on great powers and strategic stability, it 
ends up reinforcing a set of unjust global relations stemming from power and 
coercion. For this reason, Cox challenges the idea that ‘truth’ is absolute – as 
in realism’s assertion that there is a timeless logic to international relations, or 
liberalism’s assertion that the pursuit of global capitalism is positive. Instead, 
he asserts that ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox 
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1981, 128). Drawing on Gramsci, Cox comes up with a picture of the world 
political system brought into being by the hegemony and hierarchies of power 
manufactured in the economic arena. Therefore, power is understood in the 
context of a set of globalised relations of production demanding the trans-
formation of the nation-state, and depends on the combination of material 
elements and ideas for acquiring legitimacy (Cox and Jacobsen 1977). Cox 
explores the economic contradictions spurring change in power relations and 
guiding transitions towards a fairer world order, even if acknowledging that 
emancipation is not inevitable.
As Hutchings (2001) points out, the critical project connecting Linklater to Cox 
sets out to uncover all sorts of hegemonic interests feeding the world order as 
a first step to overcome global systems of exclusion and inequality. Linklater’s 
critical project aims at reconstructing cosmopolitanism, drawing not from 
some abstract or utopian moral principle but from non-instrumental action and 
ideal speech (open and non-coercive communication) assumptions devel-
oped by Habermas. Ideal speech is the critical tool used in the reconstruction 
of political communities (from local to global levels) through open dialogue 
and non-coercive communication, a process whereby all affected by political 
decisions put forward their claims and justify them on the basis of rational and 
universally accepted principles of validity. This method poses questions of the 
‘good life’ (what a society ought to be like) and questions of justice (fairness 
in the way members of a society choose what their society ought to be like). 
Thus, emancipation is conceived not with reference to an abstract universal 
idea but based on a process of open discussion about who can be excluded 
legitimately from specific political arrangements and what kinds of 
particularities (gender, race, language) entitle people to special sets of rights. 
For Linklater, the historical development of citizenship attests to both the 
potential and the limitations of such a process of open discussion about rights 
– who is entitled to what in the context of the state system. Citizenship has 
been the critical concept and set of practices permitting the enjoyment of 
universal rights inside a community (freedom of conscience, freedom of 
movement, freedom of association), but also the protection of vulnerable 
minorities by granting them particular rights in order to avoid or mitigate the 
effects of discrimination. On the other hand, however, citizenship has divided 
humanity into national groupings and has therefore been a barrier to the 
universal fulfilment of human freedom.
According to Linklater then, emancipation demands global interactions guided 
by open, inclusive and non-coercive dialogue about the ties that bind 
communities together. This also extends to our obligations to strangers and 
how fair it is to restrict outsiders from the enjoyment of rights granted to 
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insiders. For Linklater, the answer lies in the potential for a more universal 
concept of citizenship, refashioned through open dialogue among those 
affected by the global processes that are changing the world. These 
processes are issues like non-state forms of violence (such as sexual 
violence and terrorism), forced migration, climate change and resource 
depletion. Therefore, critical theory can be seen as an instrument of the 
powerless to advance more equitable types of global relations. More 
importantly for us, within IR theory it combats the traditional approaches, 
mainly liberalism and realism, and shines a light on how they feed the 
imbalances of an unjust global order by failing to question (or critique) their 
foundational claims. Linklater’s work is marked by the awareness that 
modernity is an unfinished project in its potential for accomplishing human 
freedom, namely through the transformation of the competitive system of 
separate states into a global community.
By admitting that immediate security needs press humans to set up bounded 
communities and to act according to national loyalties, Linklater recognises 
the limits to cosmopolitan politics. At the same time however, he underlines 
that there is a growing awareness that global interconnectedness and 
vulnerabilities impose their consequences on how communities define 
themselves and live side by side with others. Proximity with strangers 
prompts, for instance, a heightened sense of sharing a finite planet and finite 
resources and leads individuals to question exclusive obligations to the state 
in favour of a degree of cosmopolitan responsibility towards those who do not 
belong to one’s national community. 
Accordingly, Linklater explores the moral tensions emerging between 
humanity and citizenship (‘humans’ and ‘citizens’) in order to devise practical 
possibilities for creating more inclusive communities, with a civilising effect 
upon the conduct of international relations. Linklater does not underestimate 
the historical movement towards the creation of bounded moral communities 
(nation-states) but also sees potential within the historical process to enhance 
the expansion of rights and duties beyond the state. The fact that it has been 
possible for states in the modern international system to agree upon the 
protection of human rights and the political relevance of avoiding human 
wrongs is a sign of the relevance of these ideas. 
What unites critical theorists like Cox, Linklater and others, then, is a political 
inquiry with an explicit emancipatory purpose. It aims at uncovering the 
potential for a fairer system of global relations resulting from already existing 
principles, practices and communities that expands human rights and pre-
vents harm to strangers. 
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Critical theory and the European migrant ‘crisis’
Haman stares at the long night behind him when I surprise his 
absent gaze on the deck of the Blue Star ferry carrying us to 
the Greek port of Piraeus. Departing from Rhodes, the ferry 
had made its first stop at the island of Kos where dozens of 
refugees from the Syrian war lined up patiently for hours and 
eventually got a place on board. Haman was one of them. 
After talking for hours about the war and his expectations for 
the future, it was clear to me that ferry on the Aegean Sea was 
a metaphor of a global community plagued with obstacles to 
human freedom but holding the resources for its fulfilment. 
After Kos though, I could not really tell anymore who was a 
tourist and who was a refugee, who was Greek or Athenian 
and who was neither – and it occurred to me why these 
categories had to matter at all. The common human condition 
aboard the ferry would stand for the night, but the following 
morning tourists would continue their tranquil journey home 
while refugees would have to improvise their way across 
Europe, begging for hospitality. At the port of Piraeus, on that 
early morning of August 2015, I said goodbye to Haman and 
wished him luck for the journey. It is Friday and he knows he 
must reach the Hungarian border before Tuesday or risk being 
trapped by the fence erected hastily in the previous days to 
block migrants on the Serbian side. ‘It’ll be cold’ he says, in a 
premonition of what lay ahead for those like him seeking 
refuge in Europe. That was the last I heard from Haman. I 
stayed there for a while, looking at him blending into the crowd 
conveyed throughout Europe as a crisis of refugees and illegal 
migrants.
This brief encounter with Haman and his story is a trigger for recalling how in 
recent years increasing numbers of people escaping persecution, war and 
famine have tried to reach safe havens like Europe. While this has been 
approached mostly as a ‘crisis’ affecting Europe and the national communities 
composing it, some voices have underlined how the history of humanity has 
always been a history of migration, peaceful or otherwise, and that today 
more people than at any time since the Second World War are being 
displaced from their homes. A critical perspective assumes that the security 
claims of refugees fleeing war-torn countries constitute a cosmopolitan 
responsibility for the whole of humankind, especially for those with the 
resources to address them. It proceeds by critiquing security arrangements 
pleading exclusive loyalty to a bounded community and refusing refugees a 
number of cosmopolitan rights (hospitality and refuge). The point is not simply 
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to understand how the world is constituted by moral tensions opposing 
nationals to strangers, but to contribute to more equitable political solutions to 
the current refugee ‘crisis’ by taking to the negotiating table the most vul-
nerable and their legitimate security concerns. Contrary to more traditional 
theories, critical theory does not see refugees as apart from the violence and 
inequality that produce them. In fact, it sets out to locate current waves of 
forced migration in the context of deeper economic and geopolitical structures 
producing harm and exclusion in a globalising world. Along the Cox/Linklater 
axis, current migration must be seen as forced upon individuals and the by-
product of the current world order. The state of these relations excludes the 
potential for human understanding and mutual recognition, as it has come 
about through the harmful globalisation of production and connected 
dynamics of nation-building, war and environmental degradation. Therefore, a 
critical perspective inquires deeper into how global economic forces, and 
related hierarchies of power, become complicit in creating the chaos and 
insecurity forcing people to leave their homes in different parts of the world. 
This entails looking in particular to how the dynamics of global capitalism are 
producing failed states throughout Africa and the Middle East, not just as an 
unintended misfortune but as part of how power itself works.
The main challenge for critical theory then is to connect theory to practice, to 
be able to set up a theoretical lens that results in a real-world transformative 
outcome. It is not enough to understand and trace the origins of harm and 
displacement in the world; it is crucial to use that understanding to reach 
fairer security arrangements that do not neglect refugees’ claims to basic 
rights. Someone wanting to pursue a critical line of inquiry about the refugee 
‘crisis’ might want to start with Haman and his journey from Syria to Europe 
as a mirror image of the current plight of so many people in the Global South. 
For critical theory today, politics, knowledge and global orders are for people 
like Haman and should serve the purpose of freeing them from unnecessary 
harm and unfair or unbalanced globalised interactions. Institutions like the 
state must be assessed in terms of how they fare in overcoming various types 
of exclusion vis-à-vis insiders and outsiders. Critical theory, more than other 
approaches, promises to go deeper in understanding why refugees have to 
leave their homes. This entails producing knowledge about direct reasons 
(war in Syria or elsewhere) but also about global structures of power and 
harm as well as the agents complicit in it (broader geopolitical interests, the 
workings of the global economy, climate change and its effects over the lives 
of communities). Moreover, critical theory examines the moral consequences 
(what must be done) of Haman’s journey and what kind of responsibility 
others might bear for Haman’s plight.
Cosmopolitan in character, critical theory refuses to see states as bounded 
moral communities by nature and instead finds in them the potential to protect 
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strangers in need and include them in a broader notion of national interest. In 
the context of the current refugee ‘crisis’, critique is directed to the different 
norms and practices approved by states vis-à-vis incoming refugees. A basic 
move is to distinguish which ones are and which are not compatible with 
cosmopolitan duties already enshrined in international law and upheld by 
many people and organisations in different societies. A second move is to 
promote civic initiatives capable of consolidating fairer and more balanced 
relations (solutions to the ‘crisis’) between those who seek refuge from harm 
and those who are in a position to guarantee protection from harm. Solutions 
must be sought in open dialogue, resorting to rational arguments that take 
into consideration everyone’s concerns and interests. Leaving solutions to 
national governments alone is not an option due to their rather strict position 
on national interests. On the contrary, a more balanced position would result 
from the active involvement of civil society, local authorities, European 
authorities and refugees themselves. After all, Europe is a pertinent case here 
as it is the home of the European Union – a project that united the bulk of 
European states in a supranational, and relatively open-bordered, union in 
which all citizens are legally free to work and live wherever they please within 
the Union. Clearly, there is an existing framework within European politics to 
work with to reach a more just solution to the migration ‘crisis’ than the one 
advanced by those nations who closed their borders. The reward for 
someone following a critical line of inquiry is therefore to understand to the 
full that theory is always implicated in practice and that the way we conceive 
the refugee ‘crisis’ shapes the kind of solution we envisage for it. From a 
critical perspective, then, there is only a true solution to this ‘crisis’ when 
political actors embrace cosmopolitan criteria that balance the whole range of 
interests and respect the rights of everyone involved. 
Conclusion
Recognising that there are very different strands of thought within critical 
theory, this chapter has narrowed its approach to introduce critical theory as a 
specific line of inquiry seeking to advance emancipation, or human freedom, 
in the conduct of global affairs. A relevant critique seeks to trace forms of 
exclusion that instigate both redistribution and recognition struggles and then 
identify the potential for progressive change inspired by immanent ideas, 
norms and practices. From a critical perspective, then, people – not states – 
must be put at the centre of politics, global or otherwise. Additionally, political 
arrangements should be judged, or critiqued, according to their capacity to 
advance emancipation and the broadening of moral boundaries. Critical 
theory assumes an active role in the betterment of human affairs according to 
the potential for freedom inherent in modernity and the identification of 
political alternatives at hand in the globalising society and the historical 
process bringing it into being.
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Poststructuralism
AISHLING MC MORROW
Poststructuralism encourages a way of looking at the world that challenges 
what comes to be accepted as ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’. Poststructuralists 
always call into question how certain accepted ‘facts’ and ‘beliefs’ actually 
work to reinforce the dominance and power of particular actors within 
international relations. Poststructuralism doubts the possibility of attaining 
universal laws or truths as there is no world that exists independently of our 
own interpretations. This viewpoint is underscored by Foucault’s (1984, 127) 
assertion that ‘we must not imagine the world turns towards us a legible face 
which we would only have to decipher’. For this reason, poststructuralists 
encourage researchers to be sceptical of universal narratives that attempt to 
offer an objective worldview, as these assumptions are heavily influenced by 
pre-existing assumptions of what is true – and usually underlined by the 
views of those in power. This renders poststructuralism openly critical of any 
theory that claims to be able to identify objective fact – as truth and 
knowledge are subjective entities that are produced rather than discovered. 
Therefore, by design, poststructuralism conflicts with the bulk of other IR 
theories as it finds them unable (or unwilling) to fully account for the true 
diversity of international relations.
The basics of poststructuralism
Poststructuralists argue that ‘knowledge’ comes to be accepted as such due 
to the power and prominence of certain actors in society known as ‘elites’, 
who then impose it upon others. Elites take on a range of forms and occupy 
many different roles in contemporary society. For instance, they include 
government ministers who decide policy focus and direction for a state, 
business leaders who leverage vast financial resources to shape market 
direction, and media outlets that decide how a person is portrayed while 
reporting a story. Additionally, elites are often also categorised as ‘experts’ 
within society, giving them the authority to further reinforce the viewpoints that 
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serve their best interests to a wide audience.  Jenny Edkins (2006) uses the 
example of famines to show that when elite actors refer to famine as a natural 
disaster, they are removing the event from its political context. Therefore, the 
ways that famines occur as a result of elites taking particular forms of political 
action, through processes of exploitation or inaction due to profits on 
increased food prices, are lost when they are presented as unavoidable 
natural disasters.
Although great emphasis and focus is placed upon the authority of the elite 
actors to decide what we count as valid knowledge and assumptions within 
society, poststructuralism asserts that the way in which this power is achieved 
is through the manipulation of discourse. Discourses facilitate the process by 
which certain information comes to be accepted as unquestionable truth. 
Discourses which augment the power of elites are called dominant or official 
discourses by poststructuralists. The strength of dominant discourses lies in 
their ability to shut out other options or opinions to the extent that thinking 
outside the realms set by the discourse is seen as irrational. 
An example of this can be found in the security versus liberty debate. The 
wish to increase security levels across society – in response to crime, 
irregular migration and terrorist threats – has been presented as a sliding 
scale whereby if a state wishes to be secure then the public must endure a 
reduction in personal freedoms. Personal freedoms – such as the freedom of 
expression and freedom of assembly – have been placed as the limit against 
which security exists. In this discursive construct, then, people are presented 
with the choice between a state that respects civil liberties but is left 
potentially insecure or a state that must curb personal freedoms in order to be 
secure and protected. In practice, the dominant discourse of securing the 
state often works to silence any concerns about enhanced state power. An 
elite programme to restrict civil liberties can be justified to a society 
conditioned by the ‘expert’ repetition of this discourse by appealing to the 
objective logic it asserts and discounting all other interpretations. Therefore, 
the move to achieve increased levels of security without the infringement 
upon personal or civil liberties is excluded from the argument, as the two are 
constantly being positioned in direct opposition to each other.
For poststructuralists, language is one of the most crucial elements for the 
creation and perpetuation of a dominant discourse. Through language, certain 
actors, concepts and events are placed in hierarchical pairs, named binary 
oppositions, whereby one element of the set is favoured over the other in 
order to create or perpetuate meaning. The power relation that is embedded 
within this relationship (for example, good versus evil or developed versus 
undeveloped) serves to reinforce the preferred meaning within the discursive 
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construct. International Relations as a discipline is full of these oppositions 
and they are used by elites to both create favourable meaning out of certain 
events and to allow for this meaning to be easily absorbed and accepted by 
the wider public. One of the most common binary oppositions is to establish 
different groups or countries in terms of ‘them’ versus ‘us’. 
If we look to the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001 (commonly 
known as 9/11) we can see these categories of differentiation and their 
influence begin to manifest themselves. President George W. Bush described 
Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an ‘axis of evil’ – making these countries the 
‘them’ that were rhetorically and politically positioned as international pariahs 
in contrast to the innocent ‘us’ of the United States and its allies. Hence, this 
binary opposition enabled Bush to claim that the United States was opposite 
to all that this trio represented and would be justified in taking various actions 
during a global campaign against states that were judged to sponsor, or 
harbour, terrorists.
If we look to the work of one of the leading scholars of poststructuralism, 
Michel Foucault, then the concepts of elites, discourses and the power of 
language and binary oppositions all tie together to create what he labels a 
‘regime of truth’. This model applies to the ruling discourse that operates 
unquestioned within society, masquerading as the truth or fact. A regime of 
truth, then, is constituted by the dominant discourse, elite actors and the 
language that is used to create and sustain meaning and truth that serves the 
interest of the favoured actors. 
The importance of poststructuralism is to highlight existing regimes of truth 
and show that conventional ways of thinking and analysis in international 
relations are unable to point out how certain other possibilities are excluded 
by these discourses from the very start. Butler (2003) builds upon this idea of 
discourses excluding other possibilities by proposing that certain lives, in 
certain conflicts or terrorist atrocities, are deemed as more ‘grievable’ than 
others. Butler argues that thousands of people are lost to conflict in countries 
such as Palestine and Afghanistan, often at the hands of Western powers, 
and yet these people are not mourned or memorialised or even heard of 
within Western reports of war. 
This hierarchy of grief can also be seen in the outpouring of sympathy for 
victims of terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 and Nice in July 2016. 
Yet, similar attacks in Beirut and Nigeria in November 2015 and Baghdad in 
July 2016 (to name but a few) went largely unnoticed and were silenced 
within regimes of truth that mourned for, or favoured, the ‘innocent’ Western 
victim.
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Poststructuralism and media representations of terrorists
The media is a prime example of a site where discourses within regimes of 
truth are (re)produced and can be identified. How we receive information and 
the way that news events are presented to a society shapes how we 
conceptualise and react to political events. As such, if we want to observe 
how people have come to conceive and frame both terrorism and terrorists, 
the poststructuralist can analyse media accounts in order to analyse the 
discursive construction of these political actors and associated terrorist 
events.
As the defining global terrorist attack of the twenty-first century, the attacks of 
11 September 2001 on the United States can be used to convey how 
dominant discourses, instigated by governmental elites, were perpetuated 
and reinforced by the media. 
In newspaper reports – specifically, in the week after the attacks – the 
terrorists were presented as evil and irrational, their stated political 
motivations were effaced and instead terrorists were repeatedly spoken of as 
crazed and apolitical. The terrorists were plagued by ‘inexplicable neurosis’ 
and driven by ‘ethnic, superstitious and tribal madnesses’ (Toynbee 2001). 
Additionally, these terrorists were set apart as different from more traditional 
forms of terrorism that the world had previously witnessed through the 
highlighting of the lethality and deadliness of mass murdering transnational 
terrorism – a move which heightened the emotions of fear and anxiety further. 
To underscore this link to death and destruction, the media narrative also 
consistently linked both the acts and actors of 9/11 to images and metaphors 
of pestilence and disease. In contrast to this, was the cultivation of the idea of 
‘American innocence’ (Boswell 2001) that was ‘vulnerable to hate’ (Boyd 
2001), coupled with the persistent repetition and reminder of the suffering of 
the victims of 9/11 and the heroism of the first responders. Interspersed with 
this, the widespread international outcry to the attacks simultaneously worked 
to further emphasise the immorality and inhumanity of these actors. Themes 
of patriotism and civility were deployed within the media to further distance 
the cohesive ‘us’ from the generic barbarian terrorist. The reactions of the 
public that gathered together to pray, support each other, volunteer and 
eventually join the military juxtaposed radically with the destructive actions of 
the terrorists. Moreover, the emotions that the narratives of these actions 
evoked related back to feelings of love, empathy and altruism that the media 
utilised to engender further cohesion in society against the ‘other’ of the 
terrorist.
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The importance of the recognition of this discourse is not to attempt to 
present these political actors – the terrorists – in a better light, but to 
recognise how the consistent and universal portrayal of them as evil and 
irrational made certain reactions and foreign policy actions more amenable 
and immediately cut off other methods of responding to these terrorist 
attacks. From this, poststructuralism critically questions what purpose did the 
construction, by both the media and the government, of a dominant discourse 
that posited the terrorists and the society that they belonged to as evil and 
barbaric serve? How did the positing of an unbridgeable chasm between the 
civilised society and the primeval terrorist, within this regime of truth, favour 
elite agendas? One answer has been the identification of how this ‘good 
versus evil’ construct prepared and almost rallied the American public for war. 
It certainly prevented the chance of dealing with these attacks through 
diplomacy, as the overarching discourse stated that these terrorists merely 
wanted to destroy the world before them. While some may support the wars 
in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) that followed these attacks, the 
poststructuralist contribution deconstructs how this militaristic and aggressive 
response to 9/11 was legitimised by the discursive construction of the 
terrorists, the emotions that were manipulated and the divide between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ that was fashioned. 
The pervasion of this discourse also served to conflate the motivations and 
acts of these terrorists with the construction of a wider Muslim and Arab 
society. With the simplistic interpretation of the historical relations between 
the ‘West’ and ‘East’ that was encouraged in this discursive construction, the 
regime of truth played upon and amplified the notion of the Muslim or Arab 
world as backward and primordial. Within the regime of truth of the War on 
Terror, then, this emotive discourse was extended to every Muslim, every 
Arab, and, eventually, every non-Westerner.
With the passage of time, we are also able to trace the gradual disruption to 
and destabilising of this regime of truth. As the United States was drawn 
further into destructive and protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
public opinion that had supported intervention began to wane. Over time, the 
discursive construction of terrorists by the media was not strong enough to 
override the concurrent media accounts of large numbers of casualties 
resulting from the intervention. Along with these fatalities, as the media began 
to report on the abuses that were carried out, the regime of truth that had 
been centred on the foreign policy directives of the Bush presidency started 
to falter. Thus, the official discourse regarding terrorism and intervention was 
changing and this shift can be identified by a shift to more clandestine forms 
of intervention in the Middle East from 2009 onwards – watermarked by the 
presidency of Barack Obama. The increased use of special forces and drone 
strikes allowed Obama to continue to exert influence over the region without 
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overtly declaring war – while also distancing his administration from the milit-
ary intervention that defined that of his predecessor.
The official discourse across an event, although powerful, never fully 
accounts for the reading of the entire situation. While the presentation of 
terrorists as irrational and evil has found solid ground and the dominant 
perceptions of terrorism and terrorists are of an illogical and apolitical act and 
actor, there always will be deviation from this conceptualisation. As such, the 
official discourse as crafted by elites never fully accounts for or subsumes the 
whole of a society. For example, despite the warmongering in the wake of 
9/11, there were large-scale anti-war protests by members of the public 
across many nations. This messy entanglement of the everyday and the elite 
shows that a plethora of discourses can coexist and craft the view of 
international relations that we are offered. From this we must recognise that 
elite and everyday discourses co-exist and, although one assumes a dom-
inant position, there are still many other competing discourses at play that 
shape international relations and have the potential to contribute to under-
standings commonly seen as ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’.
Conclusion
The impact of poststructuralism within IR theory comes from its ability to not 
only identify and uncover power relations that dictate political events but also 
make space for alternative discourses to emerge that can also affect the 
course of events. By examining elite actors, we can see how commonly 
accepted facts about the political system are not ‘natural’ but, instead, 
constructed in order to favour a dominant discourse. Furthermore, by tracing 
the rise and fall of regimes of truth as they take on new forms and favour new 
actors, poststructuralism shows how discourses can change over time and be 
destabilised. Most importantly, poststructuralism allows you to become care-
fully attuned to – and interrogate – the many ways that power is exercised.
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Feminism
SARAH SMITH
From the outset, feminist theory has challenged women’s near complete 
absence from traditional IR theory and practice. This absence is visible both 
in women’s marginalisation from decision-making and in the assumption that 
the reality of women’s day-to-day lives is not impacted by or important to 
international relations. Beyond this, feminist contributions to IR can also be 
understood through their deconstruction of gender – both as socially const-
ructed identities and as a powerful organising logic. This means recognising 
and then challenging assumptions about masculine and feminine gender 
roles that dictate what both women and men should or can do in global 
politics and what counts as important in considerations of international 
relations. These assumptions in turn shape the process of global politics and 
the impacts these have on men and women’s lives. Rather than suggest that 
traditional IR was gender-neutral – that is, that gender and IR were two 
separate spheres that did not impact on each other – feminist theory has 
shown that traditional IR is in fact gender-blind. Feminist scholarship 
therefore takes both women and gender seriously – and in doing so it 
challenges IR’s foundational concepts and assumptions. 
The basics of feminism
If we start with feminism’s first contribution – making women visible – an early 
contribution of feminist theorists is revealing that women were and are 
routinely exposed to gendered violence. In making violence against women 
visible, an international system that tacitly accepted a large amount of 
violence against women as a normal state of affairs was also exposed. For 
example, former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s ‘UNiTE’ campaign to 
end violence against women estimated that up to seven out of ten women will 
experience violence at some point in their lives – and that approximately 600 
million women live in countries where domestic violence is not yet considered 
a crime. Violence against women is prevalent globally and is not specific to 
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any particular political or economic system. Jacqui True (2012) has demon-
strated the links between violence against women in the private sphere (for 
example, domestic violence) and the kinds of violence women experience in 
public, in an increasingly globalised workplace and in times of war. In short, 
nowhere do women share the same economic, political or social rights as 
men and everywhere there are prevalent forms of gendered violence, 
whether this be domestic violence in the home or sexual violence in conflict. 
In looking at violence against women in such a way, it is possible to see a 
continuum of gendered violence that does not reflect neat and distinct 
categories of peace, stability and so on. Many societies are thought of as 
predominantly peaceful or stable despite high levels of violence against a 
particular portion of the population. It also presents a very different image of 
violence and insecurity to that viewed through the security agendas of states, 
which is characteristic of traditional IR viewpoints.
In making women visible, feminism has also highlighted women’s absence 
from decision-making and institutional structures. For example, in 2015 the 
World Bank estimated that globally women made up just 22.9% of national 
parliaments. One of the core assumptions of traditional perspectives that 
feminism has challenged is the exclusionary focus on areas that are 
considered ‘high’ politics – for example, sovereignty, the state and military 
security. The traditional focus on states and relations between them over-
looks the fact that men are predominantly in charge of state institutions, 
dominating power and decision-making structures. It also ignores other areas 
that both impact global politics and are impacted by it. This is a gendered 
exclusion as women contribute in essential ways to global politics even 
though they are more likely to populate those areas not considered high 
politics and their day-to-day lives may be considered peripheral. Traditional 
perspectives that ignore gender not only overlook the contributions of women 
and the impact global politics has on them but also perpetually justify this 
exclusion. If women are outside these domains of power, then their exper-
iences and contributions are not relevant. Feminist theorists have worked to 
demonstrate that this distinction between private and public is false. In doing 
so they show that previously excluded areas are central to the functioning of 
IR, even if they are not acknowledged, and that the exclusion and inclusion of 
certain areas in traditional IR thinking is based on gendered ideas of what 
counts and does not count.
This brings us to the second key contribution of feminism – exposing and 
deconstructing socially constructed gender norms. In making sense of IR in a 
way that takes both women and gender seriously, feminism has demon-
strated the construction of gendered identities that perpetuate normative 
ideas of what men and women should do. In this regard, it is important to 
understand the distinction between ‘sex’ as biological and ‘gender’ as socially 
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constructed. Not all gender considerations rest on the analysis of women, nor 
should they, and gender relates to expectations and identities attached to 
both men and women. Gender is understood as the socially constructed 
assumptions that are assigned to either male or female bodies – that is, 
behaviour that is assumed to be appropriate ‘masculine’ (male) or ‘feminine’ 
(female) behaviour. Masculinity is often associated with rationality, power, 
independence and the public sphere. Femininity is often associated with 
irrationality, in need of protection, domesticity and the private sphere. These 
socially and politically produced gender identities shape and influence global 
interactions, and IR as theory – and global politics as practice – also 
produces such gendered identities in perpetuating assumptions about who 
should do what and why. These gender identities are also imbued with power, 
in particular patriarchal power, which subordinates women and feminine 
gender identities to men and masculine gender identities. What this means is 
that socially constructed gender identities also determine distributions of 
power, which impact where women are in global politics. Whereas men can 
be feminine and women masculine, masculinity is expected for men and 
femininity of women. 
Cynthia Enloe (1989) asked the question ‘where are the women?’, 
encouraging IR scholars to see the spaces that women inhabit in global 
politics and demonstrating that women are essential actors in the 
international system. She focused on deconstructing the distinctions between 
what is considered international and what is considered personal, showing 
how global politics impacts on and is shaped by the daily activities of men 
and women – and in turn how these activities rest on gendered identities. 
Traditionally, the military and war making have been seen as masculine 
endeavours, linked with the idea that men are warriors and protectors, that 
they are legitimate armed actors who fight to protect those in need of 
protection – women, children and non-fighting men. In practice this has meant 
that the many ways that women contribute to conflict and experience conflict 
have been considered peripheral, outside the realm of IR’s considerations. 
For example, the issue of sexual and gendered violence in conflict has only 
recently entered the international agenda. Comparatively, the mass rape of 
women during and after the Second World War was not prosecuted as the 
occurrence was either considered an unfortunate by-product of war or simply 
ignored. This has since changed, with the 2002 Rome Statute recognising 
rape as a war crime. However, this recognition has not led to the curtailment 
of conflict related sexual violence and this form of violence remains endemic 
in many conflicts around the world, as does impunity for its occurrence.
In turn, these issues highlight the importance of intersectionality – 
understanding that IR is shaped not only by gender but also by other iden-
tities, such as class, race or ethnicity. Intersectionality refers to where these 
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identities intersect, and in turn how different groups of people are margin-
alised, suggesting that we must consider each in tandem rather than in 
isolation. In examining wartime rape, Lori Handrahan (2004, 437) has shown 
the intersection of gender and ethnic identities, where the enemy’s women 
become constructed as ‘other’ and violence against them consequently 
comes to represent the ‘expansion of ethnic territory by the male conqueror.’ 
This rests on gendered constructions, which occur at the intersections with 
other forms of identity, such as ethnicity or race. Gendered constructions that 
see women characterised as protected mean that conquering them – through 
rape or sexual violence – is representative of power and domination over 
one’s enemy. Applying feminist theory to the issue of male wartime rape also 
shows the gendered logics that inform its occurrence, in particular that the 
rape of male opponents is seen to ‘feminise’ (that is, humiliate, defeat) opp-
onents. This again highlights the contribution of feminism in understanding 
how gender influences IR and how the feminine is undervalued or devalued.
As discussed above, feminism has exposed gender violence and women’s 
marginalisation in global politics. However, it also challenges gendered 
constructions of women as inherently peaceful, as in need of protection or as 
victims. Feminists see these constructions as further evidence of gender 
inequality and also as contributing to the exclusion of women from traditional 
IR perspectives in the first instance. If women are assumed to be victims 
rather than actors or as peaceful rather than aggressive or as only existing in 
the domestic or private realm (rather than the public sphere), then their 
experiences and perspectives on global politics are more easily ignored and 
justified as marginal. Accounts of women disrupting these gender identities, 
such as being agents of political violence for example, have challenged these 
assumptions. This is an important contribution of feminism and one that 
challenges the construction of gendered identities that do not reflect the 
diversity of women’s engagements with IR and in practice perpetuate wom-
en’s limited access to power. Therefore, taking feminism seriously is not 
simply about upending the historical marginalisation of women, it also 
provides a more complete picture of global politics by taking into account a 
broader range of actors and actions.
Feminism and peacekeeping
Building peace after conflict is an increasingly central concern of IR scholars 
– especially as conflicts become broader and more complex. There are also 
questions regarding how post-conflict societies are to be rebuilt and how best 
to prevent relapses into conflict. Peacekeeping missions are one way that the 
international community seeks to institute sustainable peace after conflict and 
the United Nation’s traditional peacekeeping role (understood as acting as an 
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impartial interlocutor or monitor) has broadened considerably. Missions now 
frequently include a laundry list of state-building roles, including re-
establishing police and military forces and building political institutions. 
Feminist theorists have demonstrated the ways that peacekeeping, as 
security-seeking behaviour, is shaped by masculine notions of militarised 
security. Post-conflict situations are generally characterised as the formal 
cessation of violence between armed combatants, ideally transitioning to a 
situation where the state has a monopoly on the use of force. It is this shift 
that peacekeeping missions seek to facilitate, conducting a wide range of 
tasks such as disarming combatants, facilitating peace deals between various 
state and non-state groups, monitoring elections and building rule of law 
capacity in state institutions such as police forces and the military. 
However, as feminist IR scholars have shown, violence against women often 
continues in the post-conflict period at rates commensurate to or even greater 
than during the conflict period. This includes rape and sexual assault, 
domestic violence and forced prostitution, as well as those selling sex to 
alleviate financial insecurity. The dominant approach to keeping peace often 
obscures these kinds of violence. Issues like gender equality and domestic 
violence (and human rights) are considered ‘soft’ issues as opposed to the 
‘hard’ or real issues of military security. This understanding of peace, then, is 
one in which women’s security is not central.
In terms of structural and indirect violence, women are generally excluded 
from positions of power and decision-making in reconstruction efforts and 
have limited access to economic resources. Donna Pankhurst (2008) has 
theorised what she terms a post-conflict backlash against women, one that is 
chiefly characterised by high rates of violence and restrictions on women’s 
access to political, economic and social resources post-conflict. The 
restriction of women’s access to such resources – such as basic food, 
housing and education – makes them more susceptible to gendered violence. 
This often begins with women’s exclusion from peace negotiations and deals, 
which instead focus on elite actors who are predominantly men, often 
militarised men. In peacekeeping missions, women are also under-
represented. In 1993, women made up only 1% of deployed personnel. That 
figure had only risen to 3% for military and 10% for policy personnel by 2014. 
As gender inequality has become increasingly acknowledged, those involved 
in peacekeeping have paid more attention to the causes and consequences 
of women’s insecurity in post-conflict settings. 
In October 2000 the UN Security Council devoted an entire session to 
Women, Peace and Security – adopting Resolution 1325 as a result. This 
resolution called for a gender perspective to be ‘mainstreamed’ throughout 
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peace operations and for women to be included in peace agreements and 
post-conflict decision-making – in addition to the protection of women and 
girls during conflict. Resolution 1325 calls on all actors to recognise the 
‘special needs’ of women and girls in post-conflict societies, to support local 
women’s peace initiatives, and advocates for the protection of women’s 
human rights in electoral, judiciary and police systems. However, consistent 
with the construction of a gendered understanding of peace discussed above, 
there remain limitations to the full implementation of Resolution 1325. 
A United Nations study by Radhika Coomaraswamy (2015) found that gender 
in peacekeeping continues to be under-resourced politically and financially, 
and the gendered elements of post-conflict reconstruction are still 
marginalised in missions. Women still experience high rates of violence post-
conflict, are still excluded from peace processes and still ignored in peace-
building policy. This is demonstrated, for example, in national and inter-
national attempts to disarm former combatants after conflict and reintegrate 
them into post-conflict society. This is a post-conflict policy area that feminist 
scholars have routinely exposed as being highly gendered and exclusionary 
of women who are former combatants. Megan Mackenzie (2010) has attrib-
uted this to constructed gender identities that minimise the idea that women 
are agents in conflict or involved in war-making, instead constructing them as 
victims with limited agency. In other words, they are subject to war rather than 
war’s actors. 
This means not only that women are excluded from disarmament prog-
rammes because of socially produced gender norms but also that they are 
unable to access the material and economic benefits that may flow from such 
programmes – or the political and social gains they could make from being 
recognised as legitimate veterans in post-conflict societies. This example 
demonstrates the power invested in gendered identities, the ways they can 
shape policy and how gender inequality is perpetuated via such policy.
Finally, international interventions such as peacekeeping missions also 
contribute to the continuation of violence post-conflict and are a site in which 
gendered identities are produced. There have been numerous reports of 
peacekeepers perpetrating sexual violence against women, girls and boys 
while on mission. This issue gained much attention in 2015 and into 2016, 
when a United Nations whistle blower exposed not only reports of sexual 
abuse of children in the Central African Republic by French peacekeepers but 
also the United Nation’s inaction in the face of these reports. From a feminist 
perspective, the impunity that peacekeepers enjoy – despite rhetorical 
commitments to zero tolerance – is a result of gendered security imperatives 
in which militarised security and the coherence of the institution (whether that 
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be an international organisation or a state) is prioritised over the welfare of 
the individual.
Conclusion
Feminist research has demonstrated the value in taking women’s experiences 
and contributions seriously and used that as a base to demonstrate how IR 
rests on, and perpetuates, gendered ideas about who does what, who 
experiences what – and why – in global politics. Beyond this there is also 
recognition that women are important agents in political, economic and social 
processes. Despite its designation, feminism does more than focus on 
women, or what are considered women’s issues. In highlighting both ineq-
uality and relations of power, feminism reveals gendered power and what it 
does in global politics. Being concerned with women’s subordination to men, 
gendered inequality and the construction of gendered identities, feminism has 
challenged a homogenous concept of ‘women’ in IR and exposed gendered 
logics as powerful organising frameworks.
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Postcolonialism
SHEILA NAIR
Postcolonialism examines how societies, governments and peoples in the 
formerly colonised regions of the world experience international relations. The 
use of ‘post’ by postcolonial scholars by no means suggests that the effects 
or impacts of colonial rule are now long gone. Rather, it highlights the impact 
that colonial and imperial histories still have in shaping a colonial way of 
thinking about the world and how Western forms of knowledge and power 
marginalise the non-Western world. Postcolonialism is not only interested in 
understanding the world as it is, but also as it ought to be. It is concerned with 
the disparities in global power and wealth accumulation and why some states 
and groups exercise so much power over others. By raising issues such as 
this, postcolonialism asks different questions to the other theories of IR and 
allows for not just alternative readings of history but also alternative perspec-
tives on contemporary events and issues.
The basics of postcolonialism
Postcolonialism has specifically drawn attention to IR theory’s neglect of the 
critical intersections of empire, race/ethnicity, gender and class (among other 
factors) in the workings of global power that reproduce a hierarchical IR. This 
hierarchy is centred not on striving for a more equal distribution of power 
among peoples and states but on the concentration of power. 
A key theme to postcolonialism is that Western perceptions of the non-West 
are a result of the legacies of European colonisation and imperialism. 
Discourses – primarily things that are written or spoken – constructed non-
Western states and peoples as ‘other’ or different to the West, usually in a 
way that made them appear to be inferior. In doing so, they helped European 
powers justify their domination over other peoples in the name of bringing 
civilisation or progress.
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To better understand postcolonialism we can consider the discourses that 
make certain power relations seem natural or even inevitable. Postcolonialism 
views key issues in International Relations as constituting discourses of 
power. This notion of a discourse allows scholars to utilise a frame of 
reference for thinking about the world and its problems that does not merely 
reside in the empirically verifiable and ‘fact’-based inquiry that drives 
traditional IR theories such as realism and liberalism. Take, for example, the 
issue of global inequality. Postcolonialism suggests that in order to better 
understand how global class relations emerge and are maintained we must 
address ideas about why these relations appear normal. This approach points 
to how characterisations of global poverty are often accompanied by images 
and narratives of non-Western governments and societies as simultaneously 
primitive, hyper-masculine, aggressive, childlike and effeminate. In short, 
postcolonialism argues that addressing and finding solutions to poverty and 
global inequality come up against representations of the other that make it 
difficult for Western policymakers to shed their biases and address the 
underlying global structural factors such as how capital and resources are 
accumulated and flow around the world generating inequality. For this reason, 
solutions often focus only on intervening to support a seemingly less 
developed state, rather than addressing the underlying causes of global 
inequality.
In analysing how key concepts such as power, the state and security serve to 
reproduce the status quo, postcolonialism proposes a more complex view of 
such concepts than is characteristic of traditional theories. For example, the 
concept of sovereignty, and with it the contours of the modern state, were 
imposed on the colonial world by European powers. Yet it is a concept that is 
usually taken for granted by scholars of realism and liberalism. Postcol-
onialism also challenges the Marxist perspective that class struggle is at the 
root of historical change – instead demonstrating how race shapes history. 
Analyses that focus only on class fail to consider how the identification of the 
‘Third World’ (a term developed during the Cold War to describe those states 
unaligned to the United States or the Soviet Union) as ‘backward’, ‘primitive’ 
or ‘non-rational’ are linked to persistent economic marginalisation. Similarly, 
while mainstream IR theories see the international system as an anarchy, 
postcolonial scholars see it as a hierarchy. Colonialism and imperialism 
fostered a long process of continued domination of the West over the rest of 
the world and cultural, economic and political domination still characterise 
global politics.
Postcolonialism also demonstrates how Western views about Islam and its 
adherents are a manifestation of the West’s own insecurities. The rise of 
political Islam across the Muslim world – watermarked by Iran’s Islamic 
Revolution in 1979 – not only confronted neo-imperialist interventions but also 
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revealed the impacts of core cultural and social shifts accompanying a more 
interconnected global economy. In the West, however, the view of this 
resurgence has been interpreted by prominent policymakers and academics 
as heralding a ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington 1993) and worse, 
constituting a direct threat to Western civilization. Edward Said (1997) 
showed how Western media, film, academia and policy elites rely on a 
distorted lens or framework used to describe the history and culture of Arab 
peoples and adherents of Islam. He called it Orientalism because it const-
ructs a particular idea of the so-called ‘Orient’ that is distinct from the West 
and that in a binary or dualistic way of thinking ascribes to the Orient and its 
inhabitants characteristics that are essentially the opposite of the West. For 
instance, people of the Orient may be characterised as being exotic, 
emotional, feminine, backward, hedonistic, non-rational and so forth. This is 
in contrast to the more positive attributes usually associated with the West 
such as rationality, masculinity, civilization and modernity. 
Many postcolonial scholars emphasise how orientalist discourses are still 
visible in Western representations today. Representations and perceptions 
matter to postcolonial theorists because they dictate what comes to be seen 
as normal or as making sense.
Postcolonialism owes a significant debt to Edward Said for his work on 
developing Orientalism. Yet Said himself was influenced by the writing of anti-
colonial and nationalist thinkers such as Frantz Fanon (1967) and Albert 
Memmi (1991) whose works discuss the power of ‘othering’. For example, 
Fanon shows how race shapes the way that the coloniser relates to the 
colonised and vice versa by capturing how some people under colonial rule 
began to internalise – that is, identify with – ideas of racial difference that saw 
‘others’ as inferior to white Europeans. Fanon explains that the ‘black man’ is 
made to believe in his inferiority to the ‘white colonisers’ through psycho-
logical aspects of colonisation, such as the imposition of the coloniser’s 
language, culture, religion and education systems. Through such impositions, 
the colonised come to believe they are a culturally inferior other. This 
internalisation made it easier for colonisers to justify and maintain their rule. 
Postcolonialism thus brings into focus how racial binaries – that is, how races 
are constructed as different, opposite or ‘other’ – continue even after the end 
of formal colonial rule. It highlights how racialised othering frames not just 
history, but contemporary debates such as national security, nuclear politics, 
nationalism, culture, immigration, international aid and the struggle for 
indigenous rights.
An example of racialised othering can be found in discourses around nuclear 
non-proliferation. In such discourses, countries and their leaders in the Global 
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South are usually deemed not to be trusted with nuclear weapons. These 
dominant discourses construct these states as dangerous, unpredictable or 
unaccountable and as violating basic norms on human rights. One need only 
look at how North Korea and Iran, two states that have pursued nuclear 
proliferation, are portrayed as rogue states in US foreign policy discourse. 
Yet, for decades, the West’s disregard for human rights may be seen in 
uranium mining that has often taken place on lands that are populated by 
indigenous peoples around the world – including in the United States – and 
has caused death, illness and environmental degradation. Most importantly, 
what is often missing from the nuclear debate is the fact that the United 
States is the only power to have ever used nuclear weapons (aside from 
testing), when it dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Nagasaki 
and Hiroshima in 1945, with horrific and devastating loss of life. 
Therefore, for postcolonial scholars such as Shampa Biswas (2014), the 
notion that some states can be trusted with nuclear weapons while others 
cannot because they are less developed, less mature in their approach to 
human life or less rational is a racialised discourse. In debates such as these, 
postcolonialism asks not who can be trusted with such weapons, but rather 
who determines who can be trusted – and why? Simply looking at the comp-
etition between states to accrue nuclear weapons will not tell us enough 
about the workings of power in international relations – such as how a nuclear 
arms race is underpinned by the power of some states to construct other 
states so that they are deemed not capable of having any such weapons at 
all.
Postcolonialism and the marginalisation of women of colour
As with all theories of IR, there are internal debates among postcolonial 
scholars and in this case also a significant overlap with feminism – especially 
‘third wave’ feminism that became prominent in the 1990s. bell hooks (2000) 
observed that the so-called ‘second wave’ of feminism of the mid- to late 
twentieth century had emerged from women in a position of privilege and did 
not represent African American women such as herself who remain on the 
margins of society, politics and the economy. She called for an alternative, 
critical and distinctive feminist activism and politics. 
For example, does a black woman from a poor neighbourhood on Chicago’s 
south side experience sexism in the same way as a white woman from its 
wealthier suburbs? Women who share the same ethnic identity might 
experience sexism in different ways because of their class. The same might 
be true for women of colour and white women from the same social class. 
Women of colour and white women in the United States experience 
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‘heteropatriarchy’ – a societal order marked by white male heterosexual 
domination – differently even if they come from the same social class. An 
illustration of how this works may be found in the video of Beyonce’s 
‘Lemonade’ which not only draws on how sexism is filtered through this 
patriarchal order but also explores how race, gender, class and sexuality are 
intimately intertwined in the history of black women. 
The fact that some black women may be more privileged in relation to class 
may not take away from their experience of racism. For this reason (and 
others), feminist postcolonial scholars (see Chowdhry and Nair 2002) call for 
more attention to the intersections of race and/or ethnicity, nationality, class 
and gender. By doing so they address the ways that different aspects of one’s 
identity, such as race, gender, class, sexuality and so forth, intersect to create 
multiple and distinct forms of oppression so that no one aspect can be privile-
ged over another in understanding oppression. Instead, various identities 
must all be understood as intersecting in producing one’s experience of 
oppression. This idea of ‘intersectionality’ is central to third-wave feminist 
approaches. 
Postcolonial feminists share a desire to go beyond simply analysing the 
impacts of patriarchy, gender inequality and sexual exploitation. Instead, they 
highlight the need to fight not only patriarchy (broadly understood as the 
power of men over women) but also the classism and racism that privileges 
white women over women of colour. They question the idea of universal 
solidarity in women’s movements, arguing that the struggle against patriarchy 
as well as social inequality must be situated in relation to racial, ethnic and 
sexual privilege. For example, while Western feminism has often portrayed 
the veil as a symbol of oppression of women, many Algerian women adopted 
the veil, standing alongside men, when protesting French rule. To them, it 
was a symbol of opposition to white, colonial patriarchy. In many other parts 
of the colonised world, women stood shoulder to shoulder with men in 
nationalist movements to overthrow colonial rule, showing that women in 
different cultural, social and political contexts experience oppression in very 
different ways. Postcolonial feminists are committed to an intersectional 
approach that uncovers the deeper implications of how and why systemic 
violence evident in war, conflict, terror, poverty, social inequality and so forth 
has taken root. Understanding power thus requires paying attention to these 
intersections and how they are embedded in the issue at hand.
Postcolonial feminism asserts that women of colour are triply oppressed due 
to their (1) race/ethnicity, (2) class status and (3) gender. An example can be 
found in the employment conditions of the many women in the Global South 
who work in factories producing textiles, semi-conductors, and sporting and 
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consumer goods for export to the West. In one such factory in Thailand, the 
Kader Toy Factory, a fire in 1993 killed 220 female factory workers and 
seriously injured over 500 more. The doors to the building were locked at the 
time of the fire. The tragedy revealed the exploitation and deplorable working 
conditions of these women, who were employed by local contractors of 
American companies to make toys and stuffed animals for sale in Western 
markets. Despite decades of such abuses, there was little attention given to 
the conditions in these factories, or to the tragedy of the fire, in the 
mainstream Western media. One opinion piece captured the shocking 
disregard for these women’s lives,
These executives know that their profits come from the toil of 
the young and the wretched in the Far East; they can live with 
that – live well, in fact. But they do not want to talk about dead 
women and girls stacked in the factory yard like so much 
rubbish, their bodies eventually to be carted away like any 
other industrial debris (Herbert 1994).
In another tragedy, the Rana Plaza – a garment factory in Dhaka, Bangladesh 
– collapsed, killing 1,135 garment workers, mostly women. It threw a spotlight 
on the workings of the global garment industry. Popular Western clothing lines 
profit from low wages, exploitation and sweatshop conditions by producing 
their clothes in countries with lax building codes and regulations and non-
existent (or inadequate) labour standards. The clothing lines do not then hold 
the factories to account for working conditions or safety. Postcolonial scholars 
argue that the deeply exploitative conditions and the disregard for the safety 
of these workers show that lesser value is ascribed to brown bodies 
compared to white ones. 
While there was much more coverage of this industrial accident in the 
Western media and the brands whose clothing was being made at the Rana 
Plaza did suffer some momentary bad publicity, there has been little 
sustained effort to right the wrongs in the operations of multinational firms. 
The quest for the highest possible profit margins forces developing countries 
into a ‘race to the bottom’ in which they compete to have the cheapest labour 
and production costs in order to attract investment from multinational 
corporations. 
The results are low wages, exploitation and low safety standards. Post-
colonial scholarship explains the failure to change these conditions by 
exposing how race, class and gender come together to obscure the plight of 
these workers, meaning that the factory overseers, like the owners of the 
Rana Plaza and Kader operations, are not held accountable until tragedy 
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strikes. Even when they are held accountable, the punishment does not 
extend to the Western corporations further up the chain who sub-contract the 
task of exploiting workers – and ultimately killing some of them in these 
cases. It is almost impossible to imagine that a tragedy of a similar scale in a 
Western state would prompt so little action against those responsible or allow 
the conditions that caused it to continue virtually unchecked.
Conclusion
Postcolonialism interrogates a world order dominated by major state actors 
and their domineering interests and ways of looking at the world. It challenges 
notions that have taken hold about the way states act or behave and what 
motivates them. It forces us to ask tough questions about how and why a 
hierarchical international order has emerged and it further challenges main-
stream IR’s core assumptions about concepts such as power and how it 
operates. Postcolonialism forces us to reckon with the everyday injustices 
and oppressions that can reveal themselves in the starkest terms through a 
particular moment of crisis. Whether it has to do with the threat of nuclear 
weapons or the deaths of workers in factories churning out goods for Western 
markets, postcolonialism asks us to analyse these issues from the pers-
pectives of those who lack power. While postcolonialism shares some 
common ground with other critical theories in this regard, it also offers a 
distinctive approach. It brings together a deep concern with histories of 
colonialism and imperialism, how these are carried through to the present – 
and how inequalities and oppressions embedded in race, class and gender 
relations on a global scale matter for our understanding of international 
relations. By paying close attention to how these aspects of the global play 
out in specific contexts, postcolonialism gives us an important and alternative 
conceptual lens that provides us with a different set of theoretical tools to 
unpack the complexities of this world.
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Towards a Global IR?
AMITAV ACHARYA
The study of International Relations is growing rapidly all over the world. IR 
students in Western universities are an increasingly multicultural lot, drawn 
from many different parts of the world. There is also a proliferation of IR 
departments and programmes in universities outside the West, especially in 
large countries such as China, India, Turkey, Brazil and Indonesia. However, 
IR is not yet a truly global discipline that captures the full range of ideas, 
approaches and experiences of both Western and non-Western societies. IR 
theories and concepts remain heavily biased in favour of Western Europe and 
the United States. Consequently, they neglect the experiences and relat-
ionships in other parts of the world, or offer a poor fit for understanding and 
explaining them.
The idea of a global IR challenges traditional IR’s neglect and marginalisation 
of the voices and experiences of the non-Western world, or the Global South. 
The principal aim of global IR is to ‘bring the Rest in’. It calls for greater 
participation from scholars from the Global South in the IR discipline and the 
broadening of the way IR is taught and written in the dominant centres of 
knowledge in the West. The purpose of global IR is to ensure the trans-
formation of the discipline into something that actually captures and explains 
the relationships among states and societies in all parts of the world: East, 
West, North, South. A global IR perspective on IR theory does not seek to 
displace existing theories, but challenges them to broaden their horizons and 
acknowledge the place and role of the non-Western world.
The reasons for the hitherto Western dominance of IR are many. One is the 
hegemonic status of Western scholars, publications and institutions in IR and 
their widespread belief that the Western IR theory has discovered the right 
path to understanding IR, or the right answers to the puzzles and problems of 
the day. Compounding the problem is a serious lack of institutional resources 
in the non-Western world. Add to this the challenges facing scholars from 
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non-English speaking countries in getting published in major IR journals or to 
pursue the major debates and developments in the field that are mainly 
carried out in the English language. Another factor is the close link between 
IR academics and governments in many developing countries (although this 
is also a feature in the West), which promotes policy-oriented research at the 
expense of theoretical work. There is also the tendency among many IR 
scholars in the Global South towards an uncritical acceptance of Western 
theory – and a resulting lack of confidence to take on Western theorists. In 
this situation, what passes as theory is mostly the application of Western 
theoretical concepts and models to the local context, rather than injecting 
indigenous ideas and insights from local practices to the main body of IR 
theory.
The discipline of International Relations, as often presented in its mainstream 
textbooks and the learning and training programmes of major institution 
teaching, is said to have nominally begun in the United Kingdom in 1919 
when the first named department and professorship in international politics 
was created in Aberystwyth, Wales. But it really developed in the United 
States after the Second World War. It can hardly be a coincidence that these 
countries were the leading powers of the world before and after the Second 
World War. According to the traditional view, IR begins with the Peace of 
Westphalia (1648), when Europe developed the sovereign nation-state. This 
also coincided roughly with the rise of ‘the West’ via the European states 
system that expanded to the rest of the world due to European colonialism. 
As non-Western nations became independent during the period of 
decolonisation post-1945, they inherited and adopted European ideas, 
institutions and practices. After the Second World War, while some European 
ideas retained their centrality, the United States added its own ideas and 
approaches. Europe before 1945 had managed international relations through 
a balance of power system, based on the idea that the stability of an 
international system is best ensured through an approximate parity among its 
major powers. Any attempt by any single power to become hegemonic 
(dominate the rest) should be defeated by an alliance among other powers in 
the system. The United States on the other hand sought to manage inter-
national order through multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations and 
the International Monetary Fund. Although these institutions were theoretically 
open to participation by all nations, their purpose and agenda were heavily 
influenced by the interests and preferences of the United States and its allies.
Shaped by the ideas and practices of the West, the field of IR gave little 
attention to ‘the Rest’. The traditional literature viewed non-Western countries 
as ‘norm-takers’ or ‘passive subjects’ – recipients of Western ideas and 
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institutions – rather than active contributors to international order in their own 
right. Against this traditional view, Global IR offers an alternative narrative. IR 
as a discipline might have been invented in the West, but the substance of IR 
did not begin with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which marked the 
beginnings of the period of Western dominance. Other and older civilisations 
– such as India, China and Islam – pioneered different international systems 
and world orders. For this reason, their contribution should be more central to 
the study of IR. IR should study not only anarchic international systems like 
the Greek city-states system and Europe after the Peace of Westphalia, but 
also hierarchical systems such as prevailed in Asia and the Middle East 
before the advent of European colonialism.
Global IR also argues that international systems should be studied in terms of 
not only political-strategic interactions but also cultural and civilizational 
interactions. Many of the so-called modern concepts such as economic 
interdependence, balance of power, and collective management of security – 
which are often traced by traditional IR to European ideas and practices – 
actually have multiple points of origin, both within and outside of Europe. With 
such a broader scope, IR then offers more space to the history, culture, 
economic systems and interactions and contributions of non-Western 
civilizations and states. IR is best understood as the product of interactions 
and mutual learning between all civilisations and states, even though some 
have been more powerful than others at different stages in history.
Broadly stated, the idea of global IR revolves around six main dimensions 
(see Acharya 2014 and 2016). 
First, global IR calls for a new understanding of universalism or universality. 
The dominant meaning of universalism in IR today is deeply influenced by the 
European Enlightenment. As Robert Cox (2002, 53) puts it, ‘In the Enligh-
tenment meaning, universal meant true for all time and space.’ His conception 
of universalism may be called ‘particularistic universalism’, in the sense of 
one set of ideas from Europe applying to all of humankind. This conception of 
universalism had a dark side: the suppression of diversity and the justification 
of European imperialism – which was inspired by the belief that European 
ideas, institutions and practices are superior to those of others and hence 
deserve to be imposed over other societies through force and occupations. 
An alternative to particularistic universalism is pluralistic universalism. This 
recognises the diversity among nations, respects it and yet seeks to find the 
common ground among them. It views IR as a discipline with multiple and 
global foundations. 
Second, global IR calls for IR to be more authentically grounded in world 
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history, rather than Western history – and in the ideas, institutions, intellectual 
perspectives and practices of both Western and non-Western societies. 
‘Bringing the Rest in’ does not mean simply using the non-Western world as a 
testing ground to revalidate existing IR theories after a few adjustments and 
extensions. Global IR must be a two-way process. A key challenge for 
theories and theorists of global IR is to develop concepts and approaches 
from non-Western contexts on their own terms, and apply them not only 
locally but also to other contexts, including the larger global canvas.
Third, global IR subsumes, rather than supplants existing IR knowledge, 
including the theories, methods and scientific claims that we are already 
familiar with. I fully recognise that IR theories are hardly monolithic or 
unchanging when it comes to dealing with the non-Western world. Some 
theories, especially postcolonialism and feminism, have been at the forefront 
of efforts to recognise events, issues, agents and interactions outside the 
West and drawing theoretical insights from them to enrich the study of IR. 
Realism is ahead of liberalism in drawing insights from the non-Western 
world. For example, realists recognise the thinking of India’s Kautilya or 
China’s legalist thinkers, such as Han Feizi, as forerunners of Machiavelli or 
Hobbes. Realism has also added new variants to its theoretical family that 
have rendered it more relevant to the non-Western world than in its classical 
forms. Constructivism has been especially important in opening space for 
scholarship on the non-Western world because of its stress on culture and 
identity. Realism and liberalism privilege material determinants of 
international relations, such as power or wealth. These are often in short 
supply in the developing world. But ideas and norms are not, and they are 
often the main mechanisms through which the developing countries make 
their contribution to international relations. Liberalism is also useful in this 
sense as it identifies and prescribes three major pathways to peace: 
economic interdependence, multilateral institutions and democracy. The 
world has seen increasing trends towards these in the developing world. 
Global economic interdependence has grown since the end of the Cold War. 
There has been growing regional economic interdependence in East Asia, a 
critical region of the world. Multilateral institutions have proliferated, including 
in relatively newer areas such as cyberspace and climate change. To a lesser 
degree, democratisation has taken hold in the developing world, especially in 
Latin America and parts of East Asia, such as Indonesia and Myanmar. These 
developments could potentially make liberalism more relevant to under-
standing the international politics of the non-Western world.
At the same time, global IR does not leave the mainstream theories – 
realism, liberalism and constructivism – as is. Instead, it urges them to rethink 
their assumptions and broaden the scope of their investigation. For realism, 
the challenge is to look beyond conflicts induced by national interest and 
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distribution of power and acknowledge other sources of agency, including 
culture, ideas and norms that make states and civilisations not clash, but 
embrace and learn from each other. For liberals, there is a similar challenge 
to look beyond American hegemony as the starting point of investigating 
multilateralism and regionalism and their institutional forms. Liberalism also 
needs to acknowledge the significant variations in cooperative behaviour that 
exist in different local contexts, as no single model of integration or 
interactions can account for all or most of them. For constructivism, taking 
stock of different forms of agency in the creation and diffusion of ideas and 
norms remains a major challenge.
Fourth, global IR gives centre stage to regions. Regionalism today is less 
state-centric and encompasses an ever-widening range of actors and issues. 
Regionalism is sometimes viewed as the antithesis of universalism, but the 
two can be complimentary. Groupings such as the European Union (EU), 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the African Union (AU) 
actually compliment the role of the United Nations in peacekeeping, 
humanitarian operations and conflict management. The study of regions is not 
just about how regions self-organise their economic, political and cultural 
space – it is also about how they relate to each other to shape global order. In 
addition, focusing on regions is central to forging a close integration between 
disciplinary approaches (which often have a global scope) and area (or 
regional) studies. 
Fifth, a truly global IR cannot be based on cultural exceptionalism and 
parochialism. Exceptionalism is the tendency to present the characteristics of 
a social group as homogenous, collectively unique and superior to those of 
others. Claims about exceptionalism are frequently associated with the 
political agendas and purposes of the ruling elite, as evident in concepts such 
as ‘Asian Values’ or ‘Asian human rights’ or ‘Asian Democracy’. These are 
usually associated with variations of authoritarian rule because they 
originated in the 1990s from such countries as Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore, 
Mahathir Mohamad’s Malaysia and Deng Xiaoping’s China. Similarly, 
exceptionalism in IR often justifies the dominance of big powers over the 
weak. Before its defeat in the Second World War, Japan sought to establish 
an empire over Asia under the pretext of a distinctive pan-Asian culture and 
identity. Today, the rise of China has raised the possibility of an international 
system in Asia dominated by Chinese (Confucian) values and suzerain 
institutions, such as its historical tributary system.
Finally, global IR takes a broad conception of and multiple forms of agency. 
Not so long ago, agency in international relations was primarily viewed in 
terms of a ‘standard of civilisation’ in which the decisive element was the 
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capacity of states to defend their sovereignty, wage war, negotiate treaties, 
enforce compliance and manage the balance of power. This self-serving, 
ahistorical and brazenly racist formulation by the European colonial powers 
ignored the fact that even the most sophisticated forms of statecraft were 
present in many early non-Western civilisations. While the mainstream IR 
theories viewed the so-called Third World or Global South as marginal to the 
games that nations play, some of the critical theories actually thrived on this 
presumed marginality. They rightly criticised mainstream theories for 
excluding the South but did little exploration of alternative forms of agency in 
the South. While global disparities in material power are not going to 
disappear, we need to adopt a broader view of agency in international 
relations, going beyond military power and wealth. Agency is both material as 
well as ideational. Agency is not the prerogative of the strong, but can 
manifest as the weapon of the weak. Agency can be exercised in global 
transnational space as well as at regional and local levels. Agency can take 
multiple forms. Agency means constructing new rules and institutions at the 
regional level either to challenge or to support and strengthen global order. 
For example, China’s nationalist leader before the Second World War, Sun 
Yat-sen, is the father of the idea of international development that came to 
underpin post-war institutions such as the World Bank. India’s Jawaharlal 
Nehru was the first to propose a ban on nuclear testing. The Latin American 
countries adopted a declaration of human rights months before the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was drafted at the United Nations in New York. 
And Asian nations played an important role in the making of subsequent 
United Nations covenants on civil and politics rights and economic, social and 
cultural rights.
Agency means conceptualising and implementing new pathways to security, 
development and justice. In the 1960s, African countries developed formal 
and informal rules to maintain their postcolonial boundaries within the 
framework of the Organization of African Unity, which was later replaced by 
the African Union in 2000. Along with the African Union, a major role in the 
creation of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) norm was played by African 
political leaders such as Nelson Mandela, diplomats such as Francis Deng (a 
Sudanese) and Mohamed Sahnoun (an Algerian) and the former United 
Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. Indian economist Amartya Sen and 
Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq frontally challenged the orthodox 
Western model of development that focuses on national economic power and 
growth rates in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). They put forward the 
alternative and broader notion of human development, which focuses on 
enhancing individual capabilities through primary education and health. As is 
evident, some of these acts of agency are not just for specific regions or for 
the South itself, but are important to global governance as a whole. Using this 
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broader framework of agency, global IR gives a central place to the voices 
and agency of the South, to Southern perspectives on global order and to the 
changing dynamics of North–South relations. 
With the fundamentals of global IR now laid out it is important to recall Robert 
Cox, who warned that ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ 
(1981, 129). Who is global IR for and for what purpose? Because global IR 
does not reject IR’s existing theories, but seeks to accommodate them, it is 
open to criticism that it might end up preserving IR’s basic structure – albeit 
filling in new contents by collecting concepts around the world. In other 
words, global IR might end up globalising traditional IR theories and 
concepts. There is also the risk of over-focusing on the stronger and more 
resource-rich non-Western countries at the expense of the weaker countries 
of the developing world. Another challenge for global IR is how to study all 
nations, civilisations and issue areas under one framework without obscuring 
the cultural, political and economic variations among them. Attempting this 
also carries the risk of making IR too broad, lessening its analytic value and 
making theory-building difficult. These risks are not trivial, but keeping them in 
focus would help scholars to positively advance a discipline that clearly 
requires a new, global, perspective.
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Green Theory
HUGH C. DYER
In the 1960s there was public recognition of the global environmental crisis 
arising from the ‘tragedy of the commons’, which is the idea that as self-
interested individuals, humans will overuse shared resources such as land, 
fresh water and fish. In the 1970s the first United Nations conference on the 
subject was held and by the 1980s green political parties and public policies 
had emerged. This coincided with a demand for a green theory to help 
explain and understand these political issues. By the 1990s, International 
Relations had come to recognise the natural environment as an increasingly 
significant source of questions for the discipline, requiring theoretical as well 
as practical attention – especially in the wake of mounting evidence that 
human actions were significantly changing our global climate and presenting 
security problems as well as ecological ones.
The basics of green theory
Ecological thought addresses the interests of nature itself rather than only the 
interests of humanity in nature. Green theory captures this orientation in 
political terms of value and agency (Goodin 1992) – what is to be valued, by 
whom and how to get it. Green theory belongs to the critical theory tradition, 
in the sense that environmental issues evoke questions about relations 
between and among ourselves and others in the context of community and 
collective decision-making. In turn this has always raised the question of 
where the boundaries of political community are. For environmental problems, 
which transcend boundaries, these questions take the form of asking at what 
level of political community we should seek a solution. For green theorists, 
the answers are found in alternative ideas about political association based 
on our ecological relationships.
The introduction of environmental issues into IR has had some influence, but 
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their theoretical significance and practical policy implications may be viewed 
either as compatible or as irreconcilable with traditional assumptions and 
current practices. If viewed traditionally, then environmental issues can simply 
be added to the list of issues dealt with by existing means, for existing ends. If 
viewed alternatively, then these issues may lead to theoretical and practical 
transformation. Because theory and practice are linked, when environmental 
issues challenge existing practice they also raise new questions that IR 
theory must contend with. The obvious practical challenges of environmental 
change have not yet transformed IR theory – or even practice very much. The 
continued prevalence of competitive state relations is not conducive to 
environmental cooperation or encouraging to green thought. However, there 
has been theoretical development and some practical progress and a wide-
ranging literature has emerged viewing a variety of environmental issues from 
different theoretical perspectives. If this doesn’t amount to a single clear 
vision, it certainly represents a longer-term view about humankind’s common 
future.
Typically, environmental issues are buried in IR texts under other headings 
and with little acknowledgement of their unique theoretical significance. 
Environmentalism-themed scholarship is generally accepting of the existing 
framework of political, social and economic structures of world politics. While 
there are of course established forms of critical thought, these address 
relations within and between human communities, rather than human 
relations with the non-human environment. For example, liberalism empha-
sises individual rights of choice and consumption but is not fundamentally 
concerned with the environmental consequences of that consumption. 
Consequently, most forms of environmentalism seek to establish theoretical 
positions and practical solutions through existing structures, or in line with 
existing critiques of such structures. If less critical in orientation, then these 
views are likely to be compatible with a liberal position in IR (viewing 
international cooperation as being of general benefit to states). If more critical 
in orientation, then environmentalism may align itself to a critique of the capit-
alist world system (maldistribution of benefits to people), if not challenging its 
commitment to production and consumption per se. An environmentalist 
perspective, while identifying environmental change as an issue, attempts to 
find room for the environment among our existing categories of other 
concerns, rather than considering it to be definitional or transformational.
Those frustrated by the lack of recognition of the environmental challenge in 
international relations turned to the interdisciplinary science of ecology. 
Political ecology has allowed both an ecological perspective to inform political 
thought and a political understanding of our environmental circumstances. In 
particular, our circumstances have long been determined by a particular 
developmental path that depends on the over-consumption of natural 
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resources. Specifically, our political-economic practices of production, 
distribution and consumption are intended to meet our immediate human 
needs and desires. However, these practices are reflected in a growth-
dependent global market economy that is not designed to achieve 
environmental sustainability or recognise ecological limits. This economy has 
provided material development of a kind, but with such uneven benefits and 
widespread collateral damage – including to the environment – that it has not 
provided human development in an ecological context. From an ecological 
perspective, there has been a general criticism of development and even 
apparently progressive sustainable development practices. The well-known 
model of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968), in which our short-term, 
individual, rational choices destroy our environmental resources, has thus 
been applied to the planet as a whole. It is tragic because we can see it 
coming but seem unable or unwilling to do anything about it. That inability is 
more than a practical problem; it is a profound theoretical challenge. Hardin 
pointed out that such issues cannot be solved by technical means, but require 
a change in human values.
Moving beyond environmentalism and political ecology, green theory more 
radically challenges existing political, social and economic structures. In 
particular, it challenges mainstream liberal political and economic assum-
ptions, including those extending beyond the boundaries of existing political 
communities (for conventional IR, this means states). Goodin (1992) suggests 
that a distinguishing feature of green theory is its reference to a coherent 
moral vision – a ‘green theory of value’ – which operates independently of a 
theory of practices or political agency. For example, a green morality might 
suggest that human material development should be curtailed in the interest 
of preserving non-human nature. This would limit our freedom to consume 
however much we can acquire. The need to put some limits on traditional 
liberties suggests an approach that puts nature before people. Green theory, 
in this sense, is ecocentric. 
Ecocentrism (ecology-centred thought) stands against anthropocentrism 
(human-centred thought). This is not because ecocentrism ignores human 
needs and desires, but rather because it includes those within a wider 
ecological perspective. Ecocentrism prioritises healthy ecosystems because 
they are a prerequisite to human health and wellbeing. In contrast, 
anthropocentrism sees only the short-term instrumental value of nature to 
humans. This ecocentric/anthropocentric distinction is at the heart of green 
theory. The holistic ecocentric perspective implies a rejection of the split 
between domestic and international politics, given that arbitrary boundaries 
between nations do not coincide with ecosystems. For example, air and water 
pollution can cross a border and climate change cuts across all borders and 
populations. Simply, human populations are ecologically interconnected. This 
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impacts on how we understand and deal with transboundary and global 
environmental issues collectively, setting aside national self-interest.
The traditional IR concern with the state, in an international system of states, 
is a challenge to thinking about environmental issues. As a central feature of 
the historical Westphalian model of sovereign (self-determining) nation-states, 
the concept of sovereignty (ultimate authority) has been particularly troubling. 
Sovereignty neither describes the modern reality of political control nor offers 
a reliable basis for human identity or wellbeing. Global environmental 
problems require global solutions. This requires that we develop our under-
standing of the ‘global’ as an alternative organising principle and perhaps look 
to green social movements rather than states for theoretical insights. This 
gives rise to the question of whether we need to give up on the idea of 
countries with borders as still being relevant to people’s lives, or recast them 
in some more ecologically appropriate way with reference to how people live 
in relation to their environment. This will likely entail a more global than local 
kind of ethics. In part this hinges on our view of the need for political 
structures (big government, small government or no government) and the 
level or extent of their development. For example, we could promote 
centralised global political structures, such as an institution for governing 
environmental issues (Biermann 2001), or allow a variety of decentralised, 
even anarchical, interconnected local structures to emerge as circumstances 
require (Dyer 2014).
Decentralisation, or the transfer of authority and decision-making from central 
to local bodies, has certain attractive features, such as self-determination and 
democratic accountability. Ecologically there seem to be advantages as well, 
since small communities may depend more on immediate local resources and 
so be more likely to care for their environment. Local communities are more 
likely to conceive of the natural environment and their relationship to it in less 
instrumental terms, viewing it more as their home, thus addressing one of the 
key reasons for the environmental crisis. 
For example, the concept of ‘bioregionalism’, where human society is 
organised within ecological rather than political boundaries, raises intriguing 
issues of knowledge, science, history, culture, space and place in an 
ecological context (McGinnis 1999). For instance, our sense of identity might 
derive more from familiar environmental surroundings than from the idea of 
nationality, such that we have greater inherited knowledge and understanding 
of our local environment than of our political location. However, there are also 
a number of objections to decentralisation, or greater localisation of decision-
making. These include the concern that it would not promote cross-
community cooperation as it is too parochial (too exclusively local; the 
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problem of nationalism), and this would mean little chance of developing 
effective mechanisms to deal with global problems. In effect, it might just 
reproduce a troublesome sovereign-state model of politics on a smaller scale. 
To date IR theory has shown concern with transformations in our political 
communities but somewhat less concern with transformations in our 
ecological communities. Perhaps this is because we are not yet sure how a 
cosmopolitan global sense of community colours our local relationships.
Green theory and climate change 
Climate change is the dominant environmental issue of our age, caused by 
our dangerous reliance on fossil fuels. Green theory helps us to understand 
this in terms of long-term ecological values rather than short-term human 
interests. These interests are generally pursued by states through invest-
ments in technology, but there is no easy technical solution to human-induced 
climate change. From the perspective of green theory, this technical impasse 
requires a change in human values and behaviour and therefore presents an 
opportunity for political innovation or even a transformative shift in global 
politics. IR theory can explain why climate change is a difficult problem for 
states to solve because of economic competition and disincentives to coop-
eration. However, it cannot provide an alternative framework to explain how 
this might be addressed. IR remains overly focused on states and their 
national interests rather than other actors that may be more cooperative, such 
as cities and communities or non-governmental organisations and green 
social movements. 
A green theory perspective on climate change understands it as a direct 
consequence of human collective choices. Specifically, these choices have 
led to historically anthropocentric economic practices of historically arbitrary 
political groups (states), who have exploited nature in their own short-term 
interests. Climate change presents a clear case of injustice to both present 
and future humans who are not responsible for causing it and to the 
ecosystem as a whole. Therefore, a solution requires an ecocentric theory of 
value and a more ethical than instrumental attitude to human relations in our 
common future. Green theory helps us to redefine issues such as climate 
change in terms of long-term ecological values rather than short-term political 
interests.
At the international level efforts have been underway since before the 1992 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio, which 
gave rise to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
and other environmental agreements. As with many issues caught up in the 
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direct tension between environmental goals and developmental goals, any 
bargains struck are inadequate compromises. 
For green theory there is no such tension in an ecological path to develop-
ment, even if that path seems more costly in the short term. This is not least 
because some countries have developing still to do and hold already 
developed countries historically responsible for climate change – and no 
national actor is willing to bear global costs. After faltering efforts to address 
climate change through the terms of the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol, an 
outline agreement was eventually achieved in the Paris Accords of December 
2015. Whether or not this effort will actually address the sources and conse-
quences of climate change remains to be seen, but green theory suggests 
that a focus on human values and choices in communities is better than a 
focus on bargaining between states.
In a world of states with primary responsibilities to their own citizens, finding 
acceptable trade-offs between immediate economic wellbeing and longer-
term ecological wellbeing is difficult. There is some prospect of powerful 
states (like China) or groups of states (like the European Union) leading the 
way and altering the structural parameters. However, the common ground 
available from an IR perspective of competing states is unlikely to be 
anywhere near the common ground envisioned by green theory. More 
fundamentally, it is unlikely to meet the challenge of climate change. Even 
with some political agreement, there remain significant differences about 
responsibility for historic climate change and the costs of adapting to an 
already changing climate that is affecting the least developed populations 
hardest. While it is possible for states to cooperate in order to make helpful 
environmental commitments, this is not directly related to action or change. 
In any case, while international agreements are formally implemented by 
governments and other constitutional bodies, the key agents of change are a 
much wider range of non-state actors, smaller groups and individuals, which 
may suggest a kind of anarchy rather than hierarchy. In sum, a green solution 
to climate change could involve global governance institutions and 
communities working together – largely bypassing the state – in order to 
reduce damaging emissions, protect the climate and preserve the planetary 
ecology on which humans depend. 
Green theory equips us with a new vantage point for analysing these 
developments. It also allows a broader ecological perspective on our common 
human interests and emphasises choices made within the ecological 
boundaries of climate change, rather than the political boundaries of econo-
mic advantage. 
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Conclusion
For IR, the contribution of green theory helps us re-examine the relationship 
between the state, the economy and the environment. IR normally sets this in 
the context of globalisation viewed from the limited perspective of states and 
markets – but globalisation also involves opportunities for developing shared 
global ecological values. Green theory has the potential to radically challenge 
the idea of sovereign nation states operating in competition and is thus part of 
the post-Westphalian trend in IR thought. Of course, the greater contribution 
of green theory, or its capacity for critical engagement with IR, lies in its very 
different origins – taking planetary ecology as a starting point and looking 
beyond our current political-economic structures. Green theory is thus able to 
offer not just an alternative description of our world but also a different logic 
for understanding it – and how we might act to change it. IR theory is likely to 
be disrupted and re-oriented by green theory, not so much because greens 
will win the arguments but because IR theorists will inevitably have to provide 
a coherent account of how we all live sustainably on our planet. This means 
that at some point we may have to stop theorising about the state-centric 
‘inter-national’ and find another political point of reference in human 
relationships, such as policy networks or social movements.
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Global Justice
ALIX DIETZEL
Global justice is a theory that exists within the broader school of cosmo-
politanism, which focuses on the importance of the individual as opposed to 
the state, community or culture. Cosmopolitans take the individual as their 
starting point because they believe that all human beings have equal moral 
worth and therefore have the right to equal moral consideration. In this sense, 
even if cosmopolitans disagree on how to ensure that individuals are the 
subject of equal moral concern, the focus of these differing approaches is the 
value of the individual. This focus on the moral importance of the individual 
has led some cosmopolitan scholars to critically engage with theories of 
justice, which are traditionally confined to the state and contained within the 
realm of political (not international) theory. This endeavour has led to the 
theory of global justice, which seeks to investigate the question of how best to 
secure a just life for all individuals on Planet Earth, regardless of their 
nationality or status.
The basics of global justice
Justice, at its core, concerns itself with who deserves what and why. True to 
their cosmopolitan roots, contemporary global justice scholars concern them-
selves with the moral worth of the individual, regardless of place of birth, and 
focus on problems of global cohabitation in which individuals are not yet 
treated as morally equal or where the moral focus has traditionally been on 
states. To engage with such problems, global justice scholars usually focus 
on what individuals across the world deserve and how distribution of these 
entitlements can be achieved. The answers to these types of questions vary 
significantly depending on which problem is being addressed.
John Rawls’ (1971) Theory of Justice set out a theory that political structures 
(typically states) can determine who deserves what and why due to the power 
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to make laws, raise taxes and dispense public spending. Therefore, such 
structures should be built carefully to ensure a just distribution of rights and 
duties between all citizens. Hence, Rawls’ idea was one of distributive justice. 
Rawls was not advocating for communism, where all wealth is shared equally, 
but for a society where inequality was moderated so that those who were 
disadvantaged (for whatever reason) were at least able to live a decent life. 
Rawls theorised that such a structure could only exist within a democratic 
society, or in other words, a specific type of state. Therefore, Rawls’ account 
of justice describes the potential for a just human existence for those 
fortunate enough to live within such a state – but his theory was not designed 
to apply internationally as no such formal structure of global distributive 
justice exists. 
Cosmopolitan scholars take issue with Rawls’ state-centric approach to 
justice and argue that questions of justice must include all humans, 
regardless of state association. For example, Charles Beitz (1975) argues 
that limiting questions of justice to the national level in the modern global era 
is morally inappropriate, because we now have global institutions that may be 
able to perform some of the basic functions of the state, such as collect forms 
of taxation or make laws. Thomas Pogge (1989) stresses that global ine-
qualities between individuals call for a global approach to justice that can 
effectively respond to these inequalities. Although these scholars ground their 
arguments in different ways, they both advocate for a widening of the scope 
of justice to the global level. These types of arguments are where the term 
‘global justice’ originates and provide the bedrock for its emergence as a 
theory of IR.
When discussing global poverty, Thomas Pogge (2001) and Gillian Brock 
(2010) argue that poverty alleviation should focus on redistributing wealth and 
resources between rich and poor individuals. When analysing humanitarian 
intervention, scholars such as Mary Kaldor (2010) and Daniele Archibugi 
(2004) make the case that individuals must be prioritised over state-centric 
non-intervention laws. Furthermore, scholars such as Garrett Brown (2012) 
analyse the issue of global health and argue that the health of individuals is 
determined by global structures to make the case for reform. Contemporary 
global justice scholars focus on problems as diverse as gender inequality, 
immigration and refugees, warfare and climate change. This implies that the 
question of who deserves what, and why, covers a wide range of topics, most 
of which are contemporary international relations problems. This is why the 
discipline of global justice is so relevant to IR, because global justice scholars 
concern themselves with analysing and assessing fundamental problems 
caused by global cohabitation. In this sense, it is a modern theory that will 
continue to be relevant as long as global problems exist.
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Although global justice scholars usually assert that individuals must be the 
central unit of moral concern when exploring global problems, it is important 
to note that these scholars often prioritise different goals in order to ensure 
that individuals are the subject of equal moral concern. For example, some 
scholars emphasise human rights, some discuss the importance of 
institutions operating fairly (referred to as procedural justice), some empha-
sise the importance of human capability, while others are concerned with fair 
global social processes. It is important to keep this diversity in mind when 
studying global justice. No two scholars have the exact same aims, which 
implies a healthy diversity of ideas within the field. This is true even within 
more narrow subjects, such as climate justice, where authors have many 
different ideas on how to achieve a just response to the problem of climate 
change.
While you might assume that an approach that seeks to treat all humans on 
Earth better is popular, or logical, global justice also attracts some notable 
criticisms. David Miller (2007) argues that national borders are more 
important than cosmopolitan global justice. Miller believes that coming to an 
agreement on principles of justice requires a common history and culture and 
that defining global principles is not possible because of national differences 
on conceptions of what is ‘good’ or ‘right’. Thomas Nagel (2005) and Michael 
Blake (2001) both argue that global justice cannot be achieved without the 
backing of powerful global institutions. However, global institutions that have 
power over individuals and states simply do not exist (yet), rendering 
discussions about global principles of justice futile. Finally, Iris Marion Young 
(2011) regards cosmopolitanism as a Western-centric theory that does not 
have the global appeal it purports to have. After all, global justice is based on 
the importance of the individual and often makes appeal to human rights and 
other liberal norms, which some perceive as Western ideals, not universal 
ones. These criticisms do not take away from the importance of global justice: 
like all theories of IR, its theoretical development is spurred on by answering 
its critics.
Global justice and climate change
Climate change requires actors from around the world to come together and 
agree on how to move forward. As temperatures continue to rise and the 
global response lags behind what scientists recommend, global justice 
scholars are becoming increasingly interested in climate change and its 
global (mis)management. Spurred on by the global nature of the problem and 
the injustices it presents, global justice scholars have also turned their 
attention to climate change for several important reasons.
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First, climate change is undoubtedly a global problem and global justice 
scholars are keen to engage with such problems. Greenhouse gas emissions 
cannot be confined within a state, they rise into the atmosphere and cause 
global temperature changes within and outside of their original state borders. 
Although it is difficult to establish direct blame or fault, it is nonetheless 
undeniable that virtually all individuals, states and corporations contribute to 
some degree to climate change. In this sense, the global nature of the climate 
change problem defies conventional assumptions about state sovereignty and 
justice, which is what makes it so interesting to global justice scholars. 
Second, climate change requires a global solution, which suits global justice 
scholars who are interested in providing recommendations for problems of 
global cohabitation. No one state can stop climate change on its own. There 
is no doubt that combatting climate change will require a collaborative effort, 
implying the need for global agreements. Coming to such agreements will 
inevitably involve discussion about which actors must lower emissions and by 
how much or even which actors should contribute to the costs of climate 
change – such as helping certain populations adapt to rising sea levels or 
extreme weather. These are, by their nature, questions of distributive justice 
and are therefore of interest to global justice scholars. 
Third, climate change presents an unfair distribution of benefits and burdens 
between morally equal individuals, who are the key concern of global justice 
scholars. Climate change will most negatively affect those living in less 
developed countries who have done the least to contribute to the causes of 
climate change, while those living in developed countries, who have 
contributed the most emissions, will likely suffer the least. This is because 
less developed countries are more often located in areas which will bear the 
brunt of the problems associated with climate change. Furthermore, devel-
oping states typically do not have as many resources as developed states to 
adapt to dangerous weather patterns. For example, the Solomon Islands has 
already lost five small islands as a result of climate change and yet it is one of 
the lowest emitting countries in the world. Paul Harris (2010, 37) argues that 
the climate change problem ‘cries out for justice’ because the effects of 
climate change fall disproportionately on people who are already vulnerable, 
cannot adequately protect themselves and have not significantly contributed 
to the problem.
Although global justice scholars agree that climate change will affect 
individuals and are therefore concerned with addressing the problem, these 
scholars have different ideas on what exactly is at stake and what should 
therefore be prioritised. For example, Simon Caney (2010) defines three 
distinct rights that are predicted to be threatened by climate change: the right 
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to life, the right to food and the right to health – and any programme combat-
ing climate change should not violate these. 
Tim Hayward (2007) defines a right specific to the climate change problem: 
ecological space – a human right to live in an environment free of harmful 
pollution adequate for health and wellbeing. Hayward’s approach differs from 
Caney’s because his priority is not protecting human rights that already exist 
in international law but rather creating new climate related rights that must be 
defended. 
Patrick Hayden’s (2010) conception of rights encompasses both environment 
specific substantive and procedural rights. Hayden’s substantive rights 
include the right to be protected from environmental harm and his procedural 
rights include the right to be fully informed about the potential effects of 
environmental hazards, the right to participate in democratic procedures for 
climate policymaking and the right to complain about existing conditions, 
standards and policies (Hayden 2010, 361–362). In this sense, Hayden is 
concerned not merely with basic rights but also with fair procedures. 
The debate about rights is important because defining who deserves what 
can help guide a discussion on what should be done about climate change 
and who should be responsible for climate change action. For example, if the 
right to health must be protected, this could imply that lowering emissions is 
not enough and that populations must be protected from disease in other 
ways – for example, by inoculating vulnerable people against certain diseases 
or providing clean drinking water in drought-prone areas. 
The question of who is responsible for climate change action is another key 
point of discussion amongst global justice scholars. The discipline of IR is 
traditionally concerned with relationships between states. Some scholars 
following this tradition and these debates usually focus on which states 
should contribute how much to climate change action. 
Henry Shue (2014) advocates for the Polluter Pays Principle, which is based 
on examining who caused the problem to determine who should pay (and 
how much) for climate change action – and the Ability to Pay Approach, which 
asserts that the responsibility should be borne by the wealthy. Thomas Risse 
(2008) takes issue with these approaches and advocates for an index that 
measures per capita wealth and per capita emission rates, then groups 
countries into categories. 
In this sense, the debate concerns how responsibility for climate change 
should be allocated, which is important for international relations as it reflects 
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ongoing discussions between states, most recently when putting together the 
2015 Paris Agreement. Other scholars are keen to include non-state actors in 
their conceptions of climate justice and responsibility. 
Paul Harris points out that cosmopolitanism is traditionally concerned not only 
with states but also with individuals. For this reason he studies how individ-
uals are affecting climate change and discovers that it is rich individuals who 
produce the most greenhouse gases, regardless of which state they live in. 
As he puts it, ‘affluence is the primary and disproportionate cause of global 
environmental degradation’ (Harris 2010, 130). These individuals have 
responsibility to act on climate change by (for example) travelling less, 
reducing meat consumption and buying fewer luxury items. Simon Caney 
(2010) argues that all agents (not just the wealthy) who contribute to 
emissions and have the means of lowering these, including individuals, 
states, corporations, sub-state political authorities and international financial 
institutions, should be held accountable. 
These debates about the climate responsibilities of non-state actors are 
important to IR theory, which is traditionally concerned with how states relate 
to one another. By discussing which other actors might be responsible for 
climate change, global justice scholars are able to move the discipline of 
International Relations in a new direction.
Conclusion
International relations theory has traditionally been overly concerned with 
global (dis)order. Global justice scholars have contributed to widening the 
scope of IR theory by shifting the focus to individuals, on a planetary scale, 
and thereby approaching problems of global cohabitation in a new way. Yet 
despite signs of progress in academia, states seem to be more focused on 
managing conflict, distrust and disorder than on reaching global agreements 
and treating one another fairly. For that reason, global justice as an issue has 
been underrepresented in policy and global justice scholarship has not yet 
reached the same prominence as mainstream IR theories such as realism or 
liberalism. Nevertheless, in times of transnational terrorism, rising global 
inequalities, migration crises, pandemic disease and climate change – 
considerations of global cooperation, fairness and justice are more important 
than ever.
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Queer Theory
MARKUS THIEL
Queer theory offers a significant avenue through which to deconstruct and 
then reconstruct established IR concepts and theories. Stemming from 
various fields that transcend a narrow view of IR, queer research applies an 
interdisciplinary outlook to advance new critical perspectives on sexualities, 
gender and beyond. A single viewpoint in a field as diverse as IR would 
unnecessarily limit the range of scholarly viewpoints. It would also preclude a 
nuanced debate about the contents and forms of lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender (LGBT) perspectives, queer scholarship and queer scholarly 
politics in IR. Due to these themes, and because of its diversity, it is difficult to 
define queer theory precisely. Indeed, a narrow definition of it would not be in 
line with queer theoretical tenets. Queer theory is not just confined to 
sexualities or sexual rights. It also questions established social, economic 
and political power relations – and critically interrogates notions of security.
The basics of queer theory
Queer theory’s origins are in LGBT studies – which focus on sexuality and 
gender. It soon distanced itself from those approaches due to disagreements 
with the stable identities that LGBT studies suggest. Queer theory 
emphasises the fluid and humanly performed nature of sexuality – or better, 
sexualities. It questions socially established norms and dualistic categories 
with a special focus on challenging sexual (heterosexual/homosexual), 
gender (male/female), class (rich/poor), racial (white/non-white) classificat-
ions. It goes beyond these so-called ‘binaries’ to contest general political 
(private/public) as well as international binary orders (democratic/
authoritarian). These are viewed as over-generalising theoretical constructs 
that produce an either/or mode of analysis that hides more than it clarifies 
and is unable to detect nuanced differences and contradictions. But queer 
theory also analyses and critiques societal and political norms in particular as 
they relate to the experience of sexuality and gender. These are not viewed 
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as private affairs. Just as feminists perceive of gender as a socially 
constructed public and political affair, so queer theorists argue with regards to 
sexuality and gender expression.
As the word ‘queer’ was used to describe homosexuals in the nineteenth 
century, queer theory traces its lineage from the study of sexuality in its 
private and public forms. A commonplace meaning attributed to the term 
revolves around being non-conforming in terms of sexuality and gender, thus 
adding an ambiguous notion to being or acting queer. Hence a queer 
approach towards sexual equality complicates identity-based LGBT advocacy, 
as queer thinking expresses a more challenging, fluid perspective. This split 
has become even more pronounced as the international politics of sexual 
orientation and gender identity receives an ever-increasing degree of public 
attention. Some states have implemented substantial equality provisions in 
order to prove that they are ‘modern’ or ‘Western’ enough, while others have 
responded with pushback in the form of homophobic legislation and 
persecution. Sexual orientation and gender identity rights, which themselves 
are questioned by queer theorists as overly reliant on Western liberal norms 
of human rights and democracy, have become points of political contention, 
eliciting domestic culture wars as well. 
Consider the debate in the United States over whether transgender 
individuals should be free to use the toilet of their personal choice. The status 
of sexuality and gender politics in IR has clearly been elevated via cases 
such as this which can quickly transcend domestic politics and enter the 
international realm. In addition, it has also impacted apparently unrelated 
policies such as defence policies, health care and labour market regulations 
and thus created new avenues for the re-construction of conventional IR 
concepts. As a result, new perspectives are needed to explain this inherent 
part of the social and political world. Queer theory does not assume a uniform 
access to reality, but rather acknowledges that subjective knowledge(s) about 
sexuality, gender and other social aspects are constructed rather than pre-
existent, fluid rather than stable, and not always in line with societal norms. In 
this sense, queer theory has moved beyond focusing simply on the 
experience of sexuality and gender.
Sexuality politics and the queer scholarship connected to it arrived late on the 
theoretical scene in part because sexuality and gender initially were anchored 
in the private, rather than the public, spheres. Scholars advanced critical and 
feminist viewpoints emerging from the writings of Michel Foucault (1976), 
Judith Butler (1990) and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1990) among others. 
Foucault’s groundbreaking linking of sexuality and knowledge to political 
power, and Butler’s rejection of stable sexual orientation and gender identities 
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in favour of everyday performed ones remain foundational notions. Kosofsky 
Sedgwick’s calling attention to the discursive definition of homo/
heterosexuality in society further defined queer thinking. These scholarly 
statements were hardly accepted in mainstream political science because 
they rejected objectivity and highlighted the conditional and unstable human 
nature of social and political orders, including IR questions of security and 
governance. Hence queer theory evolved largely in literature, philosophy, 
sociology and queer studies programmes without making substantial inroads 
into IR theorising.
Despite the distinct emergence of queer theory from these wider origins, 
some questions remain. One of the major issues is to what extent ‘queer’ 
should be adopted as a label for transgressive (socially unacceptable) forms 
of thinking and acting – as this would in turn create a queer/mainstream 
binary. This is something that queer scholars argue against. Another issue 
lies in the vague definition of queer theoretical tenets and terms, leading to 
uncertainty about how a queer theoretical lens can best be deployed in 
various disciplines by a wide range of individuals. In its application to IR, 
queer theory challenges many assumptions about world politics unrelated to 
sexuality and gender. It aims to deconstruct established simplistic binaries – 
such as insecurity/security or war/peace – and recognises the inherent 
instability of political and social orders. Instead, it embraces the fluid, perfo-
rmative and ambiguous aspects of world politics. Hence, it criticises those 
approaches to politics and society that assume natural and moral hierarchies. 
It problematises, for instance, the way in which non-traditional sexualities 
have become normalised according to ‘hetero-normative’ standards, including 
the aspiration towards marriage and child rearing. Queer theorists argue that 
this results in a societal integration of sexual minorities into mainstream 
consumer society – making them less willing (or able) to contest deeper 
political inequalities.
Queer theory perceives sexuality and gender as social constructs that shape 
the way sexual orientation and gender identity are displayed in public – and 
thereby often reduced to black-and-white issues that can be manipulated or 
distorted. With regard to more classical IR topics, it critically assesses the 
assumption that all societies find themselves at different points along a linear 
path of political and economic development or adhere to a universal set of 
norms. Hence it embraces ambiguity, failure and conflict as a counterpoint to 
a dominant progressive thinking evident in many foreign or development 
policies. As a scholarly undertaking, queer theory research constitutes of ‘any 
form of research positioned within conceptual frameworks that highlight the 
instability of taken-for-granted meanings and resulting power relations’ (Nash 
and Browne 2012, 4).
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Weber (2014) highlights a lack of attention to queer theory by decrying the 
closed-mindedness of standard IR theories, arguing that queer scholarship in 
IR exists but is not recognised. The invisibility of queer theory is slowly 
changing, with case-study work on state homophobia (Weiss and Bosia 2013) 
or collective identity politics (Ayoub and Paternotte 2014) and the increasing 
relevance of transnational LGBT rights discourses for IR scholarship. But if 
empirical work in this area concentrates mainly on the agency of groups in 
their surrounding political structure, what is ‘queer’ about LGBT advocacy 
perspectives? These works offer comparative case studies from regional, 
cultural and theoretical peripheries to identify new ways of theorising the 
political subject by questioning the role of the state as we have come to 
accept it. They add to IR by broadening the knowledge about previously 
under-recognised perspectives that critically examine IR’s apparently obvious 
core concepts (or ‘myths’, as Weber calls them) such as sovereignty, power, 
security and nationalism. They do so from the vantage point of the outsider 
and infuse these well-worn IR concepts with critical considerations and 
interpretations. Importantly, they contest existing dualistic binaries in 
mainstream IR – such as state/system, modern liberalism/premodern homo-
phobia, and West/Rest. Queer IR scholars look for the contribution queer 
analysis can provide for re-imagining the political individual, as well as the 
international structure in which people are embedded.
Reflecting on the possible futures of queer theory, there are various important 
aspects to consider. Progress in LGBT politics is mainly limited to the Global 
West and North and evokes culture wars about how hetero-normative such 
advocacy should be. And, it elicits international (homo)colonialist contentions 
about the culturally intrusive manner by which LGBT rights are promoted. 
This becomes clear when powerful transnational groups, governments or 
international organisations propose to make foreign aid disbursement 
conditional on equality reforms in certain countries. At the same time, they do 
not sufficiently recognise that their explicit LGBT support increases the 
marginalisation of minorities in certain states. It has to be mentioned though, 
that many LGBT organisations have a better understanding of local contexts 
and often act with the cooperation of local activists, though typically in a 
weaker position than the intergovernmental institutions they are allied with. 
LGBT politics and queer IR research can inspire and parallel each other as 
long as sexual advocacy politics does not fall prey to overly liberal, 
patronising politics. No matter if in the domestic or international arenas a 
number of problematic issues remain with the alleged progress of LGBT 
politics: if predominantly gay and lesbian rights such as marriage and 
adoption equality are aimed for, can one speak of true equality while 
transgender individuals still lack healthcare access or protection from hate 
crimes? And if the normalisation of Western LGBT individuals into consuming, 
depoliticised populations leads to a weakening of solidarity with foreign LGBT 
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activists and appreciation of their difference, what effects does this have on 
global LGBT emancipation? Queer theory is an important tool for helping to 
better appreciate the complexity of these debates.
Queer theory and sexual equality in Europe
Globalisation has equipped queer theorists and activists with an expanded 
terrain for intervention. With reference to LGBT advocacy politics, the 
emergence of numerous Western-organised non-governmental organisations 
but also local LGBT movements with the significant publicity they generate – 
be it positive or negative – expands transnational politics to a previously 
unknown degree. Both chip away at the centrality of the state in regulating 
and protecting its citizens. A key place this can be detected is within debates 
in the European Union (EU), which is an international organisation with 
supranational (law-making) powers over its member states.
The inclusion of LGBT individuals not as abject minorities but as human rights 
carriers with inherent dignity and individual rights of expression may 
transform the relationship between a marginalised citizenry and governmental 
authority – both at the state and EU level. But queer theory does not always 
align comfortably with the predominant political strategies advanced through 
transnational LGBT rights advocacy in Europe. It disputes many existing 
socio-political institutions such as neoliberal capitalism or regulatory 
citizenship that form the bedrocks of European politics. LGBT advocacy is, at 
times, viewed by queer theory as conforming, heteronormative, stereotyping 
and even (homo)nationalistic in its particular value-laden Western overtones. 
This is because it assumes that striving for Western standards of equality and 
inclusion is universally applicable and leads to liberation and inclusion. These 
become evident in the pressuring of more conservative European states to 
adopt certain policies, which often produce counter-productive tensions and 
expose vulnerable minorities. LGBT advocacy is aimed at inclusion within 
existing forms of representation rather than the appreciation of difference that 
queer theory strives at. Thus, LGBT organisations often appear ‘de-queered’ 
for political purposes to gain approval by the rest of society, which often leads 
to internal debates about their representation and goals. 
Tensions between mainstream advocacy and radical queer approaches 
signify the need to rethink simplistic IR analytical approaches. Political 
tensions in the ‘real’ world prompt the queer IR theorist to question generally 
accepted, established conceptions of international governance. In doing so, 
queer theorists use existing literature or audio-visual material such as movies 
or even performances to go beyond the apparently obvious to deconstruct 
and then reconstruct IR events and processes. They often exhibit a critical 
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perspective towards naturally assumed conditions of space and time that tend 
to conceal and flatten differences among actors and interpretations of 
international events. For example, Cynthia Weber (2016) uses Hillary 
Clinton’s sexual rights speech at the United Nations in 2011 and contrasts it 
with Conchita Wurst’s winning performance at the Eurovision song contest in 
2014 to highlight a ‘queer logic of statecraft’ that contests traditional, 
gendered and binary approaches to governance. Weber highlights how 
despite transforming the notion of the homosexual from deviant into normal 
rights-holder in her speech, Clinton still produced an international binary of 
progressive versus intolerant states. On the other hand, Conchita Wurst – a 
character created by Thomas Neuwirth – challenged accepted notions of 
what is considered normal or perverse by performing in drag with a beard. In 
the course of this, Wurst destabilised racial, sexual, gendered and geo-
political notions of what it means to be a European. Taken together, both 
cases show how seemingly stable ideas in international relations are far from 
natural. Instead, they are intentionally created, normalised, challenged and 
reconfigured.
Looking deeper at issues within Europe, the EU’s justification of sexual non-
discrimination on neoliberal market policies highlights the ambiguous 
positioning of the EU when it advocates limited equality provisions (Thiel 
2015). This anti-discrimination policy is being implemented in the EU’s 
complex multi-level governance system that includes EU institutions as rights 
‘givers’, member states as not always compliant ‘takers’, and LGBT groups 
somewhere in the middle. In addition to this potentially problematic setting, 
the EU’s anti-discrimination policy package applies only to employment-
related discrimination. But Europe’s largest LGBT advocacy group, the 
International Lesbian, Gay, Trans, Bisexual and Intersex Association (ILGA 
Europe), together with many other groups has been pressing the case for a 
broader anti-discrimination law covering all areas of life. This is complicated 
by the fact that a few powerful states do not want to broaden the existing 
market-based law and by EU hesitancy to reach beyond its focus on 
economic rights and freedoms. 
It becomes evident that the dominance of neoliberalism as the EU’s main 
rationale limits the rights attainment of LGBT individuals because it restricts 
alternative critical views. Given the EU’s orientation, non-governmental 
organisations are pressured to prioritise market-principles such as labour 
participation, while becoming more dependent on governmental or EU 
funding. At the same time, this increase in non-governmental advocacy coin-
cides with a retreat of governments in social and welfare sectors. This 
diminishes the potential for contesting existing policies and potentially their 
legitimacy, as groups have to link anti-discrimination activities with more 
societal and labour market inclusion if they want to retain funding from the 
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EU. Such reorientation around neoliberal EU objectives produces a hierarchy 
of rights which risks putting social inclusion and a wider sense of equality at 
the bottom.
This case study thus questions the cooperation of non-governmental advo-
cacy organisations with a supranational governance system that is at least 
partly responsible for constraining national welfare policies. Moreover, the 
EU’s valuation of rights is problematic because inalienable rights are being 
made an object of economic value and output. Yet it cannot be criticised in a 
system in which EU policy planning is protected by its supposed non-political 
regulatory, expert-led nature – reminding us of Foucault’s knowledge–power 
linkage. It also implies that a reflection of norms is needed, in the way 
neoliberal heteronormativity is desired by political actors in the EU policy 
process and accordingly (re)produced or challenged by gender/sex-based 
rights groups. The feminist contribution to IR highlights uneven gendered 
power relations, but a critical political economy perspective that merges 
concerns about structural injustice with the thoughtful critique of queer 
theory’s view on civil society inclusion adds profound insights into the politics 
of sexual rights recognition. This is most relevant here when considering 
queer theory’s theoretical tenets such as taking seriously the distinct positions 
of political actors and the often troubling content of public policy.
Conclusion
The development of queer theory in IR suggests that more rigorous questions 
of the impact of LGBT issues in international politics have begun to be 
successfully answered. It highlights the valuable contribution to analysing IR 
through until now unrecognised perspectives on sexual and gender 
expression. Queer theory has also proven to be theoretically inclusive in ways 
that LGBT and feminist scholarship sometimes has not. A question that 
remains is whether queer theorists can recognise – and perhaps transcend – 
their own racial, class and Western-centric orientations. Such broadening 
would also make it easier to find common cause with other affected minorities 
– not least to move from a purely critical or deconstructive mode to a more 
transformative and productive one. Precisely because queer theory is able to 
transcend the focus on sexuality and gender through general analytical 
principles, it lends itself to interrogating a wide range of IR phenomena. In a 
time when IR is often accused of being parochial, queer theory is a necessary 
corrective to powerful myths and narratives of international orders.
104Securitisation Theory
14
Securitisation Theory
CLARA EROUKHMANOFF
Securitisation theory shows us that national security policy is not a natural 
given, but carefully designated by politicians and decision-makers. According 
to securitisation theory, political issues are constituted as extreme security 
issues to be dealt with urgently when they have been labelled as ‘dangerous’, 
‘menacing’, ‘threatening’, ‘alarming’ and so on by a ‘securitising actor’ who 
has the social and institutional power to move the issue ‘beyond politics’. So, 
security issues are not simply ‘out there’ but rather must be articulated as 
problems by securitising actors. Calling immigration a ‘threat to national 
security’, for instance, shifts immigration from a low priority political concern 
to a high priority issue that requires action, such as securing borders. 
Securitisation theory challenges traditional approaches to security in IR and 
asserts that issues are not essentially threatening in themselves; rather, it is 
by referring to them as ‘security’ issues that they become security problems.
The basics of securitisation theory 
The end of the Cold War sparked a debate over ideas of security in IR 
between ‘narrowers’ and ‘wideners’. The narrowers were concerned with the 
security of the state and often focused on analysing the military and political 
stability between the United States and the Soviet Union. Dissatisfied with 
this, wideners sought to include other types of threat that were not military in 
nature and that affected people rather than states. This expanded the security 
agenda by including concepts such as human security and regional security – 
together with ideas of culture and identity. Feminism had an important role in 
widening the agenda by challenging the idea that the sole provider of security 
was the state and that gender was irrelevant in the production of security. On 
the contrary, the state was often the cause of insecurities for women. 
Widening the agenda from a feminist perspective brought gender into focus 
by placing gender and women as the focus of security calculations and by 
demonstrating that gender, war and security were intertwined. It was an 
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important development in the rise of a wider perspective on security. Whether 
one agrees with the wideners or the narrowers, the end of the Cold War 
indicated that security was an essentially contested concept – ‘a concept that 
generates debates that cannot be resolved by reference to empirical evidence 
because the concept contains a clear ideological or moral element and defies 
precise, generally accepted definition’ (Fierke 2015, 35). By pointing at the 
essentially contested nature of security, critical approaches to security argue 
that ‘security’ is not necessarily positive or universal, but context and subject 
dependent and even negative at times.
Because some administer security while others receive security, security 
produces uneven power relations between people. For example, in the 
context of the Global War on Terror, a person who looks Arab has been 
regarded with suspicion as a dangerous ‘other’ and there has been an 
increase in surveillance operations in Muslim communities on the presum-
ption that because they fit a certain profile, they may be connected to 
terrorism. Viewed in this light, surveillance becomes a security apparatus of 
control and a source of insecurity. It is by questioning the essence of security 
in cases such as this that securitisation theory developed and widened the 
scope of security to include other referent objects beyond the state. A referent 
object, a central idea in securitisation, is the thing that is threatened and 
needs to be protected. 
Securitisation theorists determined five sectors: the economic, the societal, 
the military, the political and the environmental sector. In each sector, a 
specific threat is articulated as threatening a referent object. For example, in 
the societal sector, the referent object is identity, while the referent objects in 
the environmental sector are the ecosystem and endangered species. It is 
only in the military sector that the referent object remains the state. By 
‘sectorialising’ security, we understand that existential threats are not 
objective but instead relate to the different characteristics of each referent 
object. This technique also highlights the contextual nature of security and 
threats. Suicide bomb attacks, for example, are a greater source of anxiety 
for some people today than they are for others. Yet we often hear suicide 
terrorism framed as a ‘global’ threat. Securitisation shows that it is incorrect to 
talk about issues such as terrorism as if they concern everyone around the 
world equally. By talking about referent objects we can ask: Security for 
whom? Security from what? And security by whom?
Central to securitisation theory is showing the rhetorical structure of decision-
makers when framing an issue and attempting to convince an audience to lift 
the issue above politics. This is what we call a speech act – ‘by saying the 
words, something is done, like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship’ 
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(Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 26). Conceptualising securitisation as a 
speech act is important as it shows that words do not merely describe reality, 
but constitute reality, which in turn triggers certain responses. In the process 
of describing the reality we see, we also interact with that world and perform 
an action that will greatly contribute to seeing that reality in a different way. 
For example, referring to an immigration camp in Calais as ‘the Jungle’ is not 
simply describing what the camp really is, but portraying it as a lawless and 
dangerous place. Hence, threats are not just threats by nature, but are 
constructed as threats through language. In order to convince an audience to 
take extraordinary measures, the securitising actor must draw attention and 
often exaggerate the urgency and level of the threat, communicate a point of 
no return, i.e. ‘if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be 
irrelevant’, and offer a possible way out (lifting the issue above politics) – 
which is often framed in military terms. In so doing, the securitising actor 
makes some actions more intelligible than others and enables a regime of 
truth about the nature of the threat and about the referent object’s nature.
An issue becomes securitised when an audience collectively agrees on the 
nature of the threat and supports taking extraordinary measures. If the 
audience rejects the securitising actor’s speech act, it only represents a 
securitising move and the securitisation has failed. In this respect, the focus 
on the audience and on process requires considerably more than simply 
‘saying security’. This has generated criticism from some scholars, who 
recommend understanding securitisation as a long process of ongoing social 
constructions and negotiation between various audiences and speakers. Any 
security issue can be presented on a spectrum ranging from non-politicised 
(the issue has not reached public debate) to politicised (the issue has raised 
public concerns and is on the agenda) to securitised (the issue has been 
framed as an existential threat). When an issue is securitised, actions are 
often legitimised under the language of ‘urgency’ and ‘existential threats’ and 
are measures that may be deemed undemocratic in normal situations. 
Security measures in the War on Terror, such as the Guantanamo Bay 
detention camp, the use of torture, the increased surveillance of citizens, 
extraordinary renditions and secretive drone strikes, illustrate the logic of 
exceptionality. Had the War on Terror not been framed in a context in which a 
suspension of normal politics was permissible and necessary, these security 
measures would probably not have existed – nor would they have endured to 
the present day.
A successful securitisation places ‘security’ as an exceptional realm, investing 
securitising actors (nominally states) with the power to decide when the 
democratic framework should be suspended and with the power to 
manipulate populations. For Wæver (2015 and 2000), securitisation theory 
was built to protect politics against the disproportionate power of the state by 
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placing the success and failure of securitisation in the hands of the audience, 
rather than in the securitising actor. Wæver also voiced his preference for 
‘desecuritisation’ – a return to normal politics. After all, audiences are not 
complete dupes at the mercy of the securitising actor, and by making the 
process more transparent, securitisation theory endows the audience with 
agency and responsibility. In this context, the role of the security analyst 
moves from objectively analysing the threat to studying the processes by 
which securitising actors construct a shared understanding of what is 
collectively recognised as a threat. Securitisation theory is thus not so much 
involved with answering ‘why’ an issue has been securitised. It is more 
important that we be concerned with the conditions that have made the 
securitisation possible by asking ‘how’ questions: how has a specific lang-
uage enabled the actor to convince the audience of the threat?
Securitisation theory and the Islamic State group in Europe
Following attacks in a range of European cities, the Islamic State group (also 
known as Daesh, ISIS or ISIL) became a high priority on security agendas 
from 2015 onwards. The group has been presented as a threat to the security 
of the state, to the security of individuals in Western Europe and more broadly 
as a threat to the Western way of life. This means that the securitisation of 
the Islamic State group affects at least three sectors: the societal, the military 
and the political. Securitisation theory observes that sometimes in a 
democracy the government must justify the suspension of normal politics to 
the public. Hence, if the Islamic State group is securitised in European states, 
which are regarded as democratic, we should be seeing securitising moves 
from government officials – a rhetorical justification of why intervention, for 
instance, is the only way to remove the threat of the Islamic State.
It is important to note that securitising actors are not limited to politicians. 
Security professionals like the police, intelligence services, customs, 
immigration services, border guards and the military all play an important role 
in defining the security landscape. They operate within a field of security 
characterised by competition over the ‘right’ knowledge over the threat and 
other risks associated, as well as competition over the ‘right’ solution. 
Although disagreements and confrontation occur between security 
professionals, Bigo, Bonditti and Olsson (2010, 75–78) argue that they are 
still guided by a set of common beliefs and practices. Securitising actors take 
security threats objectively and seek to solve them by undertaking various 
missions. In addition, there are also functional actors who can influence the 
dynamic of the field of security but who do not have the power to move an 
issue above politics. Functional actors are paramount since they help frame 
storylines about the existentially threatening nature of the issue, often 
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creating divides between ‘us’ and ‘them’ – and often implicated in ‘othering’ 
processes. Examples of functional actors can be the media, academia, non-
governmental agencies and think tanks. It can also include individuals 
themselves, by telling and sharing stories between friends, families and 
colleagues. For example, extreme claims made in tabloid newspapers across 
Europe create a narrative in which the Islamic State group is infiltrating 
society and working to bring on the demise of the democratic state.
Noticeable examples of securitising moves in the United Kingdom can be 
found during the House of Commons debate on the motion for British military 
action in Syria on 2 December 2015. British Prime Minister David Cameron 
argued that ‘we face a fundamental threat to our security’ from the threat of 
the Islamic State group, who ‘attack us because of who we are, and not 
because of what we do’ (this was the presentation of the nature of the threat 
and establishment of a regime of truth). He then said that ‘we should not wait 
any longer’ to reduce the threat (this was the point of no return). Finally, he 
pointed out that it is ‘not about whether we want to fight terrorism but about 
how best we do that’ (this was the solution provided). 
It is more evident in France, when, after the Paris attacks of 13 November 
2015, President Francois Hollande declared that ‘France is at war’ against an 
army of jihadists that ‘has attacked France because France is a country of 
liberty’ (again, focus on ‘what and who we are’). In this framing, the French 
people are ‘a people that is fierce, valiant and courageous’ and are victims of 
such attacks for simply ‘being alive’. At the other end of the spectrum is 
‘them’, ‘an army of jihadists’, of ‘coward murderers’ who constitute an 
‘abomination’ and ‘vile attack’ that can only be characterised by ‘horror’. A 
point of no return is invoked when Hollande claims that the Islamic State 
group is an organisation that ‘threatens the whole world’ and that this ‘is the 
reason why the destruction of Daesh is a necessity for the international 
community’. Finally, the solution, lifting the issue ‘above politics’ is offered: 
‘immediate border controls and a state of emergency have been commanded’ 
(Hollande 2015).
The grammar of the security speech act is discernible. The speech points to 
the existentially threatening nature of the Islamic State group, a point of no 
return and a solution which breaks free of the normal democratic processes. 
In the months after the Paris attacks, Hollande increased French military 
strikes in Syria and ordered a state of emergency that gave French security 
forces controversial domestic powers. Hence, we have a case of successful 
securitisation. It is important to note that when arguing that the Islamic State 
group is securitised, securitisation theorists do not challenge the existence of 
the group, or that the group has indeed coordinated attacks in Europe. 
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Instead, securitisation questions the processes by which this group has come 
to be viewed as a threat and argues that by naming the group a threat, 
leaders of European states such as France and the United Kingdom are also 
implicated in the making of war. In that sense, securitisation highlights how 
Hollande’s securitising speech act does not merely describe a state of affairs 
‘out there’, but constitutes the attacks as an act of war and by doing so, 
brings war into being. Describing the threat of the Islamic State group is thus 
not impartial or objective, rather it is in an action in and of itself, and one that 
should be viewed as a political act.
Using securitisation theory shows that the politics of terrorism and 
counterterrorism is about threat magnification and that the symbolic violence 
caused by attacks is out of proportion to the number of deaths it is 
responsible for. For example, the number of victims in Western Europe was 
higher in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of groups such as the IRA than the 
number that can be attributed to Islamic terrorists in recent times. Yet leaders 
of European countries claim that the world has never faced such ‘barbarity’, 
‘horror’ and ‘atrocity’. This threat magnification demonstrates the except-
ionality of the threat, which, in turn, requires urgent and extraordinary 
responses. Thinking of terrorism in this way is not only detrimental to the 
deliberative process but also limits our understanding of terrorism more 
generally.
Conclusion
Securitisation is a useful tool for students in IR as it contests traditional 
approaches to security that are overly focused on the security of the state, 
rather than on other referent objects. Adopting a securitisation framework 
entails challenging hegemonic and taken-for-granted ideas about the 
universality and objectivity of security and emphasises the ways in which 
knowledge is not merely ‘out there’ but is driven by interests. Securitisation 
theory reminds us that securitisation is not a neutral act but a political one. 
From that starting point we are able to dig deeper and investigate the various 
insecurities that are found in international relations.
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Critical Geography
IRENA LEISBET CERIDWEN CONNON & ARCHIE W. SIMPSON
Critical geography is based upon the notion that humanity has the potential to 
transform the environment. It challenges the dominant ideologies that 
characterise international political structures, hence contesting traditional 
categories and units of analysis in IR such as anarchy, security and the 
concept of the state. Critical geography is based upon the principle that 
questions about spatial relations, which refer to how an object located within 
a particular space relates to another object, are important because political 
behaviour is embedded in socio-political structures based on ideas about 
space. Following from this, if scholarship and political behaviour are ingrained 
in socio-political structures, an objective analysis of international politics 
becomes impossible. IR theory cannot reflect the global situation from a 
neutral standpoint. Critical geographers suggest that alternative ways of 
thinking about space have the potential to change fundamental ideas, 
theories and approaches that dominate the study of international politics. In 
turn, they hope that this alternative scholarship will help to transform 
international politics and reduce human inequality.
The basics of critical geography
Critical geography emerged in the 1970s as a critique of positivism, which is a 
form of scholarship based upon the idea that the world exists independently 
of observers. Critical geography is rooted in neo-Marxism and draws upon the 
ideas of Jürgen Habermas and the Frankfurt school, who expanded upon 
ideas within classical Marxism by exploring how freedom from inequality 
could result from peaceful processes rather than revolutionary action. At this 
time, scholars began examining how dominant political structures and 
scholarship perpetuated existing political inequalities.
The end of the Cold War in 1991 saw new global economic developments, 
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accompanied by changes in global demographics. In the early 1990s, the 
increasing importance of non-state actors such as non-governmental 
organisations and multinational corporations accompanied by increasing 
ethno-nationalism – whereby nations are defined on the basis of ethnicity 
rather than civil state membership – fostered new ideas about security and 
the role of the state. 
Critical IR scholarship began focusing on how dominant theories like realism 
reinforced unequal power relations by favouring the states that dominated 
international politics. Drawing on the ideas of Ken Booth and Richard Wyn 
Jones from the Welsh school, they argued that human insecurity was 
perpetuated by existing political structures (Booth 1991 and 1997). From this, 
scholars began looking towards critical geography and Lefebvre’s (1991) 
critical theory of space to examine how assumptions about space perpetuated 
these existing insecurities and inequalities. Two important scholars 
associated with this are David Harvey and John Agnew, who highlight how 
traditional conceptions of space decontextualise processes of state formation 
and cement traditional polarised conceptions of space between East and 
West, North and South, developing and developed countries in International 
Relations thinking (Agnew 1994; Harvey 2001 and 2006).
Critical geography offers a means of examining international political 
behaviour, including the relationship between governments and people, 
between states at regional and global levels, and between international 
organisations and states. There are a number of key ideas and concepts 
within critical geography that offer alternative analyses of international 
relations. One key idea relates to the notion of territorial space. Philosopher 
Henry Lefebvre (1991) argued that there are three ways to think about space: 
in absolute, relative and relational terms. From an absolute perspective, 
space is viewed as fixed and measurable. This fixed idea about territory 
underpins traditional theories of IR. But, if you assume that territory is fixed, it 
reinforces assumptions about relationships within and between particular 
territories. 
For example, think about how the world is represented on a standard political 
map. A political map represents the world in terms of individual states 
separated from each other by territorial borders. An absolute view of global 
space takes this mode of representation as fixed, meaning it would not 
consider the possibility of alternative ways of mapping the world. This fixed 
view also ignores how international politics changed throughout history, 
altering the shape of the global space as new states and international 
institutions emerged.
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The absolute view of space is not the only option that scholars have for 
thinking about the international global space. Lefebvre’s concept of relative 
space challenges the absolute view of space. This concept involves thinking 
about space in a way that views the international space not ‘as an “empty 
container” or fixed space, but one filled with objects and interconnecting 
relationships’ (Meena 2013). Furthermore, a relative view of space views the 
existence of this space as a result of the relationships between the objects 
within this space. From this, the ways in which we understand space can be 
argued to be a product of a particular set of relationships. 
For example, if we consider particular spaces in terms of how they relate to 
other spaces, we can see that when scholars talk about the ‘Global South’ 
they are referring to the south in relation to the ‘Global North’. Ideas and 
representations of the ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’, or of ‘East’ and 
‘West’ are presented as resulting from the polarised relationships that 
characterised international politics until the end of the Cold War.
A relative view of space can be used to demonstrate the existence of multiple 
views and alternative ways of conceptualising space from the views of 
particular states and other international actors. For example, when IR 
scholars classify all states in the southern hemisphere as representing the 
Global South, this view fails to acknowledge the differences and complex 
relationships that exist between states. It leads us to assume that all states in 
the south are equal in terms of their political and economic power, when this 
is not the case as powerful states in the Global South like Brazil have far 
more political and economic power than poorer states like Malawi. It assumes 
that states in the South also see themselves as existing together on an equal 
basis with all the other states in the South, which is an oversimplification as it 
ignores the many economic and political rivalries that exist between different 
states in this region. It also fails to acknowledge how particular states within 
the Global South are politically and economically linked to states within the 
Global North through trade agreements.
A relational view of space suggests that space cannot exist without the 
perspective of an observer, as objects only exist in terms of their relations 
with other objects. For example, when we think about a place, we can only 
think about it in terms of what we know about it. What we know leads us to 
form opinions which influence the form and shape that the space takes and to 
the development of arguments that either support or reject pre-existing ideas 
and political developments. In turn, these opinions influence the political 
decisions taken by international state actors that shape the global 
international space. This can be seen, for example, in terms of approving 
state membership to regional organisations like the European Union. The way 
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that most scholars think about and represent international political space in 
terms of sovereign states and their territorial borders can therefore be said to 
be a product of a perspective of space.
Developments in the literature examine how processes of global change and 
the growth of alternative political organisations, such as transnational 
environmental movements and indigenous government institutions, have 
contributed to shaping the contemporary global space (Harvey 2009). One 
such development looks at how the rise of indigenous government institutions 
in the Arctic offer alternative views of space that challenge traditional 
conceptions of international space and look at how Inuit approaches to 
governance emphasise collective responsibility for the environment beyond 
state borders (Zellen 2009). Another recent development examines how the 
expansion of neoliberal capitalism has resulted in rising socio-economic 
inequality on a global scale, marginalising the poor within and across nation 
states, with state-based representation in international political institutions 
contributing to these growing inequalities (Harvey 2009). In addition, as 
concerns about human security associated with the risks and impacts of 
global climate change increasingly come to the fore in IR, critical geography 
can show us how the mainstream ideas about space embedded in 
international politics and IR theory may serve to perpetuate human inequality 
and the marginalisation of those most directly at risk from global environ-
mental change. Alternative ideas about space compel scholars to re-assess 
the global scale of the risks and impacts of climate change and lend support 
to arguments that call for representational reform in international politics to 
reduce inequality and to address the increased risks that climate change 
poses for traditionally marginalised groups, such as for indigenous people.
Critical geography and Inuit views of space 
The Inuit are a group of culturally similar indigenous people living in the Arctic 
regions of Alaska, Canada, Greenland, Denmark and Russia. Their view of 
territorial space is based upon cultural similarity and use of land for traditional 
hunting practices rather than nation-state boundaries. The spatial extent of 
Inuit occupancy of Arctic territory reaches across five states, illustrating their 
historic sovereignty over a large area. Yet political maps of the world do not 
represent this area as Inuit territory. Rather, the area that Inuit territory covers 
is broken down and subsumed within individual state boundaries. When Inuit 
territories were colonised by European, American and Russian powers, their 
territories became part of colonial nation-state territories and the Inuit 
became subject to the colonial state governments. Today, the legacy of 
colonialism can still be seen in representations of the international political 
space, as the majority of membership within international political institutions 
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continues to be designated on the basis of sovereign states, resulting in the 
ongoing political marginalisation of the Inuit. 
Without adequate representation at the international political level, Inuit 
concerns about security and environmental sustainability cannot influence 
international policy to the same extent that state governments can. 
Furthermore, the extent to which Inuit interests are represented in the 
decisions made at the international level is poor. This is especially so when 
Inuit interests conflict with the interests of governments, such as over pipeline 
constructions through Inuit territory to transport oil between states. However, 
by adopting an Inuit perspective of territory that rejects nation-state 
delineation of the global space, critical geographers can offer alternative 
definitions of territory and provide more accurate representations.
The Inuit represent only a small segment of the total population of residents 
within an individual state – for example, only 0.2% of the total Canadian 
population were registered as Inuit in the 2011 census. But, when thinking 
about how Arctic sea ice loss (due to climate change) affects the total 
numbers of Inuit across each of the five nation states by defining territory as 
consisting of cultural commonality rather than state boundaries, a much 
spatially larger picture emerges (Huntington 2013). The loss of ice endangers 
the economic and cultural livelihoods of the Inuit, as it affects hunting 
activities and puts coastal villages at risk of erosion and flooding. 
When viewed from this perspective, the security risk to the wellbeing of 
people right across such a large area of the globe appears much more 
prominent than that afforded by most other IR theories. When scholars adopt 
traditional spatial definitions, they over-simplify the global space and, as we 
can see in this example, oversimplify the geographic extent of threats to 
human security. Furthermore, when scholars define space as existing solely 
of independent states, it limits the examination of the impacts of environ-
mental disaster to simple comparisons between two or more nations, such as 
between Canada and United States. This undermines differences in the 
severity of impacts of natural disasters within particular regions of the world. 
Moreover, this traditional method of analysis also overlooks how the human 
security threats posed by environmental disasters are not evenly spread 
within individual state territories. For example, it downplays the fact that the 
Inuit living in Alaska are at risk of far greater disruption from the effects of 
melting sea ice than people living in other areas of the United States. It also 
downplays how coastal communities within Alaska are at a greater risk from 
the devastation caused by flooding and erosion than communities located 
within the interior of the state.
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Inuit understandings of territorial space can also provide scholars with an 
alternative tool to make assessments of international political action taken to 
mitigate the impacts of global environmental change. Critical geographers 
contend that traditional analyses of patterns of international political activity 
are prone to focus on actions taken by formal institutions, like the United 
Nations, that use a nation-state means of political representation – but stress 
that this places limits on our appreciation of the wider forms of political action 
that have been taken to mitigate climate change. 
For example, the majority of the scholarly analyses of the International Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) in Copenhagen in Denmark in 2009 described 
how opinions of state representatives regarding action on climate change and 
emission on greenhouse gases fell into three camps that consisted of: 1) 
North America and Europe, whose past industrial activities contributed to 
most of the problems of climate change, 2) industrialising countries such as 
the BRICS nations, which tended to see no alternative to carbon emissions as 
a means to fuel economic growth, and 3) poorer countries, which were more 
likely to disagree to changes on the basis that development and poverty 
alleviation represented more pressing goals (Meena 2013). However, this 
mode of analysis is based on divisions of territory defined by tiers of industrial 
development and ignores differences in influential capacities across and 
within nations grouped within each tier – for example, between Brazil and 
China, or between large segments of the South African population.
Over-simplistic ways of thinking about the international political space lead to 
a lack of consideration for alternative forms of political action, particularly 
action that takes place outside formal international political institutions 
including that taken by indigenous organisations, whose spheres of 
representation and governance transcend nation state boundaries. For 
example, the Inuit are members of the Arctic Council, which is an international 
governmental organisation that addresses issues faced by Arctic govern-
ments and indigenous people. The Inuit take prominent decision-making roles 
in the Council rather than having their participation restricted to mere 
observer status – as at the United Nations climate summits. The decisions the 
Inuit take are based upon their sense of commonality that transcends state 
boundaries. Because of their influence in the Arctic Council they have been 
able to achieve success in fostering a culture of collective governance on 
environmental management by seeking discussion and resolution of a matter 
of common concern to all Inuit. 
However, despite the success of Inuit representation in the Arctic Council, the 
vast majority of indigenous governmental bodies continue to fall outside the 
formal political representational structure in larger international climate 
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change negotiations. The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) is a United Nations-
recognised non-governmental organisation that defines its constituency as 
Inuit populations in Greenland, Alaska, Canada and Russia. However, their 
participation is restricted at UN summits on climate change to that of 
‘observer’ status as it is not a sovereign state – thereby constraining its voice. 
It is on this basis that the state system of representation within the United 
Nations climate summits can be argued to further marginalise indigenous 
groups like the Inuit. As representation is afforded on the basis of state 
territory rather than Inuit conceptions of territory it reinforces the decision-
making power of the former colonial governments, enabling them to exercise 
greater control over international affairs, which hinders Inuit self-
determination efforts.
The power of the Inuit to shape international political decision-making risks 
becoming further marginalised if IR scholarship does not critically question 
nation-state ideas about territory and representation. By bringing alternative 
conceptualisations of territory to the foreground, critical geography opens up 
a space for recognising and exploring alternative modes of representation 
that reduce inequality between indigenous people and state governments. If 
the Inuit are at greater direct risk from the impacts of global climate change, 
representational reform would enable them to have a greater voice in 
managing these risks.
Conclusion
By drawing attention to alternative ways that space can be imagined, critical 
geographers have sought to transform international politics and the global 
space. Critical geography highlights how issues of economics and climate 
change impact upon people and shows that the spatial effects of these 
processes differ to how they are dealt with by states, international organ-
isations and within academia. The unique vantage point of critical geography 
provides useful ways to rethink what we know about International Relations in 
both theoretical and empirical terms. It challenges assumptions about space 
and territory, offers new conceptual and analytical tools and encourages 
students to question mainstream thinking.
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Asian Perspectives
PICHAMON YEOPHANTONG
With the emergence of the so-called ‘Asian Century’, which sees rising 
powers like China and India assume a more prominent role in shaping world 
affairs, Asia has become an important region of study. These global trends 
have been matched by new directions in scholarship, whereupon Asia has be-
come a conceptual anchor for the development of non-Western approaches 
to the study of world politics. It is, therefore, within the Asian IR context that 
some of the most exciting theoretical challenges to, and innovations in, IR 
scholarship are being mounted and produced. Given the vast socio-cultural 
and political diversity found across the continent, Asian IR is made up of an 
array of different perspectives. Some originate in countries in the Global 
South while others, such as Japanese perspectives, do not. Asian IR 
therefore feeds into Global South IR perspectives, but remains distinct from 
them, just as it speaks to mainstream IR theories but is founded on unique 
political traditions and practices.
The basics of Asian perspectives
IR theory is primarily based on assumptions derived from Western modes of 
thinking and viewing the world. This, in turn, renders it ‘too narrow in its 
sources and too dominant in its influence’ (Acharya and Buzan 2010, 2). The 
result of this is that non-Western perspectives and theoretical insights have 
been systematically neglected or ignored altogether by the discipline. For 
many scholars, this silence of non-Western IR voices constitutes a profound 
cause of concern, and one that casts a doubtful light on the utility of 
mainstream theories as a lens to make sense of a complex and culturally 
diverse world. Consider the English school of IR. The key concepts under-
pinning the English school and its conception of ‘international society’ – for 
example, the principles of national sovereignty and sovereign equality – are 
founded upon the historical European experience. China, for one, only learnt 
these concepts through its encounter with the colonial-era European powers, 
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as was also the case for other Asian countries. The Chinese empire had, until 
then, conducted its dealings with other nations on the basis of a Sinocentric 
worldview, where it acted as the political and cultural centre of the world, with 
the Chinese emperor seen to rule over Tianxia or ‘All-under-Heaven’ 
(basically, the rest of the world). Sovereign equality never existed as a 
concept to the Chinese mind until the nineteenth century. Given the distinctive 
histories, cultures and interstate dynamics seen in Asia, we clearly cannot 
take for granted the universality of the assumptions and concepts prevalent in 
IR scholarship.
Asian perspectives on interstate politics exist – and have existed – for 
millennia. Ancient Indian and Chinese political theorists like Kautilya (circa 
300 BCE) and Confucius (551–479 BCE) have provided some salient 
observations on foreign policy. It would only be in the mid-1990s, when efforts 
began to make IR scholarship more representative, that the contributions of 
these thinkers started to be taken seriously by the discipline. In the years 
since, we are seeing language barriers being broken down along with growing 
theoretical innovation challenging old thinking in IR. Discussions have 
converged on the feasibility of constructing various schools and theories of 
Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Southeast Asian IR – among other poss-
ibilities. As such, though still mired in debate and a degree of uncertainty, the 
ultimate outcome of these discussions will prove central to the future of IR as 
a global discipline.
At present, there is no single, unifying, pan-Asian school or theory of 
International Relations. Various reasons can be given for why this is the case. 
For example, the ‘hidden’ nature of non-Western IR theories, referring to the 
difficulty of recognising non-Western perspectives even when we see them 
(Acharya and Buzan 2010, 18) – or the failure to challenge the theoretical 
‘imports’ and acknowledge the value of non-Western theory-building (Puchala 
1997, 132; Chun 2010, 83). There is, of course, nothing inherently ‘Western’ 
about IR theorising. But whether we can rightly speak about an Asian IR 
theory depends in large part on how we define ‘theory’ and understand 
‘Asian’. 
In this light, Asian IR should not be viewed as a self-contained, monolithic 
discourse, nor as an intellectual enterprise aimed purely at the production of 
grand theories. Although having garnered plenty of attention in non-Western 
IR scholarship, the Chinese and Japanese schools of IR represent but two 
strands of Asian thought among several others. Rather than ‘theory’ in the 
sense of advancing testable observations about how the international system 
operates, it may be better to describe the bulk of Asian IR approaches as 
perspectives for making sense of the world. This, in turn, raises the important 
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question of whether a unified Asian IR theory is in fact desirable. Siddharth 
Mallavarapu (2014), for one, is less interested in putting forward monolithic 
theories, being more ‘curious about how the world is viewed from this 
particular location’. Navnita Chadha Behera (2010, 92) likewise rejects the 
notion of creating an Indian school of IR out of concern that such an 
undertaking would result in a ‘self-other binary’ that simply pits Indian IR (self) 
against Western IR (other). This speaks to a broader concern that the 
construction of unified schools of thought risks creating grossly simplified and 
polarising categories that end up supplanting one dominant body of 
knowledge with another. Similar sentiments also pervade debates on the 
Chinese school, with some scholars remaining sceptical about the feasibility 
of a single school representing the diversity of Chinese perspectives.
Conceptual pluralism better serves the original intention of non-Western IR 
theorists – that is, to bring diversity back into the study of world politics. 
Following from this, it is also important that we don’t overstate the differences 
between Western and Asian IR approaches. Indeed, a common attribute of 
Asian and Western approaches lies with their normative qualities – that is, 
their interest in how the world ought to be. Kautilya, for example, noted the 
necessity of waging a just war (for example, for a king not to take the land of 
an ally), whereas Confucian scholars were concerned with how to sustain 
‘harmony’ (peace and stability) in the world through able statecraft.
Much like Western IR theories, Asian perspectives have deep roots in political 
thought. In many cases, it is a matter of transposing theories of statecraft, 
society and human nature to the global realm. Just as Enlightenment-era 
philosophers like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke were central to the 
development of IR theory, ancient and modern philosophers from Confucius 
and Sun Tzu (544–496 BCE) to Shiratori Kurakichi (1865–1942) and Nishida 
Kitarō (1870–1945) are important sources of inspiration for Asian scholars. 
According to Benoy Kumar Sarkar (1919), early Hindu political theorists 
already had an indigenous conception of sovereignty that recognised the 
importance of ‘self-rule’ and national independence to the exercise of state 
authority. The Indian statesman and philosopher Kautilya, who is often lauded 
as one of the world’s earliest realists, is a critical figure in this regard. In 
setting out the principles of conduct central to the task of empire-building, his 
mandala (spheres of influence) theory advanced ideas as to how a king 
should manage alliances and relations of enmity with surrounding countries. 
It acknowledged, for instance, the utility of non-intervention as a means for 
building confidence between kings and avoiding unnecessary foreign 
entanglements, having also proposed an early conceptualisation of ‘strength’ 
as a tool for attaining ‘happiness’ (Vivekanandan 2014, 80). 
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Similarly, elements of Confucian thinking on power, order and statecraft can 
be distilled from how China conducts its foreign policy today. The importance 
of maintaining harmony to safeguarding the global order is a Confucian 
concept that remains a popular refrain in China. Similarly, the notion that to 
wield power a state must shoulder commensurate domestic and international 
responsibilities is one that defines China’s contemporary identity as a 
responsible stakeholder. It has also served as the basis for the corresponding 
‘responsibility thesis’, which advances the notion that China has certain 
unavoidable duties and obligations as a rising power, particularly with respect 
to managing and securing global order and stability (Yeophantong 2013).
In seeking to identify its own unique contributions to the field, Japanese IR 
has also drawn extensively upon the works of celebrated philosophers, 
including Nishida Kitarō, who was the pioneer of the Kyoto School. Often 
labelled as a ‘proto-constructivist’ due to the prominence he gave to cultural 
factors and identity construction, Nishida advanced a philosophy of identity 
for addressing a fundamental Japanese conundrum of whether Japan 
belongs to the East or the West. Here, he adopted a dialectic approach, 
arguing that Japanese identity exists within a ‘coexistence of opposites, 
Eastern and Western’, which consequently allows it to cultivate a universal 
appeal (Inoguchi 2007, 379). In other words, Japan is accorded a special role 
in the world, as it is positioned to encourage both Eastern and global 
awareness. This argument fits with Nishida’s broader vision of a multicultural 
world, where a ‘true world culture’ was to be achieved through the recognition 
of cultural difference and the union of these differences (Krummel 2015, 218).
Despite criticism against their hegemonic position in the discipline, it warrants 
note how mainstream IR theories have helped to provide fertile ground for 
new ideas and approaches to germinate among Asian IR scholars. South 
Korean IR scholars, for example, have been heavily influenced by main-
stream IR – specifically, its theories that are focused on addressing real-world 
issues. The rationale behind efforts to build a Chinese IR School also stems 
from the desire to better represent Chinese ideas and interests within an 
American-dominated discipline. It is possible, however, to divide Chinese IR 
scholars working in the pre-1949 period and during the 1980s-90s into two 
camps (Lu 2014): those who sought to learn from and emulate Western 
theories and those who used Western IR as the basis for critique and the 
development of alternative perspectives. 
It is interesting to recall how Samuel Huntington’s 1993 ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 
article, which argued that culturally driven conflicts will invariably define the 
post-Cold War world, had sparked heated discussion within China during the 
mid-1990s due to its controversial speculation of a coming conflict between 
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the West and ‘Confucian-Islamic’ states. Not only did this lead to a deepening 
of Chinese dissatisfaction with Western theories and their misrepresentations 
of Eastern cultures, it also gave Chinese scholars renewed impetus to estab-
lish a Chinese school of IR. 
You are probably wondering, if there is no Asian IR theory, then can Asian 
perspectives really provide a (more) compelling account of interstate 
dynamics than mainstream IR theories? 
Certainly, we can view the lack of a unifying set of core theoretical 
assumptions as a sizeable limitation of current Asian IR approaches. While 
we can easily identify the major tenets of realism or constructivism, Asian 
perspectives tend to exhibit a greater degree of conceptual fluidity and 
context-specificity. In practical terms, however, there are instances where 
Asian IR has made noteworthy contributions to ‘middle-range theorising’ (the 
formulation of fact-driven theories to explain a specific real-world pheno-
menon) and ‘soft IR theory’, which refers to the policy-driven theories 
informed by the ‘thinking and foreign policy approaches of Asian leaders’ 
(Acharya and Buzan 2010, 11). These are normally relied upon to generate 
policy prescriptions, as well as insights into the factors that motivate the 
foreign-policy behaviour of Asian states. 
An influential middle-range theory is Akamatsu Kaname’s ‘flying geese model’ 
of regional development. Not only has the theory been used to justify Japan’s 
economic leadership within Asia (Korhonen 1994), but it also serves as the 
rationale behind the country’s economic assistance to developing countries. 
Kaname posited the theory in the 1930s to explain how a developing country 
can catch up with industrialised countries through their interactions. With 
Japan’s rapid industrialisation from the late nineteenth century onwards and 
the remarkable economic development of East Asian countries in the post-
Second World War period, Japan came to be depicted within this theory as 
the ‘lead goose’ in a V-shaped formation comprised of emerging Asian 
economies. Here, Japan helped to stimulate regional industrialisation and 
economic growth by passing down its older technology and know-how 
(through economic assistance programmes, for instance) to other developing 
countries. 
An example of a soft theoretical contribution is the concept of ‘non-alignment’ 
(not taking sides). Developed by India’s Jawaharlal Nehru against the 
backdrop of divisive Cold War politics, non-alignment became an influential 
policy framework adopted by Asian and African countries that had sought to 
occupy the middle ground between the rival powers during the 1950s and 
1960s.
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Asian perspectives on developing a Chinese school of IR
In China, the construction of a Chinese school of IR theory has become a 
national preoccupation that resonates strongly with China’s global aspir-
ations. At a time when the Chinese government is emphasising the country’s 
rich cultural – namely, Confucian – heritage in official rhetoric, Chinese IR 
scholars are increasingly turning to ancient Chinese political thought for 
insights that transcend both time and geography. 
Although having been in development since the late 1920s, early attempts to 
build a Chinese school can be traced back to the late 1950s, when the focus 
of academic debates began to earnestly shift from learning from the West to 
rejecting Western IR and developing a distinct Chinese IR approach. This 
shift crystallised with the rift in Sino-Soviet relations during the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s, whereupon the Soviet Union’s approach to IR was officially 
denounced within China. The late 1980s saw a clearer division emerge 
between Chinese scholars who favoured Western IR approaches and those 
who pushed for IR theory with Chinese characteristics. Maoist scholars like 
Liang Shoude argued for the rejection of Western theories and the 
development of a Chinese model instead. Subsequent debates in the early 
2000s largely centred on the hegemonic status of Western IR. Here, the 
notion of establishing a Chinese school replaced the more ideologically driven 
objective of theorising with Chinese characteristics. 
The Chinese school project thus came to be defined not only in opposition to 
a ‘prejudiced’ IR discipline, but also in light of the challenges faced by China 
as a rising power within an American-dominated, globalising world (Wang and 
Han 2016, 54). It is in this way that Chinese IR perspectives draw upon 
Western IR theories, while being equally coloured by Maoist-socialist ideas, 
ancient Chinese political thought and China’s own experiences in navigating 
the international terrain.
According to Qin Yaqing (2016), a theory of ‘relationality’ postulates that 
states as social actors base their actions on the nature of the relations they 
have with others. The logic of relationality thus dictates that ‘an actor tends to 
make decisions according to the degrees of intimacy and/or importance of her 
relationships to specific others’ (Qin 2016, 37). This logic is founded upon 
ancient Chinese philosophy that emphasises the importance of respecting, 
and behaving in line with, the hierarchy of relationships (e.g. between the 
emperor and heaven, king and subject, father and son) to social and even 
cosmological stability. But of particular significance here is the relationship 
between the two opposite forces, yin and yang, which is seen to govern all 
other relationships. The existence of yin is seen as dependent on yang, which 
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effectively makes them two complementary halves of a whole. This notion of 
inclusivity – that ‘each of a pair is inclusive of the other’ (Qin 2016, 40) – is 
central to the concept of Zhongyong (‘the Middle Course’), which suggests 
how opposites give rise to positive interactions, rendering harmony, not 
conflict, as the state of nature. The theory of relationality is one that seeks to 
explain how contradictions can coexist and also how their coexistence is 
necessary to functioning relationships. Considering how world politics 
operates on the basis of ambivalent relationships, where a state can be 
perceived as an ally one moment and a threat the next, relationality becomes 
a useful theory. 
Take, for example, the relationship between China and the Philippines. 
Political ties between these two countries, while longstanding, have been 
frayed due to their competing territorial claims over a chain of islands and 
atolls in the South China Sea, which are believed to hold valuable gas 
deposits and strategic importance. As both countries have become ever 
bolder in their attempts to assert ownership over the islands, tensions have 
flared. In 2016, the Philippines won an arbitration case that concluded that 
China has no legal basis to claim historic rights to the South China Sea. The 
Chinese government strongly rejected the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 
ruling. Speculations soon emerged of a coming military conflict between the 
two countries. Yet, no military conflict occurred. Despite animosity on both 
sides over this issue, economic relations between China and the Philippines 
continue to grow. 
From the perspective of relationality, both political tension and economic 
cooperation constitute the Sino-Philippine relationship. Applying the 
Zhongyong concept, one can assume that conflict is not unavoidable within 
this relationship. If anything, military conflict would constitute an aberration to 
the status quo – something that is costly to both sides. Such a prospect could 
thus serve to compel China and the Philippines to seek out new avenues for 
conflict resolution and cooperation as a means to restore balance between 
the oppositional forces within the relationship. Shortly after the arbitration 
ruling, Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte articulated his desire to negotiate 
directly with China on the South China Sea issue, even proposing joint 
resource development in the contested waters and urging the Chinese 
government to assist the Philippines with infrastructure development. A 
Chinese white paper (2017) published after the ruling, while reaffirming 
China’s claims in the South China Sea, reiterated Beijing’s commitment to 
settling the dispute via negotiation and consultation. 
Via a relationality perspective, we can expect that harmonious contradictions 
will continue to characterise the Sino-Philippine relationship, as cooperation 
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between the two countries persists despite tensions. This is an important 
demonstration of the value of the Chinese school as it runs contrary to what 
mainstream IR theorists, who ground their analyses of interstate interactions 
in a conflictual state of international anarchy, would lead us to expect.
Conclusion
As International Relations is an increasingly popular subject, particularly in 
Asia where IR courses have become a staple at many universities, there is a 
need for it to become a truly global discipline that appreciates political and 
cultural difference but also reflects a shared history and humanity. In light of 
the uncertainties and anxieties accompanying the rise of non-Western powers 
like China and India, IR scholarship must act not only as a lens for analysing 
real-world phenomena but also as a useful and practical guide for how we 
should act within a changing global environment. That said, ‘Asia’ is as much 
a social construct as ‘the West’ and one that could potentially become as 
monolithic and hegemonic. As such, we need to be wary of creating simplistic 
categories that give rise to an unhelpful ‘self–other’ binary. For the sake of 
initiating meaningful dialogue, it is vital that scholars continue to work towards 
an inclusive outlook that reconciles East and West, capturing both the 
diversity and unity of insights to be gained from mainstream as well as Asian 
IR perspectives.
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Global South Perspectives
LINA BENABDALLAH, CARLOS MURILLO-ZAMORA  
& VICTOR ADETULA
The Global South is generally understood to refer to less economically 
developed countries. It is a broad term that comprises a variety of states with 
diverse levels of economic, cultural, and political influence in the international 
order. Although International Relations is an interdisciplinary field of study, it 
has historically been studied from a very Eurocentric perspective that does 
not always help us to understand developments occurring in the Global 
South. Understanding Global South perspectives starts with a discussion of 
the Western-centric focus of mainstream IR theories. It also recognises the 
challenges facing scholars from the Global South that might help to explain 
why Global South perspectives are largely absent from mainstream debates. 
The ultimate goal is to broaden the field of view within IR theory to incor-
porate a more just and representative understanding of international relations.
The basics of Global South perspectives
The main weakness of mainstream Western IR theories is that they are not 
universally experienced as mainstream. The concepts they are based on do 
not unequivocally reflect or match the reality in many Global South states. 
Furthermore, certain questions that are central to Global South perspectives 
are absent or under-theorised in mainstream scholarship. Tickner (2016, 1) 
for example points out that issues of race and empire have been missing from 
mainstream theories despite the existence of solid scholarship in postcolonial 
and poststructuralist studies. Curiously, she adds, colonial dominations 
profoundly shaped the state of the current global order, yet they are not even 
remotely central to mainstream IR. Today, there is a growing body of 
scholarship that pays attention to the context of international relations 
theories in Africa, Asia and Latin America and to the diverse interpretations 
within these vast regions. Much of this scholarship has been produced under 
the umbrella term of ‘global IR’.
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Mainstream IR also gets it wrong in its reading of history. When major global 
events are told from a Western perspective, the voices of the colonised and 
oppressed often go missing, which leads to a different basis for theorising. 
For example, realist scholarship refers to the Cold War as a period of relative 
stability given that no major war was fought between the two superpowers, 
the United States and the Soviet Union. However, if one looks at the same 
period through a Global South lens, one can see a world full of proxy wars 
and human suffering where both superpowers intervened in conflicts to 
support their interests or damage those of the other. A simple example like 
this highlights two issues for mainstream scholarship. On the one hand, it is 
important to incorporate non-Western actors and non-Western thinking in 
order to explore the ways in which different actors challenge, support, and 
shape global and regional orders. On the other hand, it is also important to 
question the relevance of mainstream theories to the context of postcolonial 
states and theorise the role of emerging economies and other Global South 
states in shaping international institutions and global governance. So, the 
prevailing questions are whether traditional IR theories are able to adapt to 
Global South perspectives, and if not whether new theories and approaches 
are needed in their place. In answering this question, scholars have taken a 
wide range of different positions.
While many scholars are united around a call for justice and equality in the 
way that IR narratives represent the world, it cannot be said that there is one 
grand strategy for theorising Global South perspectives. This dilemma is 
perhaps best illustrated by the question, ‘who are the Global South scholars?’ 
In many cases it would be inaccurate to refer to a single perspective that 
could be seen to represent a region or even country, let alone the majority of 
the world’s population. While they may share similar experiences of exploit-
ation under colonisation, can such a term as ‘African’ be used to describe the 
diverse experiences of states ranging from Malawi to Morocco? Scholars do 
not even agree on a single definition of which states the ‘Latin American’ 
region comprises let alone what a Latin American perspective on international 
relations might mean. Similarly, it has proved difficult to define a coherent 
theoretical body that would constitute a ‘Chinese school’ of Intern-ational 
Relations, given the array of different philosophers and interpretations of their 
work that might encompass. Issues like these make it difficult for Global 
South scholars to rally around a single theoretical perspective.
While one unifying goal might be to challenge the domination of the Global 
North, then a further risk of fragmentation lies in the power asymmetries 
between Global South states themselves. Inequalities are not exclusive to 
North/South relations but also permeate relations between states of the 
South. The emergence of strong economies and regional powers within the 
Global South such as China, Brazil and India has raised new issues of 
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marginalisation and dominance among states already marginalised by the 
North.
A further challenge comes in the historical dominance of Western means of 
knowledge production and publication. If there is little talk of an African 
theoretical perspective in IR, for example, this is perhaps more indicative of 
the impact of Western imperialism on indigenous systems of knowledge 
production in Africa than of a lack of African theorists. Indeed, the continent of 
Africa is home to age-old experiences and practices in diplomacy and 
intergovernmental relations that long predate the arrival of the Europeans in 
the colonial era. Yet, during colonisation many states were subject to the 
domination of Western forms of knowledge that consciously or inadvertently 
imposed certain values on the colonies. 
Even since independence, scholarly outputs have tended to reflect Western 
concerns and experiences, even sometimes when being written from within 
the Global South. An example of this can be seen in the development of IR 
scholarship in Latin America. Ever since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which 
stated the United States’ intent to keep European powers out of the Americas, 
the United States has adopted a policy towards its nearest neighbours that 
sees Latin America as its strategic backyard, and has regularly resulted in 
interventionist actions. In spite of notable efforts, much teaching and research 
about Latin America has been written in or for the United States. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that to secure careers, scholars need to publish in 
prestigious English-language publications, which are often based in the 
United States.
By shining a spotlight on the forgotten past of the pre-colonial era, Global 
South scholars can demonstrate the injustices of the present. For example, 
when told from a Western perspective, accounts of African histories begin 
with the arrival of the Europeans. Yet the accounts of early European 
explorers themselves towards the end of the fourteenth century testify to the 
political structures, institutions and organisations that were already in place in 
many areas. Africa was the site of empires, kingdoms and other social 
institutions that made it possible for trade, commerce and religion to thrive. 
The records of early Arab travellers and traders across the Sahara Desert 
make reference to the diplomatic activities of some early kingdoms and 
empires in West Africa, notably the Ghana empire, the Mali empire, the 
Songhai empire and Islamic missionaries who used the trans-Sahara trade 
routes. In the course of their travels, colonial missionaries form Europe 
reported that the networks of trade and commerce across the Sahara Desert 
had successfully bridged North Africa with Europe. Clearly, trade, commerce, 
diplomatic activities as well as learning and knowledge production were at 
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various levels of development in Africa before the coming of the Europeans. 
Yet, narratives that start with colonisation see African states as only being 
independent and ‘sovereign’ since decolonisation in the mid-twentieth cent-
ury. They are therefore seen to be ‘new states’, which only very recently 
became part of the contemporary international system. This ‘newness’ is used 
to defend international institutions that exclude African states from power 
structures and decision-making systems – such as key bodies of the United 
Nations like the Security Council – on the grounds that the rules for managing 
inter-state relations were established long before the establishment of most 
African states. However, if attention is paid to the histories the West ‘forgot’, 
then this becomes more difficult to justify. As a result, many African countries 
are at the forefront of the campaign for the restructuring of the United Nations 
and the work of Global South scholars is helping to build their case.
Global South perspectives on international development
Many of the policies that shape international politics today are based on 
assumptions that originate in Western modes of thinking. Take, for example, 
‘development’ – a word that has the power to dictate national and inter-
national policies and attract or divert vast sums of money. This can be seen 
through the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals and their 
successors, the Sustainable Development Goals. These involve targets that 
every country in the world agreed to strive towards and to fund. They are 
based on an understanding of development that sees many countries in the 
Global South as not having yet achieved the economic progress of the North. 
Perhaps one of the greatest contributions of Latin American scholars to IR 
theory is dependency theory, which challenges dominant understandings of 
development as an organising principle in international politics. Dependency 
theory asserts that underdevelopment and poverty are the result of political, 
economic and cultural influences exerted on such countries from the outside. 
It presents the relationship between the Global South and the Global North as 
exploitative and unfair by underlining the ways in which states in the South 
have been incorporated into the world economic system through capitalist 
development, which has exploited human and material resources and disru-
pted indigenous modes of production. Dependency theory analyses the way 
in which the underdevelopment of many states in the South might be a direct 
result of the policies, interventions and unfair trading practices of states from 
the North. From this perspective, the current (unfair) economic relations 
between the Global North and South will not help the South to develop at all. 
Rather, they will keep the South poorer than the North. Rather than the need 
for states in the Global South to ‘develop’, dependency theory stresses that 
nothing short of a restructuring of the entire international economic system 
129 International Relations Theory
will deliver economic justice for the world’s poor.
Building on the likes of dependency theory, scholars have demonstrated that 
the economic exploitation of many colonised nations did not stop with 
decolonisation. In fact, in the final years of colonialism – at the time when 
independence movements were becoming too strong to suppress – the 
departing colonial powers instigated a number of policies and programmes 
that paved the way for a new type of domination of Global South economies. 
The legacy of such policies was an emphasis on the production of cash crops 
for export, dependence on foreign financial interventions and the entrench-
ment of private capital (both domestic and foreign) as the engine of growth 
and development. North–South trade agreements and the policies of 
international organisations such as the World Trade Organization have further 
served to protect the interests of established powers despite repeated calls 
from the South for a fairer deal in global trade relations. They have served to 
privilege ‘developed’ states in trade relationships and to disadvantage the 
former ‘developing’ colonies. Viewed from the North, such policies are an 
instrument for helping the South. However, viewed from the South, they are 
tantamount to a new type of colonial domination – often referred to as ‘neo-
colonialism’ – in that they represent a continuation of unequal and exploitative 
North–South relationships.
Mainstream IR theories emerging from Western societies largely seek rational 
explanations for states’ interactions. However, some scholars have started to 
explore the motivations behind interactions between states in the Global 
South from a relational perspective. An example of this emphasis on 
relationality can be seen in China’s interactions with various African states. In 
2015 China became the African continent’s largest trading partner. Chinese 
investments across Africa include natural resource extractions, infrastructure 
construction, real estate and information technology. African and Chinese 
economies are mutually interdependent in that China imports a lot of energy 
sources from the continent and African states in return import consumer 
goods, commodities, and technology from China. Most African states, 
however, import far more than they export to China and suffer from un-
balanced trade relations. China’s development model (the Beijing Consensus) 
differs from the neoliberal model of development advocated by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and other Western-led organisations (the Washington 
Consensus). The Washington Consensus’ emphasis on liberal-isation and 
minimising the role of the state in the market has been denounced by many 
African leaders as neocolonial and exploitative. By contrast, the Beijing 
Consensus, with its emphasis on the principle of non-interference, has 
presented an attractive alternative to some African countries.
130Global South Perspectives
Furthermore, while China certainly benefits economically from its develop-
mental role in African states, enhancing cultural dialogue and cultivating 
networks through people-to-people exchanges also seem to be important 
motivating factors behind its interventions. As well as funding Confucius 
Institutes across the continent of Africa showcasing Chinese language and 
culture, the Chinese government has sponsored 200,000 opportunities for 
training professionals, academics, journalists and public servants from all 
corners of Africa. It is part of constructing a shared identity based on future 
aspirations and trajectories that will lift citizens out of poverty. Whether or not 
China’s approach in Africa is in fact a genuinely new type of development 
policy is subject to heated debate among scholars. But the point here is that 
China is keen to be seen to adopt a more relational approach, as opposed to 
the rational one of the North. Indeed, this concept is not exclusively Chinese 
– it also extends to other societies within the Global South and offers an 
alternative way of theorising South–South relations to the perspectives that 
have emerged from the North.
Conclusion
In recent years a lot has been done to highlight the important contributions 
that actors from the Global South make, and have always made, to 
international relations. Indeed, IR as a discipline has come a long way in 
incorporating aspects, actors and concepts that represent the world more 
widely. Yet, as the dynamics of the international system continue to change 
with the emergence of new economic powers such as India, China, Brazil, 
Turkey as well as other rising economies, IR will need to do more to pay 
attention to the perspectives of those in the South. Global South perspectives 
not only challenge the dominant theoretical perspectives that have served to 
create and perpetuate unjust relations between the Global North and South, 
they also open up the possibility of different, fairer relations that represent the 
interests of all concerned and challenge international institutions to have 
more representative power structures and decision-making processes.
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Indigenous Perspectives
JEFF CORNTASSEL & MARC WOONS
Being Indigenous is about honouring and renewing complex relationships 
between humans and also with the natural world. The United Nations offers a 
multifaceted working definition of what it means to be a member of one of the 
thousands of Indigenous nations living around the world. It includes factors 
like self-identification, historical continuity and a place-based existence that 
links to a particular territory. The definition also speaks to distinct governance 
systems, languages, historical experiences, cultures and ways of knowing. 
Importantly, it additionally describes communities that seek to maintain their 
territories and assert themselves as distinct peoples – despite their existence 
within a state (usually against their wishes). States, on the other hand are 
constructed around different principles of territorial sovereignty and legally 
recognised governmental systems and have historically sought to control, 
coerce, and even eliminate Indigenous peoples from the landscape. The 
existing, dominant framework of inter-state relations roots itself in state 
sovereignty. From an Indigenous perspective this has been established 
through violence, broken treaties and other unjust assertions of power over 
Indigenous peoples and their lands. This undermines, downplays, excludes 
and ultimately provokes Indigenous worldviews and counter-arguments that 
seek to push the state-centric model beyond its narrow confines. By exploring 
Indigenous perspectives and complex relationships we can more clearly see 
the problems that come from the many assumptions at the heart of 
International Relations and its family of theories.
The basics of Indigenous perspectives
The current dominant global political and legal order, invented in Europe, is 
state-centric and has since spread everywhere to create the discrete borders 
that mark the geopolitical world map most use today. Putting an end to 
decades of brutal violence and endemic conflict throughout Europe, the 1648 
Peace of Westphalia cemented the totalising and enduring notion of state 
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sovereignty. Europe’s response to anarchy, conflict and disorder among 
nations (or peoples) was thus the creation of a system of inter-state relations 
bolstered by states mutually recognising one another’s sovereign authority. 
Indigenous understandings of international relations differ from inter-state 
approaches, particularly when it comes to the ways that Indigenous peoples 
renew and act on their sacred commitments and interdependencies with the 
natural world. Assertions of Indigenous resurgence, which entails reclaiming 
and regenerating relationships with lands, cultures and communities, promote 
positive, alternative visions of the international that challenge the dominant 
inter-state model.
The concept of state sovereignty fuelled modern state-building strategies and, 
almost without exception, led to the destruction of Indigenous nations. Each 
state tries to build a vision of a common people sharing a culture, values, 
history, language, currency (and so on) through education, military conquest 
and other state-driven initiatives. This is often called a national identity, and is 
associated with ideas like patriotism and nationalism. Indigenous encounters 
with European empires saw them time and again face a stark choice (if the 
choice was even put to them at all): assimilate to the new settler colonial 
order being imposed over them and their lands or face dislocation – even 
genocide. As George Manuel and Michael Posluns (1974, 60) point out, 
the colonial system is always a way of gaining control over 
another people for the sake of what the colonial power has 
determined to be ‘the common good.’ People can only become 
convinced of the common good when their own capacity to 
imagine ways in which they can govern themselves has been 
destroyed. 
Speaking to Indigenous battles over state-building efforts that alienate 
Indigenous peoples from their lands and resources, Manuela Picq (2015) 
suggests that Indigenous perspectives offer three specific challenges to the 
state-centric perspective. First, they challenge the state’s ultimate authority by 
asserting their authority over their nations, lands/waters, and the natural 
world. Second, they expose the colonial foundations of the state-centric 
system by highlighting Indigenous views that both challenge and sit outside 
the dominant system. In other words, states as we know them owe their 
existence to processes of colonisation and settlement rooted in cultural 
imperialism, violence, destruction, genocide and ultimately the eradication of 
Indigenous identities and relationships to the land if not the eradication of the 
peoples themselves. Third, Indigenous peoples’ worldviews and practices 
challenge us to imagine what it might be like to share power within and think 
beyond state borders and the prevailing global state system.
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The principle of self-determination has provided stateless Indigenous nations 
with ways to attempt to (re)assert and (re)claim their authority. Self-
determination provides an avenue for Indigenous peoples to create political 
entities that can be recognised by the international community. The process is 
based on the idea that people should be free to form their own governments 
and control their own affairs – something central to the ethics and legality 
underpinning the United Nations. Indigenous claims of this nature have 
gained significant traction over the past century, especially post-1945 when 
decolonisation became a key international process. The sources of self-
determining authority are admittedly a source of contention. For Indigenous 
nations it emanates from complex relationships with their homelands, waters, 
sacred living histories, animal nations, plant nations, ceremonies, languages 
and the natural world. The sources of self-determining authority for states are 
much different, originating from colonial policies. For instance, the Doctrine of 
Discovery, dating back to the fifteenth century, espouses that land occupied 
by non-Christians could be legally ‘discovered’ and claimed as territory owned 
by the Crown. Other invented political and legal constructs have also become 
embedded within state legal histories and practices, shaping international 
practices that deny alternative Indigenous conceptions of relations between 
nations.
One example of the tension between state sovereignty and Indigenous self-
determination can be seen in the story of Cayuga chief Deskaheh’s European 
visit, first to the United Kingdom in 1921 and then to the League of Nations in 
1923. In his capacity as the Speaker of the Six Nations of the Haudeno-
saunee, he felt compelled to make the long trans-Atlantic journey as conflicts 
between the Haudenosaunee and Canadian peoples had reached an 
impasse. He felt it unjust that his people were being imprisoned for protesting 
the Canadian state’s imposition of its self-declared sovereignty over their 
lands, claiming it to be tantamount to an invasion and stating that ‘we are 
determined to live the free people that we were born’ (League of Nations 
1923, 3). The lands were, and still are, subject to treaties expressing an 
alternative vision of shared authority over shared lands and mutual respect 
between peoples as equal nations cooperatively governing the same territory 
– an idea that is largely antithetical to the Westphalian vision of exclusive 
territorial authority by one people. However, Chief Deskaheh’s appeals fell on 
deaf ears in both London and Geneva as the states concerned refused to 
interfere in the domestic affairs of one of their peers, namely Canada 
(Corntassel 2008). He eventually left Europe empty-handed, dying soon after 
in 1925 in New York state, exiled from his homeland that had by then been all 
but overrun by the Canadian settler state.
Some progress has been made since Chief Deskaheh’s time and now 
appears in prominent places. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
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Peoples (UNDRIP) urges states to recognise that ‘Indigenous peoples have 
the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development’ (United Nations General Assembly 2007: 3). There is also 
momentum within the United Nations to support what many consider the heart 
of self-determination – namely, an Indigenous veto over all matters affecting 
them, their communities and their territories. On the surface, the Declaration 
seems to secure for Indigenous nations powers previously extended only to 
states. As White Face (2013) points out, conspiring states refused to adopt it 
until it included limiting language that eventually made its way into Article 46, 
which states that ‘nothing in this declaration may be interpreted … or 
construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember 
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign 
and independent states’ (United Nations General Assembly 2007: 14). Article 
46 can be seen as perpetuating the above-mentioned Doctrine of Discovery 
or at least its impacts despite its formal repudiation in 2012. Unfortunately, the 
legal fictions of the Doctrine of Discovery via Article 46 of the UNDRIP as well 
as other inter-state legal instruments continue to impact Indigenous nations in 
profound and destructive ways that undermine their self-determining authority 
(Miller et al. 2010; Special Rapporteur 2010).
Indigenous self-determination should not be confused with the self-
determination efforts of non-state nations like Québec, Catalonia, Palestine or 
Kurdistan. Hoping to achieve the successes of East Timor or South Sudan, 
these national movements desire a state of their own so that they can be 
included as fully-fledged members within the inter-state system as it currently 
exists. Indigenous self-determination movements, on the other hand, mount a 
more robust and fundamental challenge to the system itself. Even if most 
Indigenous nations do not seek its wholesale elimination, they strive for ways 
of being included on their own terms that tend to reject the Westphalian idea 
of state sovereignty. Given that there are approximately 5,000 Indigenous 
nations throughout the world, there are many ways of asserting self-
determining authority. Many Indigenous alternatives even reject the very idea 
that there should be a robust set of overarching principles that govern 
relations between peoples, arguing that we should be tolerant of a plurality of 
approaches to promoting peace among peoples and with the environments 
that sustain us.
Indigenous perspectives and the Buffalo Treaty
There is an emerging scholarship on Indigenous international relations that 
challenges state-centric expressions of sovereignty and self-determination. 
As Anishinaabe scholar Hayden King (2015, 181) states, ‘in our political 
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worldviews the state and sovereignty melt away’. Indigenous nations have 
expressed solidarity with one another through the establishment of new 
confederacies, treaties and agreements that promote peace, friendship and 
new strategic alliances. Indigenous international relations are enduring and 
sacred, and making treaties with foreign countries has not prevented Indig-
enous nations from continuing their own diplomatic relations with one another. 
For example, the Treaty of Peace, Respect, and Responsibility between the 
Heiltsuk Nation and the Haida Nation (Crist 2014) was the first peace treaty 
between these two nations since the 1850s and was premised on the 
assumption that ‘there are greater troubles facing our lands and waters and 
depletion of resources generated from forces outside of our nations’. The 
Treaty was enacted between the two Indigenous nations through a potlatch 
ceremony and sought to challenge a common threat posed by the state-
sanctioned commercial herring fishery in Heiltsuk waters.  
In 2014, another historic treaty was initiated between Indigenous nations 
living along the medicine line (the United States-Canada border). Iiniiwa, 
which is the Blackfoot name for bison, have a deep, longstanding relationship 
with the land, people and cultural practices of prairie ecosystems. When 
discussing the role of the bison on their homelands, Blackfoot scholar Leroy 
Little Bear (2014) pointed out that 
[a]cting as a natural bio-engineer in prairie landscapes, they 
shaped plant communities, transported and recycled nutrients, 
created habitat variability that benefited grassland birds, 
insects and small mammals, and provided abundant food 
resources for grizzly bears, wolves and humans. 
Unfortunately, the widespread slaughter of bison in the nineteenth century led 
to the deterioration of the prairie ecosystems and with this the health and 
wellbeing of Blackfeet people. The decimation of the bison also impacted the 
cultural practices of the region’s Indigenous peoples, which has prompted the 
need for community-led action to restore the iiniiwa to Indigenous homelands.
On 23 September 2014, eight Indigenous nations (the Blackfeet Nation, Blood 
Tribe, Siksika Nation, Piikani Nation, the Assiniboine and Gros Ventre Tribes 
of Fort Belknap Indian Reservation, the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of Fort 
Peck Indian Reservation, the Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Confederated 
Salish and Kootenai Indian Reservation, and the Tsuu T’ina Nation) gathered 
in Blackfeet territory near Browning, Montana to sign the historic Buffalo 
Treaty. It involved Indigenous nations on both sides of the medicine line and 
called for the return of iiniiwa to the prairie ecosystems. Given that it was the 
first cross-border Indigenous treaty signed in over 150 years, the Buffalo 
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Treaty was also a way of renewing and regenerating old alliances. It outlined 
several community-led goals, including engaging tribes and First Nations in 
continuing dialogue on iiniiwa conservation; uniting the political power of the 
tribes and First Nations of the Northern Great Plains; advancing an 
international call for the restoration of the iiniiwa; engaging youth in the treaty 
process and strengthening and renewing ancient cultural and spiritual 
relationships with iiniiwa and grasslands in the Northern Great Plains.
As an example of Indigenous international relations, the above-mentioned 
treaty provisions demonstrate the sacred nature of treaty-making as a way for 
Indigenous nations ‘to extend their relationships of connection to all of the 
different peoples of the world’ (Williams 1997, 50). In addition to having 
Indigenous nations as signatories, the Buffalo Treaty also outlines a vision for 
the involvement of federal, state and provincial governments, as well as 
farmers, ranchers and conservation groups in the restoration of iiniiwa to 
Indigenous homelands. As individual Indigenous nations, these communities 
would have a limited ability to promote iiniiwa restoration. However, with a 
unified vision, they collectively exerted their self-determining authority to 
facilitate the return of iiniiwa to some 6.3 million acres of their homelands. 
The Buffalo Treaty is also a living document that requires periodic renewal 
and re-interpretation. Two years after the Treaty was signed, the number of 
signatories had gone from eight to 21. In September 2016, signatories held a 
pipe ceremony in Banff National Park to honour the planned reintroduction of 
sixteen iiniiwa to the area. In addition to restoring the buffalo population, 
signatories called on the Government of Alberta in Canada to change the 
name of Tunnel Mountain in Banff to Sacred Buffalo Guardian Mountain. The 
vision for the regeneration and perpetuation of iiniiwa also entails changing 
the landscape to reflect the places where the iiniiwa live. New forms of 
Indigenous treaty-making reflect the complex diplomacies and spiritual re-
awakenings that constitute Indigenous inter-national relations.
Conclusion
A power imbalance, and differences in worldviews, between states and 
Indigenous nations remains in our international system. Developments and 
critiques within the discipline of IR, and how it is theorised, highlight the 
struggle of Indigenous peoples to maintain their place-based existence so 
that their lands, cultures, communities and relationships will flourish for 
generations to come. Indigenous understandings of international relations 
come in many forms, whether through reinvigorating treaties with the natural 
world, (re)establishing alliances between Indigenous peoples or Indigenous 
advocacy in diplomatic activities within global forums. These efforts challenge 
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the dominant state-centric system to include their different ways of 
understanding and structuring relations not just between peoples, but with the 
natural world and the planet. More specifically, they challenge the West-
phalian notion of ultimate state sovereignty and seek ways of restoring self-
determining authority regarding their relationships to their homelands and 
nations. 
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A Contemporary Perspective on 
Realism
FELIX RÖSCH & RICHARD NED LEBOW
Since the end of the Cold War realism has returned to its roots. Realist 
scholars show renewed interest in their foundational thinkers, their tragic 
understanding of life and politics, their practical concern for ethics and their 
understanding of theory as the starting point for explanatory narratives or 
forward-looking forecasts that are highly context dependent. Despite their 
different perspectives on world politics, the writings of Thucydides, Niccolò 
Machiavelli, Edward Hallett Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, Arnold Wolfers, John 
Herz, Hans Morgenthau and Hannah Arendt demonstrate a remarkable unity 
of thought as they were driven by similar concerns about ‘perennial problems’ 
(Morgenthau 1962, 19). One of these problems is the depoliticisation of 
societies. Realists were concerned that, in modern societies, people could no 
longer freely express their interests in public, losing the ability to collectively 
contribute to their societies. Consequently, realism can be perceived as a 
critique of and ‘corrective’ (Cozette 2008, 12) to this development. It may 
seem strange at first, but one way to see how realism relates to today’s world 
is to look back to its roots – via its earlier scholars – rather than dwell on 
some of the later developments in realist theory, such as neorealism. For this 
reason, this chapter will revisit realism to offer a contemporary perspective on 
what is, most probably, the oldest theory of IR and, most certainly, IR’s most 
significant theory family.
The basics of a contemporary perspective on realism
Mid-twentieth century realists, often called ‘classical’ realists, were a diverse 
group of scholars. Although their geographical centre was in the United 
States (with some exceptions), many of them were émigrés from Europe who 
had been forced to leave due to the rise of fascism and communism in the 
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1930s. Although they shared a common humanistic worldview in the sense 
that they had received similar extensive secondary schooling in liberal arts 
and believed that people can only experience themselves as human beings 
by engaging with others in the public sphere, their diversity is also evidenced 
in their wide range of professions. Given that IR was only gradually 
institutionalised in Europe when the first chair was set up in light of the 
horrors of the First World War at the university in Aberystwyth in 1919, none 
of them were trained as an IR scholar. Instead, they were historians, 
sociologists, philosophers, lawyers and even theologians. Only retrospect-
ively were many of them linked to IR. Even Morgenthau, arguably the best-
known realist, held a professorship for political science and history, not for 
International Relations. Despite this diversity, however, mid-twentieth century 
realists agreed on a tragic vision of life – a view they shared with many of 
their predecessors (Lebow 2003; Williams 2005). This is because people, 
and more so leaders, have to make decisions on the basis of incomplete 
information, deal with unpredictability of their actions and cope with 
irreconcilable value conflicts within and among societies. Above all, they 
recognise that leaders must sometimes resort to unethical means (such as 
violence) to achieve laudable ends – and without prior knowledge that these 
means will accomplish the ends they seek.
This tragic outlook is understandable if we consider the contexts in which 
these classical realists wrote. Thucydides lived during the times of the 
Peloponnesian War in which Athens lost its pre-eminence in the ancient 
Greek world. Machiavelli’s life was also influenced by repetitive conflicts in 
which papal, French, Spanish and other forces aimed to seize control over 
Northern Italy during the Renaissance Wars (1494–1559). Modern realists 
finally experienced with the rise of ideologies the climax of a development 
that had started almost two hundred years earlier. Since the Age of 
Enlightenment culminating in the French Revolution, people were freed from 
religious straightjackets. But simultaneously they had lost a sense of 
community that ideologies such as nationalism, liberalism or Marxism could 
only superficially restore – and often only at the cost of violent conflicts. 
Realists shared public sentiments that losing this sense of community caused 
a decline of commonly accepted values as exemplified in the German debate 
on a cultural crisis during the early decades of the twentieth century. This 
made them more susceptible to the temptations of ideologies. This is 
because ideologies provide what Arendt (1961, 469) called ‘world 
explanations’, enabling people to channel their human drives into them.
John Herz (1951) argued that the drive for self-preservation, which ensures 
that people care about their survival in the world by seeking food and shelter, 
provokes a security dilemma because people can never be certain to avoid 
attacks from others. Morgenthau (1930), by contrast, was more concerned 
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about the drive to prove oneself, achieved by making contributions to one’s 
social-political life worlds. Success is difficult because people have incom-
plete knowledge about themselves and their life-worlds. Any political decision 
must always be temporary and subject to revision if circumstances change or 
knowledge is being advanced. In realising that their ambitions are in vain, 
another tragic aspect of life comes to the fore. For Morgenthau, accepting this 
tragic aspect is a first step toward transcending it; people can reflect critically 
about their existence and come to understand that only through their own 
efforts can life become meaningful. In modernity, however, having lost values 
as a basis to make informed judgements, peoples’ lives are characterised by 
what Steven Toulmin (1990, 35) called a ‘quest for certainty’, but very few 
manage to deal with the hardships self-critical contemplation entails. Most, as 
Nietzsche noted, content themselves with the illusions of being embedded in 
some form of community. Therefore, on the level of nation-states tragedy 
looms large because people live in political communities that are charac-
terised by the same deficiencies that hamper the human condition.
Given that these drives affect people on every level, realists do not 
distinguish between domestic and international politics. Rather, they focus on 
political communities however they may be conceived because it is through 
peoples’ relations that these human drives start to affect politics. In these 
relations, power plays a decisive role. Due to the drive to prove oneself, a 
balance of power evolves in interpersonal, intergroup and international 
relations to counter ambitions of political actors to gain the ability to dominate 
others. This balance of power is not stable but evolving because actors face a 
security dilemma, meaning that, due to uncertainty, actors live in constant 
fear. This compels them to amass further power, only causing the same 
reaction in their potential adversaries. Hence, it is less physical or material 
constraints that lead to a balance of power and more emotional insecurity. 
Ironically, therefore, balance of power works best when needed least because 
if people and communities share some form of common identity, they can 
cooperate more easily and do not require a balance of power.
However, human drives have an even more dramatic effect on societies 
beyond the evolvement of a balance of power, as they can depoliticise them. 
This concern is central to the realist thought of Hans J. Morgenthau. He 
opposed the more common friend enemy/distinction and defined the political 
as a universal force that is inherent in every human and that necessarily 
focuses on others, while at the same time it only comes into being in inter-
personal relationships. The resulting discussions, in which people express 
their interests, create an ‘arena of contestation’ (Galston 2010, 391). 
Realising their individual capabilities and experiencing power through acting 
together, people develop their identities, as they gain knowledge about 
themselves and their life-worlds. 
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The tragedy of human imperfection, however, endangers the political, as it 
fosters the development of ideologies. Given that most people cannot face 
their imperfections, ideologies offer some form of ontological security. This 
means that ideologies provide people with a sense of order and it helps them 
to conceal the initial meaninglessness of life, as ideologies offer explanations 
to historical and current socio-political events. Particularly fascism and comm-
unism occupied the minds of classical realists, as they were the most violent 
ideologies during their lifetime, but they were also critical of the hubris of 
American liberalism and nationalism in general.
For realists, ideologies aim to retain the socio-political status quo and any 
human activity is geared towards sustaining this reification. The current socio-
political reality is perceived as given and it cannot be fundamentally altered. 
The development of the political as a realm in which people can voice their 
interests freely and share their thoughts about the composition and purpose 
of their political community endangers the socio-political status quo, as it 
potentially encourages socio-political change. To cope with this depoliticis-
ation, realists put forward what can be called an ‘ethics of responsibility’, to 
use Max Weber’s term. Although realists were convinced that most people 
would be unwilling or incapable of taking responsibility for their lives, they still 
argued for an ethics in which decision-making is guided by ‘intellectual 
honesty’ (Sigwart 2013, 429). Thoughts and beliefs have to be contextualised 
in a self-critical process that demonstrates empathy towards the position of 
others. The resulting ‘discourse ethic’, as Arendt called it, can only happen in 
collectivity. American town hall meetings provided the perfect setting for 
Arendt to illustrate this, as they allow all people who share a common interest 
to congregate. As a consequence, however, people have to be prepared to 
change their positions and be willing to take responsibility for the moral 
dilemmas of (inter)national politics.
Contrary to common assumptions, realists are not apologists of the nation-
state, but critical of it, aiming to avoid its dangers and transcend its 
shortcomings by investigating the potential of a world-state (Scheuerman 
2011). For a variety of reasons, classical realists considered states to be 
‘blind and potent monster[s]’ (Morgenthau 1962, 61). They are blind because 
globalisation and technological advancements not only hinder them from 
fulfilling their role of providing security, but endanger life on earth altogether. 
Particularly strong versions of this critique can be found in Aron, Herz and 
Morgenthau. The latter provided a disenchanted view on the prospects of 
humanity in one of his last public appearances, arguing that we are living in a 
‘dream world’ because nation-states can no longer uphold the claim to have a 
monopoly of power over a given territory due to the development of nuclear 
weapons. Furthermore, the squandering of natural resources threatens the 
environment, leading to a ‘society of waste’ (Morgenthau 1972, 23). However, 
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nation-states are also potent because in gaining sovereignty over a specific 
territory and a specific group of people, they exert violence on these people 
and on others. Nation-states universalise their own standards and even try to 
impose them onto others, as evidenced in the rise of fascism during the early 
twentieth century in Europe. After seizing power in countries like Italy, 
Germany, Spain and Croatia, fascist movements not only waged wars 
internationally (ultimately leading to the Second World War) but also exerted 
violence domestically by ostracising ethical, religious and socio-political 
minorities. Furthermore, technological advancements complicate human life-
worlds, accelerating socio-political decision-making processes. This benefited 
the development of scientific elites, who are unaccountable to the public, but 
who in their attempt to socially plan the world affect people in their everyday 
lives greatly.
Classical realist perspectives on the European migration crisis
Since 2011, millions of people have become displaced from Syria due to the 
civil war there. This has been exacerbated by migration flows coming from 
other states in Africa and the Middle East due to various political and 
economic circumstances. By 2015 the issue had been declared a crisis in 
Europe – the destination for many of the migrants. Focusing on this crisis 
might not seem to be an obvious choice, but many realists were refugees or 
migrants themselves. Indeed, Herz (1984, 9) characterised himself as a 
‘traveller between all worlds’ and Morgenthau was even a ‘double exile’ 
(Frankfurter 1937) after his expulsion from Germany and later Spain before 
arriving in the United States in 1937. Beyond this point, realism provides 
useful insights into this crisis as we can investigate the conditions for a 
peaceful coexistence of differences. This is important, as the refugee issue 
has been identified as one of the reasons why the British public voted to 
leave the European Union (EU) in the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum. It has also 
been implicated in the rise of right-wing parties throughout Europe and the 
victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election. Refugees and 
migrants are clearly being pictured in security discourses as a threat – and to 
measurable effects.
Relating the work of mid-twentieth century ‘classical’ realists to this modern 
development enables IR scholarship to understand that security is estab-
lished in a discursive context, making it dependent on spatio-temporal 
conditions. This means security has different meanings in different contexts 
and therefore it is transformative (Behr 2013, 169). This puts realist thought 
into affinity with the critical theories that ostensibly seem opposed to it. Given 
that both groupings found stimulation in the same sources, one of which was 
Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia (1929), this is unsurprising. One of the 
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key concepts in Mannheim’s book is the conditionality of knowledge. This 
means that knowledge is always bound to the socio-political environment in 
which it operates, stressing that universal knowledge is impossible. Applying 
this notion to the current refugee crisis, we understand that perceiving 
refugees as a threat to security is the result of human will and political 
agency. For example, the refugee crisis was one of the dominant drivers of 
British Brexit-discourses, although the UK received fewer than 40,000 asylum 
seekers in 2015. By comparison, approximately 890,000 refugees chose 
Germany as their destination the same year, making Germany the European 
country that accepts most refugees in relation to the overall population.
This is not to say that this process always takes place consciously as we can 
never be entirely sure how our writings or actions are perceived by others, but 
classical realism can help us to understand that humans are not only the 
objects of security but also its subjects. In public discourses, people have the 
opportunity to redefine the substance of security, instead of leaving it to 
international foreign policy elites. These discourses can evolve violently, as 
they include the interests of all involved people. To avoid this looming danger, 
realists stress the possibility of dialogical learning, as current scholarship 
calls it, to increase the potential to morph these discourses into a common 
good. This form of learning is based on continuous possibilities of exchange 
between refugees, migrants and local people and it requires all groups to 
demonstrate open-mindedness and empathy as well as the willingness to 
challenge one’s own positions. As a result, security can be redefined and 
what is perceived to be a crisis can be eventually understood as an 
opportunity to create something ‘which did not exist before, which was not 
given, not even as an object of cognition or imagination’ (Arendt 1961, 151).
Recall that classical realists were sceptical of the promises of modern nation-
states and argued for the establishing of a world community, eventually 
leading to a world state. Such a global community would help to transcend 
the depolitisation in modern societies and even support ‘defenders of the 
global state to stay sober’ (Scheuerman 2011, 150). Such sobriety would be 
beneficial to add to the academic and political debate on migration. After all, 
the root of the migration crisis in Europe was that certain states, and certain 
influential groups within them, decided to enforce the metaphorical and 
physical walls of their borders and limit (or block) migrants from entering due 
to perceiving them as a security threat to their nation. By enabling people to 
get together on different levels, political spheres can extrapolate beyond 
national borders, allowing people to exchange their interests globally and 
gradually develop an identity that goes beyond that of the state. It also allows 
for different images of the migrant, or the refugee, to gain traction – to replace 
the negative ones that became widespread in Europe by 2015.
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The flexibility found within the classical realist literature allows people to 
accommodate diverse human interests. The resulting self-reflexivity and 
open-mindedness helps life trajectories influenced by different historical, 
cultural, socio-political or religious factors to be accepted. In political spheres, 
people are acknowledged for their differences and, through discussion, a 
common ground is established that is at least acceptable to citizens at a basic 
level. If this can be done within each state, then it is possible that it can be 
done at the global level. If such an end can be attained then there will be no 
migration crises in the future as a global citizenry will exist. Classical realists 
did not arrive at this conclusion straight away. Rather, scholars like 
Morgenthau and Niebuhr were sceptical at first of international organisations 
like the United Nations and the early forms of the European Union. However, 
they soon realised that they provide the space (if used as they had hoped) for 
the political to gradually evolve, as different actors can get together peacefully 
and exchange their ideas at the international level.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have introduced a perspective on realism that is probably 
unlike what may be found in other IR theory textbooks. It was our ambition to 
introduce students to a more nuanced perspective on realism, to set it apart 
from neorealism, and to demonstrate that realism can help us to develop a 
more critical awareness of international politics. Realism, especially in its 
classical form, is therefore far from being ready for the dustbin of the history 
of IR theory – as some critics suggest. It can serve as a stepping stone to 
question some of the common assumptions held in the discipline, propose 
solutions to some of the contemporary problems in international relations and 
show us how we can create more inclusive societies.
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The ‘Isms’ Are Evil. All Hail the 
‘Isms’!
ALEX PRICHARD
In this concluding chapter I want to explore some of the problems that come 
with classifying IR theory in the way we do. I want to open up a problem. Why 
is it we call theories of world politics theories and not ideologies? To answer 
this question I will engage in a bit of metatheory – that is, theory about theory 
– to expose some of the complexities and problems that emerge once we 
think a little more deeply about how the ‘isms’ can and ought to be used. The 
point of this chapter is to help you to think theoretically about how the 
previous chapters in this book hang together. In other words, while you might 
have already spotted shared characteristics of the various ‘isms’, in this 
chapter I want to give you the tools to understand why those commonalities 
exist at all. 
In short, the argument is that IR theories should be understood not only as 
theories but also as ideologies. The proximity and difference between 
theories and ideologies will become clearer as we progress, but the key point 
I want to make is that when we understand the ideological element in IR 
theory, we are better able to think critically about the enterprise of dividing IR 
up as a set of isms in the first place. 
The chapter starts with a quick overview of the rise and fall of the isms in 
political studies and IR theory. Funnily enough, for many people we live in a 
post-ideological age, and the fact IR theorists talk about theories and not 
ideologies is manifest evidence of that. I then discuss some reasons we 
should reject the isms as a way of compartmentalising philosophical thinking 
in IR, and show how concept analysis and ideology critique are good alter-
natives. But I close by arguing that we need ideologies and our isms not only 
to help frame explanations of world politics but also as raw material for 
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exposing the political and moral assumptions scholars work with. Hopefully, 
this final chapter should encourage you to be both playful and experimental 
with IR theory.
An ‘ism’ is a suffix that denotes a more or less systematic set of beliefs, 
opinions, and/or values about the world. The suffix is added when something 
moves from being quite specific to encompassing more expansive or general 
views, beliefs and attitudes. For example, Philippines president Rodrigo 
Duterte may have general views that are unique to him, but until he or anyone 
else systematises them into a coherent worldview, we are unlikely to start 
talking about Duterteism in the same way we would of Marxism for example. 
The isms become even more expansive when more than one person 
contributes to or develops the initial set of views. Contemporary Marxism 
incorporates a vast array of ideas and theories, approaches, epistemologies 
and ontologies. Indeed, other isms add a large measure of Marxism to their 
own too, mainly to distinguish them from other sub-types. For example, there 
can be both orthodox or heterodox Marxism or liberal feminism and Marxist 
feminism, and so forth. In short, in political science the isms generally denote 
ideologies and their refinements. 
In IR, however, we think of the isms as theories, not ideologies, which is odd. 
Why do we call Marxism a theory in IR, but an ideology in political science? 
This is not just a semantic issue. In fact it goes to the core of what IR thought 
of itself in the period in which it emerged as a stand-alone social science at 
the turn of the twentieth century. The reason IR scholars spoke of theory 
rather than ideology at this time was that it was generally held that 
international relations were not amenable to the totalising visions of the good 
life that we find elaborated in the architecture of the main ideologies (Wight 
1966). Realists prided themselves on their ability to cut through the moral 
haze of world politics to the perennial problems of world politics. Realism was 
not an ideology, but increasingly came to be seen as a simple set of universal 
truths about politics. 
This tendency to distinguish IR theory from ideologies was cemented at the 
end of the Cold War when almost everyone else also became post-
ideological. This had a number of core features. The end of the Cold War 
galvanised a widespread consensus that liberalism was no longer an 
ideology, but was instead given in the structures of history, which, according 
to Francis Fukuyama (1989), were now coming to fruition signifying an ‘end of 
history’. The Soviet Union, the counter-hegemonic power that offered the only 
existing alternative to Western liberalism, had fallen. For many, such as 
Fukuyama, this meant that we were entering a post-ideological age, an age in 
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which the dominance of liberalism and the demise of its main challengers – 
fascism and communism – meant there simply were no other ideologies 
around, making liberalism the truth revealed at the end of history. Part of this 
account of liberalism, however, involved a very particular conception of 
human rationality, one in which maximising your self-interest was said to be 
both rational and a universal feature of the human psyche.
Institutionalism, methodological individualism and rationalism are all theor-
etical concepts. These are concepts that just ‘do a job’, words that have little 
invested in them politically, at least on the face of it. Those who deploy such 
words usually pride themselves on their non-ideological approach to theory 
development, proposing that concepts like these are scientific tools instead. 
These tools cut through the fluff of ideology to see what really motivates 
people. By these ‘rationalist’ accounts, it was not communism but self-interest 
that motivated the Soviets. Furthermore, it was not a global genuflection 
before this or that ideology that would bring order to the world, as the conflict 
between the Communists and Capitalists suggested, but the rather more 
mundane claim that ‘institutions matter’ (Keohane and Martin 1995) in helping 
interests align (Jahn 2009).  
One might think that the left would have persisted in its critique of the 
covering up of the ideological content of liberal science, but oddly enough, 
large parts of the left also adopted their own variation of post-ideological 
thinking, around the same time. Poststructuralist theory took off at the end of 
the Cold War. One of the most significant criticisms of ideologies developed 
by poststructuralists cast them as visions of the world and history that were 
more significant as modes of power than descriptively accurate statements 
about the world and its history. Liberalism, and neoliberalism, were re-
described as modes of (self-)governance rather than explanations of how the 
world worked. Once we accept assumptions about rationality we become the 
self-interested person the theory was only supposed to describe. Ideologies 
produce political subjects. In this way, ideologies came to be seen as 
inherently regulative and dominating; they were not descriptions of the world, 
but ways of making us act in it.
By the late 1990s these contesting philosophical and world historical changes 
had broken ashore in International Relations. Here, ideologies were re-
described as ‘theories’, the details of which you can access in the preceding 
pages of this book. Few if any of the contributors speak of their various 
theories as ideological. To do so would be to invite all sorts of criticism. To 
recap only the criticisms above, ideologies are seen to be unscientific, 
dominating, moralising. In a word: finished. Theories, by contrast, are scien-
tific, somewhat testable, at least nominally depoliticised, and lack the world 
148The ‘Isms’ Are Evil. All Hail the ‘Isms’!
historical and totalising visions of the good life we usually associate with 
ideologies. But, in IR, each ism has developed a cottage industry of its own, 
with its own specialist journals and degree programmes. In spite of this 
(perhaps because of it, who knows), almost no one debates between the 
theories any more. The great debates that were central to the discipline in the 
past seem to have faded, though there is increasing evidence that they were 
never really debates, let alone great (Wilson 1998)! Ironically, the isms we are 
dealing with in this book have never been more entrenched in the field, but 
nor have they been so little used as weapons by their various protagonists. 
We have, according to one recent view, come to ‘the end of IR theory’ 
(Dunne, Hansen and Wight 2013).
If we are not talking about ideologies in IR theory, what are we talking about? 
For David Lake (2011), we are talking about academic sects that have 
developed around each of the isms. These sects demand advanced students 
(usually those embarking on PhD studies) put themselves into a box, adopt 
an ism for life and then continue to specialise in the rituals and codas of these 
‘theologies’. Eventually, the ability of advanced scholars to think beyond or 
across and between the isms simply falls away. In our attempt to update each 
ism to meet the demands of the latest ‘real world’ event, the isms become all 
the more narrowly defined, or stretched to become so broadly defined as to 
make them practically ideologies. Either way, they become unhooked from 
the historical, social and geopolitical context in which they emerged. We then 
start repeating phrases like ‘institutions matter’ without understanding how 
they mattered during the Cold War and might matter in different ways today. 
This is known as ‘reification’. 
However, Lake understood theory in a way that made a categorical distinction 
between ideologies, theologies, philosophising and theory. For Lake, the isms 
are far broader categories of thought than theories. Theories posit the relat-
ionship between variables and generate testable hypotheses, while traditions 
are messier, unsystematic confluences of ideas that people need to straighten 
out in order to pull out those hypotheses. 
For example, both liberalism and realism come from wider, more long-
standing ideological traditions, but to make them theories of IR some core 
principles had to be identified. In this case, both traditions share the view that 
anarchy and material interests are key features of world politics, but they add 
additional variables to generate different theories. In pursuing this general 
pattern of 1) elaborating general assumption, 2) positing the relations of 
theoretical concepts, 3) generating testable hypotheses, there is no question 
that what counts as theory, what counts as evidence and what counts as 
viable IR subject matter narrows exponentially. Lake assumes that IR theories 
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aspire to be scientific in a very narrow sense of that word (Lake 2011, 470), 
and then he says that those that don’t are not really appropriate for IR. Meta-
theoretical questions (again, theory about theory) – such as whether history 
has an end point or whether history is shaped by material forces or by ideas – 
are unscientific questions that are without final answers. Rather, we should 
focus on what he calls ‘mid-level theory’ – that is, hypotheses that can be 
tested against the empirical evidence: questions like, which institutions best 
limit violence? This is how Lake thinks we will come to understand how the 
world actually works, not through speculative philosophy.
This request for IR theory to ask what appear to be simpler questions is 
somewhat problematic. Lake’s solution asks us to ignore the deeply 
ideological nature of the concepts we use routinely in IR’s theories. Because 
we can no longer ask speculative questions about the coherence of back-
ground assumptions and concepts, like what is capitalism, for example, we 
end up treating the already existing stock of IR theory as the extent of the 
material we might need from which to draw testable hypotheses. The fact that 
there is little consensus on what the state is, let alone whether it is the best 
institution to constrain violence, is hugely significant. 
Paradoxically then, Lake’s criticisms make IR theories, particularly the more 
esoteric ones, sound very much like ideologies, but the point is that all 
theories are ideologies. What he is unwilling to countenance is that his 
preferred approach is itself deeply infused with a standard notion of science 
that is also itself ideological: positivism (another ism). By this account, true 
knowledge is knowledge that is empirically verifiable, and only what we can 
experience counts as true evidence. But we could not know this about Lake 
unless we had a broad understanding of scientific ideologies too, like 
positivism and empiricism, such that we would be tooled to expose his 
underlying assumptions (Jackson 2011). Nothing is gained by exercising the 
sleight of hand so common in contemporary Anglo-American IR of declaiming 
everything but science to be ideological. 
Before proposing a way out of this problem, let us quickly survey some of the 
problems that emerge when students do not think clearly about what isms are 
and what we are using the isms for. One might assume from the above that 
IR is better off without its isms and in some respects that is probably right. 
There is nothing to be gained for students or researchers by thinking that the 
isms are self-contained hypothesis generators. Nor should we welcome 
theories that purport to be able to explain everything, offering remedies to fix 
the world as general conclusions. I think anyone would be rightly suspicious 
of this. But there is a real problem with thinking about isms in this way in the 
first place – and we don’t have to. 
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What if we change what we think ideologies are? Would this help us rethink 
the isms in IR too?
Ideologies are wondrous, porous, complex and evolving things that give us a 
unique insight into the structure of collective thought. Two well-known appro-
aches to ideologies should open up what I mean here. 
For the first approach, let’s consider ideologies as a network of concepts, with 
the core concepts acting as nodes to which peripheral ones attach and 
disconnect as they evolve over time (Freeden 1996). So, for example, while 
liberty might be central to liberalism, peripheral concepts like white 
supremacy or democracy have receded and advanced in importance over 
time (respectively). Likewise, we should probably understand that concepts 
are used in particular historical contexts, which means they might have 
different meanings to the way we use them now (Berenskoetter 2016). 
Concepts like the state are themselves generative of isms, while particular 
meanings of a given concept can only be understood in terms of that ism. 
For example, could we really understand what liberalism is without an under-
standing of what contemporary liberals mean by liberty? And which comes 
first, the ideology or the concept? This is not a frivolous argument, because 
unless we can adequately grasp the historical specificity of the language we 
use, we will be tempted to simply assume this is how our language has 
always been used, leaving us ‘bewitched’ by the present (Skinner 1998).
Once we start to interrogate key concepts, their logic, coherence and their 
relation to other concepts, we can map the relations of ideologies to one 
another. For example, both realism and liberalism share core concepts like 
anarchy, the state, material power and so on. But the relative importance of 
each can only really be understood once we see how ‘peripheral’ and other 
‘core’ concepts are deployed in relation to one another, like cooperation or 
capitalism, institutions or hegemony. Have you ever wondered why you agree 
with some aspects of an ideology but not with others and agonised about how 
you can make sense of your split loyalty? This way of understanding the 
structure of ideologies better shows us the interconnected tapestry of 
ideologies, something we need to get used to – a worthwhile endeavour for 
students of IR to do with all the theories presented in this book.
So, ideologies then, like theories, are tapestries of concepts. But, let’s take 
another step back and engage in some ideology critique to explore the 
second approach. What made it possible to dream up a theory like realism or 
liberalism in the first place? With the exception of postcolonialism and 
feminism, most IR theories were, broadly speaking, developed in the West by 
151 International Relations Theory
white men, predominantly from the top 1–2% of income earners, or the upper 
middle class. In fact, it took the emergence of feminist and postcolonial 
theorists to point this out. To do this, these theorists had to develop complex 
accounts of the world and how it hung together that took on the core concepts 
and assumptions of the mainstream. Contrary to Lake, it was only because 
feminists and postcolonial theorists (amongst others) probed the existential 
concepts and categories that theoretical development was possible at all. 
And, this involved exposing IR theories as ideological. This is how dialectical 
thought operates. It explores the conditions of possibility of a given way of 
thinking, whether that is conceptual coherence, historical specificity or what-
ever, and then pushes beyond it. 
It is not important whether IR theories are true or not. What matters is 
whether they help shape our thinking such that they can guide action, 
scholarly, political or theological. It is because they guide action, shape it, 
constrain it and make sense of it that ideologies and theories should be con-
tinually scrutinised. Ideologies are the background cognitive, moral structures 
that shape societies and reflect their differences, and so understanding how 
they operate will tell us a huge amount about the world we live in.
Let’s try something: turn on your television. Is there not a striking sameness 
to the stuff that is broadcast in most countries – especially Western ones? It’s 
not just that there are a lot of programmes on cooking and real estate, but 
that the underlying assumptions behind the programmes have a certain 
resonance. You don’t find presenters of real estate shows lamenting the 
unjust structures of capitalism or proclaiming that property is theft! Rather, 
there is a shared sense of the inevitability of the logic of property ownership 
or that the objective is to secure the highest price possible. Think about the 
way boys and girls are differently appealed to in the cartoons they watch, with 
gendered roles almost routinely given rather than questioned. 
As Steve Smith (2007, 8) has argued, ‘the option of non-theoretical accounts 
of the world is simply not available’. As such, you need to familiarise yourself 
with what theory is, how it works and how it shapes the way you see the 
world. Ideology critique explores the ways in which communication in general 
is constrained and circumscribed by taken-for-granted ideas, concepts, 
attitudes and theories, or the way normal language is theory bound and 
theory dependent. Theories, then, IR theories too, are themselves reflections 
of ideology. They should be subjected to critique in the same way.
Conclusion 
Think of the isms and a broad understanding of them in three ways: 
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First, isms are ideologies and IR theories are ideologically saturated too. This 
is not a bad thing per se. Once we know this we should be able to both 
interrogate the internal coherence of the ideology and compare its virtues with 
others.
Second, ideologies themselves shape the society we live in. So, we ought to 
be able to understand our society and world politics better by exploring the 
ways in which ideologies shape and structure the ways in which people live 
and act. In many respects, then, IR theory reflects these ways of living and 
acting too. Thus, we can think of IR theory as itself an ideological reflection of 
the world around us. R. B. J. Walker (1993, 6) has made the contentious 
suggestion that ‘theories of international relations are more interesting as 
aspects of contemporary world politics that need to be explained than as 
explanations of world politics.’ You might not want to go that far, but there is 
no doubt that there is nothing politically or ideologically neutral about IR 
theory – and locating IR theories in their historical and intellectual context 
exposes this irreversibly. 
Third, ideologies can be wrong, their values reprehensible or odious, their 
core assumptions preposterous. This is because they are used by people 
whose practices and politics we might disagree with. For Robert Cox (1981, 
128), theory is not only always ‘for someone and for some purpose’, but it 
also inevitably reflects class biases. We need to be aware of this and subject 
theory to a range of critiques. Understanding Marxism would be the indis-
pensable precondition of this. Doing this would be impossible if we were to 
deny theory-as-ideologies exist, or if we overlook how deeply implicated in 
ideological structures our modern way of living and thinking are.
Nothing is gained by rejecting the isms unless we at first understand the 
complexity of what it is we are rejecting. The isms may be evil, but we must 
pay due homage to them in order to develop the critical reflection we need to 
move beyond them.
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